NCDDR (2004) Final Report

Peace in Sierra Leone:
Evaluating the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Process
DRAFT
The Final Evaluation of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

Program and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund Supporting DDR
August 2004
Gebreselassie Tesfamichael
Nicole Ball
Julie Nenon
Creative Associates International Inc.

Washington DC
Contents Formatted
Executive Summary ..............................................................................................................v
1 Introduction......................................................................................................................1
2 The Operating Environment.............................................................................................2
2.1 DDR and the Root Causes of War ..........................................................................2
2.2 DDR and the Regional Dimension...........................................................................6
2.3 DDR and the Peace Process...................................................................................7
3 Evolution of the DDR Process .........................................................................................9
3.1 Before 1998.............................................................................................................9
3.2 1998–2004 ............................................................................................................10 Deleted: 9
4 The Challenge of National Ownership ...........................................................................22 Deleted: 21
4.1 Government of Sierra Leone .................................................................................22 Deleted: 21
4.2 Donors...................................................................................................................23 Deleted: 22
4.3 RUF/GOSL ............................................................................................................24 Deleted: 23
5 Core Issues ...................................................................................................................25 Deleted: 24
5.1 Institutional Framework .........................................................................................26
Deleted: 25
5.2 Process Management ...........................................................................................32
Deleted: 31
5.3 Program Design ....................................................................................................33
5.4 Program Implementation .......................................................................................53 Deleted: 32
5.5 Reconciliation ........................................................................................................68 Deleted: 51
5.6 Program Financing ................................................................................................69 Deleted: 65

6 Post-NCDDR Activities ..................................................................................................74 Deleted: 66
7 Lessons Learned ...........................................................................................................76 Deleted: 71
7.1 Political Level ........................................................................................................77 Deleted: 73
7.2 DDR Program Design and Implementation ...........................................................78 Deleted: 74
7.3 Financial Management ..........................................................................................83
Deleted: 75
7.4 Programmatic Management ..................................................................................84
Deleted: 80
7.5 Assistance Targeting Individuals and Communities ..............................................85
Deleted: 81
7.6 Learning from Past Experience .............................................................................87
Deleted: 82
Annex 1. Levels of Disarmament, Demobilization and Discharge by Program Phases ....88 Deleted: 84
Annex 2. Ex-Combatants Participating in Reintegration Services ....................................89 Deleted: 85
Annex 3. Target Ex-combatant Beneficiary Groups and Current Program Participation ..90 Deleted: 86
Annex 4. DDR Institutional Framework.............................................................................91 Deleted: 87
Annex 5. UNICEF Programs for Child Combatants..........................................................92 Deleted: 88
Annex 6. People Interviewed............................................................................................96 Deleted: 89
Annex 7. Documents Reviewed .....................................................................................101
Deleted: 93
Annex 8. Methodology....................................................................................................105
Deleted: 98
Annex 9. Timeline of Key DDR Related Events..............................................................109
Deleted: 102
Annex 10. Terms of Reference.........................................................................................113
Deleted: 106
Tables Deleted: 110

Table 1. Policy Matrix, IPRSP ..............................................................................................5
Table 2. Number of Women Ex-Combatants, by Faction ...................................................44 Deleted: 42
Table 3. Children as Percentage of the Fighting Forces, by Faction..................................47 Deleted: 45
Draft August 2004 ii
Table 4. Estimated Cost of DDR Program..........................................................................70 Deleted: 67

Table 5. Multi-donor Trust Fund Management Costs .........................................................74 Deleted: 71
Boxes
Box 1. Variable Participation in the DDR Process ..............................................................15
Box 2. NCDDR Mandate and Main Reintegration Objectives.............................................35 Deleted: 34
Box 3. Weapons Possession: Appropriate Criteria or Discriminating Factor? ....................39 Deleted: 38
Box 4. Potential Support to Ex-Combatants Undergoing DDR...........................................41 Deleted: 39
Box 6. TEP: Sierra Leone’s Approach to Reintegration......................................................57 Deleted: 55
Box 7. Capacity Constraints on Implementing Reintegration Programs .............................60 Deleted: 58
Box 8. Value of Ex-Combatant Training .............................................................................62 Deleted: 60
The Final Evaluation of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund Supporting DDR
Draft August 2004 iii
Acronyms
AFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary Council

AFSL Armed Forces of Sierra Leone
CAII Creative Associates International Inc.
CDF Civil Defense Forces
CPTF Commonwealth Police Task Force
CRP Community Reintegration Programme (DFID)
Deleted: CRPP
CRRP Community Reintegration and Rehabilitation Project
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DDRP Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Program
DFID Department for International Development (UK)
DPKO Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UN)
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
ECOMOG Monitoring Group of the Economic Community of West African States
ERT Emergency Response Team (UK)
ES/DDR Executive Secretariat of the NCDDR
FMPU Financial Management and Procurement Unit
GOSL Government of Sierra Leone
HSF Human Security Fund
IMC International Medical Corps
IMF International Monetary Fund
INGO International Non-Governmental Organization
IP Implementing Partner
IPRSP Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
IRIN Integrated Regional Information Network (UN)
JOC Joint Operations Center
JOP Joint Operating Plan
LNGO Local Non-Governmental Organization
MDRP Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program
MDTF Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
NaCSA National Committee for Social Action
Draft August 2004 iv
NCDDR National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

NCRRR National Commission on Resettlement, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NPRC National Provisional Ruling Council
OTI Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID)
PAC Project Appraisal Committee
PDO Pre-Discharge Orientation
PPF World Bank Project Preparation Facility
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PWC Price-Waterhouse-Coopers
ROP Reintegration Opportunities Program
RUF Revolutionary United Front
SLA Sierra Leonean Army
SLPP Sierra Leone People’s Party
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General (UN)
TEP Training and Employment Program
TCC Technical Coordination Committee
TSA Transitional Safety Net Allowance
UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNAVEM United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
Deleted: S
UNOMSIL United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNV United Nations Volunteers
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WFP World Food Programme
YRTEP Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace Program, OTI
Draft August 2004 v
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. Introduction
In spring 2004, Creative Associates International Inc. (CAII) was commissioned to carry out
the final evaluation of the Sierra Leone Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
Program (DDRP) and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund supporting the disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process. After a decade of war, and several failed
attempts to achieve sustainable peace, combatants from the main fighting forces, the
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), the Civil Defense Forces (CDF), and the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF), were successfully disarmed, demobilized, and
reintegrated into society by the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization, and
Reintegration (NCDDR) and its partners. The CAII team finds that the DDR process, led by
NCDDR, achieved a high degree of success as a peace-building and conflict mitigation
mechanism. Despite a difficult working environment, the NCDDR managed to disarm,
demobilize, and reintegrate ex-combatants to the extent that a foundation was built for a
durable peace process.
A successful DDR process, such as Sierra Leone’s, helps to create an environment in which
fundamental issues related to the root causes of conflict can be addressed. DDR processes
are not, however, intended to deal directly with issues such as long-term economic and
social rehabilitation and poverty reduction. While some 72,000 ex-combatants were
disarmed and demobilized, and 56,000 participated in NCDDR’s reintegration activities,
these former fighters now face the same problems as citizens of Sierra Leone who did not
take up arms. These problems include lack of full-time, long-term employment
opportunities, particularly for youth; a weak social and economic infrastructure; serious
questions of governmental accountability at all levels; and an uncertain regional
environment. The NCDDR managed a successful transition away from war. As a conflict
resolution mechanism, however, it was never empowered, to address the many problems
that led to the conflict in the first place.
2. DDR and the Root Causes of War
In simple terms, the root causes of the conflict was poverty, poor governance and weak rule
of law, lack of access to services, absence of personal security, and inadequate
employment opportunities. The causes go back to the early 1970s, when then-president
Siaka Stevens gained economic and political dominance by controlling the diamond
industry, exploiting the system of patronage, destroying many political institutions, and ruling
with an autocratic approach. The 1980s were marked by a widening gap between the
political elite, who had access to diamond revenue, and the rest of the population, who
struggled to survive in a collapsed economy and under a corrupt government that provided
few basic services. Years of mismanaged resources, poverty, and corruption had a
particularly significant impact on youth, who grew increasingly frustrated by the lack of
opportunities and felt that the future held very little promise for them. This became a critical
factor in the war.
Draft August 2004 vi
It was against this backdrop, in the late 1980s, that Foday Sankoh went to a military training
camp in Libya, where he met Charles Taylor. The two agreed to support each other in
overthrowing their respective governments using the diamond mines in Sierra Leone to
finance their efforts. Disillusioned and unemployed youth filled the ranks of the rebel army
needed to ignite the conflict, which began in 1991.
3. The Main Points of the NCDDR Program
The effort to end the civil war in Sierra Leone went through a number of stages. Starting in
1996, there was a series of efforts to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate the combatants.
The evaluation team looked at what came to be known as Phase I, Phase II, the Interim
Phase, and Phase III of these efforts (1998 – 2004). Prior to 2000–2001, DDR was
subsumed within the greater strategy of achieving a military solution to the conflict. The
military solution was not only an option for both sides, but in practical terms, it was the
preferred option. Thus, peace efforts collapsed in 1997, 1999, and 2000. These failures did
more than interrupt work to disarm and demobilize soldiers; they led to the re-arming of
some fighters who had previously been disarmed.
The third and final phase of the DDR process, which got underway in May 2001, was
successful largely because the parties to the conflict had all realized that, for a variety of
reasons, military victory was not within their grasp. The Government of Sierra Leone
(GOSL) came to fully understand it could not eliminate the insurgency and could not rely on
the allegiance of its own army. For their part, the rebels factored in British military
intervention and regional developments, particularly the embargo on Liberia and the
precarious position of the government there. These considerations, together with the
change in the leadership of the RUF, resulted in a more robust commitment to the peaceful
resolution of the conflict. The commitment of all parties to the peace process deepened,
and DDR became a means to achieving peace, rather than a tactical maneuver aimed at
buying time.
To understand fully the NCDDR program and its strengths and weaknesses, it is important
to look at the following aspects of the DDRP.
3.1 Institutional Framework
The institutional framework within which the DDR process operated in Sierra Leone
evolved. With time, it became an effective partnership between the GOSL and its
international and domestic partners. The major actors involved in this partnership are
introduced below.
National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (NCDDR).

The NCDDR was a political and policymaking body. It was responsible for developing
policy on DDR and providing overall guidance to the Executive Secretariat. Membership
consisted of representatives from the government, the RUF, the AFRC, the CDF, United
Nations peacekeeping operations, and donors. The establishment of the NCDDR was a
clear demonstration of the government’s commitment to the DDR process specifically and to
Draft August 2004 vii
the peace process in general. It provided a forum for key national stakeholders to come
together and discuss issues.
As a committee, the NCDDR enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy from the rest of
government, which help insulate it from political pressures and bureaucratic constraints. By
Phase III, it gained the confidence not only of the major parties to the peace process but
also of the individual ex-combatants it was set up to serve. The NCDDR became the focal
institution to which ex-combatants could bring their grievances, seek support, and even vent
their frustrations. The fact that it was viewed as an independent civilian institution, staffed
by civilians, assiduously projecting a high level of neutrality in its treatment of the
combatants, also contributed to its success.
The Committee met frequently prior to the breakdown of the peace process in May 2000.
But when it became clear to the GOSL that the RUF was not committed to the peace
process, it significantly reduced the role of the NCDDR.
The government then began to rely more on the NCDDR’s Executive Secretariat as the
implementer of the DDRP, and Technical Coordinating Committees (TCCs), both of which
the government found to be particularly effective in moving the process forward. The TCCs
were made up of representatives from the government, the RUF, the CDF, and the UN.
They deliberated on current issues and problems. They also considered next steps in DDR
program implementation and submitted proposals to a newly-created Joint Committee on
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (the Tripartite Committee) for
consideration and decision
Executive Secretariat of the NCDDR (ES/DDR). Previous DDR processes have

underscored the importance of a national body, centrally located, with high-level
political backing to manage the DDR process. The Sierra Leone experience
confirms this. By all accounts, the executive secretary played a key role in relations
with the government, donors, and former warring factions, particularly after the
change in leadership of the RUF in 2000. The Secretariat was able to forge a strong
partnership with a complex set of stakeholders. In addition to its ties to the
government, former warring parties, and international donors, the Secretariat worked
closely with international and national implementation partners, and civil society and
community organizations.
Financial Management and Procurement Unit (FMPU). DDR is costly, and the
amount of money involved can expose the process to corruption. In Sierra Leone,
the FMPU was created as a mechanism to provide fiduciary safeguards and
technical capacity not available in-country when the peace process began. Along
with a multi-donor trust fund, coordinated by the World Bank, the FMPU was critical
in reassuring everyone involved that money allocated to DDR would be used for
purposes intended. The FMPU protected the Executive Secretariat from political and
personal pressures. By minimizing the opportunities for fraud and leakages, it
enabled Secretariat staff to operate in a transparent and accountable manner.
Key International Partners. The Sierra Leone peace process benefited greatly from the
support of the international community, including regional partners. The nature and scope
Draft August 2004 viii
of the international support provided exceeded that of many previous international

undertakings of a similar nature. The evaluation illustrates this by briefly examining the
policies and activities of the major international partners: the United Nations (especially
UNAMSIL, the World Food Programme, and UNICEF), the World Bank, and the United
Kingdom.
The United Nations played an important political and security role in Sierra Leone, which
evolved over time. UNAMSIL, in particular, was key in implementing the DDRP. The
mission, initially limited to monitoring, was later assigned small-scale operations. Over time,
it became progressively more proactive, while its support for DDR grew more constructive.
Beginning in 1998, the World Food Programme provided much-needed food for the ex-
combatants. UNICEF assumed crucial responsibility for reintegrating child soldiers,
reducing the burden on the NCDDR. Finally, the UN Resident Coordinator was appointed
deputy to the special representative to the secretary general (SRSG). This unusual
appointment promoted collaboration between the UN’s political and security interests, on
the one hand, and its development work, on the other. The UN’s impact in Sierra Leone
increased significantly as a result.
The UN‘s role was not without its shortcomings. Its initial mandate was weak and
interpreted conservatively by UN officials. Other problems included the varying quality of
UN troops, the overly-liberal interpretation of criteria for people being disarmed, and
misinformation provided on program benefits to lure combatants into disarmament process.
During the end of Phase II, weapons collected were not properly disposed of leading to
some being used in the renewed fighting of 2000. The rapid turnover rate of UN troops and
military observers was also a problem, as there was little institutional memory and
relationships constantly had to be recreated.
The United Kingdom’s contribution has been characterized as “crucial but inconsistent
leadership.”1 The UK began support for DDR in Sierra Leone in 1996, providing technical
and financial assistance for disarmament and demobilization activities. It continued to
provide critical political and military support for the GOLS throughout the peace process.
This was especially true during the negotiations for the Lomé agreement and after Lomé
broke down in 2000. Great Britain’s contributions to Sierra Leone are numerous. It assisted
the UN in strengthening UNAMSIL’s operational capacity. It enhanced security through an
active military role in 2000. It provided support for various aspects of the Security Sector
Reform Programme, including strengthening and restructuring the police and developing the
new Sierra Leone Army. Throughout, the UK provided critical political support for the DDR
process in Sierra Leone and in international fora. At the same time, the removal of support
at a critical moment in the DDR process, particularly the precipitous withdrawal of the UK
Emergency Response Team (ERT) in 2000, created problems for the NCDDR.
The World Bank’s contribution was vital throughout the process. The Bank consistently
supported the idea of GOSL ownership of the DDR process. It reinforced this by
1
Ted Morse and Mark Knight, “Lessons Learned from Sierra Leone Disarmament and Demobilization of
Combatants,” prepared for the Government of Sierra Leone and the World Bank, Final Draft, April 2002, pp.
40-42.
Draft August 2004 ix
strengthening capacity for the NCDDR. The Bank also provided critical financial and
technical support through its Project Preparation Facility (PPF), at which the DDR program
was designed. Despite high risk, due to the uncertainty of the peace process in 1998, the
World Bank accepted responsibility of setting up the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for DDR. The
fund unified donor support around one set of program objectives. It also unified support for
one set of procurement, financial, management, disbursement, and reporting arrangements.
Furthermore, the Bank’s mobilization capacity, and its fiduciary oversight, encouraged
donors to support the DDR process. Support even came from countries without a presence
in Sierra Leone. The World Bank’s part in the establishment of the FMPU provided the level
of comfort necessary for the international community to devote adequate resources to the
DDR process, in an environment otherwise characterized by a high level of corruption. In
addition to administering the MDTF, the World Bank fielded personnel who were highly
committed and contributed to the success of the DDR program. The Bank also provided
technical support to UNAMSIL for weapons disposal.
3.2 Program Design
Design of Sierra Leone’s DDR program poised a number of questions that will be faced in
the development of new DDR programs in Africa and elsewhere. The evaluation considers
these in detail; six are highlighted below.
Should There be One Organization or Two? One of the major lessons of previous
DDR processes is that organizationally de-linking disarmament and demobilization from
the planning and delivery of reinsertion and reintegration support creates institutional
rivalries that undermine the effective delivery of DDR programs. The GOSL wisely
chose to create the NCDDR and its Executive Secretariat as an autonomous body, with
a mandate to provide and promote the reintegration of the former warring parties. It also
chose to vest the responsibility for assistance to war-affected populations in NCRRR.
This allowed both ex-combatants and non-combatants to be served, striking a balance
that strengthened the peace process.
Should There be Assistance to Combatants or Support to Communities? It is

widely recognized that in order to help convince combatants to disarm and disband,
some form of support is required to help them reintegrate themselves into civilian life.
There are two means of delivering this support: targeting former combatants directly and
targeting communities where ex-combatants settle. The GOSL decided to provide
targeted short-term assistance to ex-combatants through the DDRP, as they were
considered a vulnerable group with their own needs. It recognized that this decision
could be controversial, but it viewed it as necessary to obtain peace. It also envisioned
that assistance to war victims, such as internally displaced persons (IDPs) and
amputees, would be provided through other channels, such as the NCRRR/NaCSA
Which Approach to Gender is best? There are two ways of incorporating women and
girls into DDR programs: by adopting a gender-neutral approach or a gender-sensitive
one. NCDDR adopted a gender-neutral approach, and it is widely agreed that females
did not fully benefit for this. This was in part due to the multiple roles females played;
traditional gender norms, which deterred access; and the narrow focus of the DDRP’s
Draft August 2004 x
objectives. Where the process had a positive impact was in the area of sensitization.
This had an impact on overall perceptions of women and the roles that they can play.
Which Approach to Child Soldiers is Best? It is now widely recognized not only that
children are often present in conflicts in significant numbers, but also that they should
not go through the same demobilization process as adults. In Sierra Leone, UNICEF
was given responsibility for running the child-soldier demobilization program as well as
for raising funds for it. The partnership between UNCEF, on the one hand, and the
NCDDR and Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs, on the other, was
exemplary.
How do Programs Obtain Adequate Linkage to Long-term Recovery and

Rehabilitation? While on the conceptual level there was a clear linkage between
disarmament and demobilization and longer-term reintegration, the complementarity
between NCDDR and NCRRR/NaCSA programs was not fully realized. NCRRR/NaCSA
and NCDDR had different mandates, different implementation styles, and different
timelines. As a result, they were not always in the same area in time periods that would
have encouraged complementarity. [I believe mandate and “timelines” were the relevant
issue, not implementation style. Given the need to rapidly proceed with demobilization,
in territories previously not accessible to Government and NGOs, it was de-facto
impossible for NCRRR to be present. I agree that coordination b/w NCRRR and
NCDDR could have been better at times, and that there might have been room to further
exploit synergies – but that is in hindsight]
Which Funding Mechanisms are Appropriate? The DDR program was financed
through multiple channels, with the MDTF as the main vehicle for support to the DDR
process. The MDTF defined the shape and content of the process. One of the MDTF’s
key benefits is its ability to focus donor contributions on the government’s program and
enhance national ownership and leadership. It also promotes resource mobilization and
reduces the administrative and financial costs of managing external resources.
Despite the important role of the MDTF, other funding mechanisms were established,
which proved crucial in implementation success. For example, the UK provided
financing outside the MDTF that gave the NCDDR and its partners needed flexibility
when urgent, unforeseen needs arose that could not be financed rapidly through the
trust fund. [From an evaluators point of view, I believe, the conclusion and
recommendation should be to improve the responsibility of a unified funding mechanism,
and not to justify a parallel mechanism. The main text provides a more nuanced picture]
3.3 Program Implementation
Sound program design must be complemented by sound program implementation.

Flexibility and the ability to think creatively are hallmarks of successful implementation. In
this regard, the DDR program functioned exceptionally well, particularly the disarmament
and development components. It evolved over time to reflect the changing political and
security context of the country, but it simultaneously maintained the central elements of the
program design: uniform, equitable, and consistent treatment of ex-combatants from all
factions; accountability; and transparency.
Draft August 2004 xi
The disarmament and demobilization components of Sierra Leone’s DDR program are
generally considered more successful than the reintegration component. A major objective
of DDR processes was to break the command structure of the RUF and AFRC units.
Managed first by the British Emergency Response Team, and later by NCDDR and
UNAMSIL, by all accounts the disarmament and demobilization appears to have sufficiently
broken the command structure of the rebel forces to lay a solid foundation for peace.
It is generally agreed that NCDDR’s reintegration program did succeed in its primary
objective of providing ex-combatants with a cooling off period that helped them to readjust
to civilian life, thereby buying time for peace to be consolidated. However, there is debate
about its overall success. A close analysis provides a wealth of lessons learned and
information that can be used in other DDR programs. A number of these lessons are
highlighted below.
Transitional Safety-Net Allowances/Reinsertion Benefit. There is widespread

agreement that transitional safety-net allowances (TSAs, later called reinsertion benefits)
played an important role in the success of Phase III. Cash payments, particularly when
timed to occur very close to disarmament, have been controversial among donors who
provide the bulk of the financing. Yet, it is widely accepted that some sort of safety net is
required to carry ex-combatants and their dependents through the first months of civilian
life. [The issue here, I believe, is less the fact that TSA payments close to disarmament
were controversial, but rather the lesson learned that prolonged encampment (caused
by a lack of political will) and the subsequent need to pay reinsertion payments in the
camp exposed the DDR program to the risk of being perceived as a weapons buy-back
program. The lesson learned was that accelerated disarmament and TSA payments in
the community of return reduced risks and expedited achievement of program
objectives]
Choice of Vocational Training and Education as Reintegration Opportunities. The

decision to provide reintegration opportunities in the form of vocational training and
education had a significant impact on the success of the program. Vocational training
gave a sufficient number of ex-combatants self-esteem, making them semi-skilled
workers, and reorienting them to civilian life. Nonetheless, the vocational training
program has been faulted on a number of accounts: for starting too slowly; for providing
sub-standard training and/or training that was of insufficient duration; for an anti-
agricultural bias; and for delayed provision of stipends, toolkits and certificates.
Psychosocial Impact. It is difficult to determine the psychosocial impact of the various

DDR activities. There is disagreement over the quality of the services provided,
especially for the counseling component. By most accounts, counseling services
consisted largely of giving advice. However, this does not mean that ex-combatants did
not receive some psychosocial benefit from the services. Evidence suggests the
counseling was sufficient enough to allow an adequate number of ex-combatants to
assimilate into civilian society. This assertion is supported by the comments of the
community mental-health workers, who say that, although the counseling was
inadequate, there is a noticeable difference between those who went through the DDR
Draft August 2004 xii
program and those who did not—with DDR program participants demonstrating a
greater degree of coping skills.
Implementing Partners. One of the greater challenges in implementing reintegration

activities was finding a sufficient number of qualified implementing partners. Local
partners ranged from legitimate training organizations, usually with limited capacity to
expand their operations, to organizations that opened overnight with virtually no capacity
at all. In the case of the latter, NCDDR officials admitted that sometimes they were
misled by those who established centers with little to no intention of providing training,
but had considerable interest in receiving funding from NCDDR. Monitoring of the
training sites exposed the most egregious cases, such as implementing partners that
collected the first tranche of their grant and disappeared. When it proved possible to
identify these false training centers, some alternate means of training the ex-combatants
had to be found.
Pace of Demobilization. While military observers might have better managed the flow
of combatants waiting to be disarmed, a fast-track disarmament and demobilization
process, which developed in Sierra Leone by 2001, meant that the number of
demobilized soldiers was always going to outstrip the ability of the reintegration
component to provide training programs in a timely fashion. Simply stated, the political
imperatives were at odds with optimal program implementation, and political imperatives
carried the day. It is important for those engaged in designing and implementing DDR
programs to understand this fact.
Provision of toolkits. Toolkits were another problematic aspect of reintegration. In

numerous interviews and reports, former combatants who had undergone vocational
training cited the delayed delivery of toolkits as a major source of grievance. The
primary reason for the delays was that the NCDDR did not procure toolkits until nearly
the end of each training course. Advance procurement, recommended by the World
Bank and the FMPU, was resisted because of cash flow problems caused by the late
disbursement of donor pledges to the Trust Fund. [Not sure I fully agree with the Govt.’s
explanation – it might have been the Govt.’s perception… ]
Employment. Unemployment and underemployment are large problems for Sierra

Leone and are sources of great frustration. The training programs, which were not of
sufficient length or substance to turn someone into a full-fledged carpenter or computer
technician, were helpful in that they provided some introductory skills. Ex-combatants
interviewed in focus groups for this evaluation reported that the training programs
assisted with procuring short-term work, apprenticeships, full-time jobs, or starting their
own business, as well as with general reintegration. However, unemployment and
underemployment is still an issue. Like other Sierra Leoneans, ex-combatants have had
to struggle to find sufficient work in an extremely weak economy.
3.4 Program Financing
The DDRP was financed through multiple channels: (1) government resources; (2) grants
to the MDTF; (3) the World Bank (IDA credit delivered through the Community Reintegration
and Rehabilitation Program and PPF); (4) peacekeeping support to disarmament and
Draft August 2004 xiii
demobilization; (5) UNICEF support for child soldiers; (6) UK government support through
ERT; and (7) parallel programs (CRP, HSF and GTZ).
Mobilizing and disbursing resources. The NCDDR initially estimated that it would require
some $33.6 million to demobilize 33,000 combatants. This sum did not include costs
incurred by ECOMOG or UN forces in support of DDR activities. When the DDRP
concluded, senior United Nations officials estimated total program costs at approximately
$100 million 2
The $100 million estimated cost incorporates the MDTF funds, resources channeled
through the parallel programs, and the costs directly contributed by UN. By far the largest
financial input, $39.5 million, was channeled through the MDTF. The main trust fund was
divided into two smaller trust funds: the first a government-executed fund, which became
the major receptacle for most of the financial resources, and the other, a World Bank-
administered fund with about $2 million. This split execution of the trust fund was an
innovation. This special arrangement was optimal as speed was of the essence, particularly
at the initial stage. The World Bank facilitated the fast procurement of critical services, such
as the provision of four core consultants for the Executive Secretariat. The World Bank-
administered fund also financed the studies, reviews, and evaluations that were
commissioned at various stages of the program, as well as the donor meetings and
pledging sessions that were organized outside of the country..
Managing Resources. Successful management was based on robust national ownership,

coupled with effective partnerships. The MDTF and FMPU, the NCDDR and its Executive
Secretariat, the World Bank, various organizations of the UN system, DFID, GTZ and others
were critical institutions and vehicles that had a role in the management of these resources.
One of the positive characteristics of the MDTF, which simplified the management task and
enhanced effectiveness, was the condition that there should be no earmarking of funds by
the contributing donors. The World Bank, when faced with the possibility of losing U.S
.funding or allowing the U.S. Government to finance only one part of the program, set up, a
separate trust fund that was used exclusively for a U.S. contribution for the payment of
reinsertion benefits.
4. Lessons Learned
Sierra Leone’s road to peace produced numerous lessons learned. Below is a summary of
the lessons:
4.1 Political Lessons
• A post-conflict DDR process is aimed first and foremost at achieving political and
security objectives.
2
Authors’ interview, May 2004.
Draft August 2004 xiv
• A post-conflict DDR process is a conflict mitigation mechanism; as such, it can make

only an indirect contribution to conflict prevention. Sufficient commitment to the
peace process is crucial for the success of a post-conflict DDR process.
• National ownership of a DDR process is essential.
4.2 Program Design and Implementation Lessons
• Collaboration between key actors can be pivotal to the success of a DDR program.
• In designing a DDR program it is essential to understand the political and security

objectives that reintegration must serve.
• Splitting the institutional responsibility for disarmament and demobilization from that
for reintegration will hamper the ability of a DDR process to achieve its main
objectives.
• Coordination between the DDR process and the rehabilitation and recovery process
is essential to start addressing the root causes of conflict.
• Targeted reinsertion and reintegration assistance significantly assisted ex-

combatants in returning to civilian life.
• Monitoring at the community level for social trends during the DDR process is
essential to promote the linkage between DDR and longer term rehabilitation and
recovery.
• Monitoring ex-combatants after the completion of the DDR process is necessary in

order to identify important trends affecting the success of the overall peace process.
• It is important to invest in reconciliation efforts and to prepare the community for the
reintegration of ex-combatants.
• Establishing eligibility criteria involves trade-offs among different security and political
objectives.
• A multi-pronged, gender-specific approach should be considered in future DDR

exercises.
• Child combatants are a special vulnerable group, and it is important to include

expertise in this area from the beginning of the program design process.
• DDR processes must incorporate the principles of transparency, neutrality, and

equity.
Draft August 2004 xv
• Efforts to enhance the capacity of the Implementing Partners need to be undertaken

to the extent possible before implementation of reintegration activities begins.
• Options for retaining capacity developed to deliver DDR training should be actively
pursued.
4.3 Financial Management Lessons
• Multiple funding sources provided flexibility in responding to the varied needs of a

post-conflict DDR process.
• Failure to fund DDR programs in a timely manner hinders implementation.
• A strong FMPU is critical for program implementation and integrity.
4.4 Programmatic Management Lessons
• Strong management leadership is key to operationalizing a DDR process.
• It is equally important that the government’s key partners deploy personnel with a
high level of commitment, understanding, familiarity with post-conflict situations, and
expertise with respect to their own rules and regulations.
• The DDR database serves a multiplicity of needs, and it may require redesign as the
program moves from disarmament and demobilization to reintegration. It also
increases the importance of exploiting technological advances wherever possible.
4.5 Lessons Regarding Assistance to Individuals and Communities
• The payment of monetized reinsertion benefits and training allowances to former

combatants can have a positive impact on local economies.
• Training programs, even if not structured optimally, can produce a semi- skilled labor
force.
• The DDR programs can help ex-combatants to make the psychological transition to
peace.
• Populations that are excluded from the DDR process still require assistance.
4.6 Learning from Past Experience
Draft August 2004 xvi
It is imperative that all stakeholders make a serious effort to learn from past
experiences so that future DDR processes can benefit from the wealth of knowledge
generated by the Sierra Leone DDR process.
Many of the lessons discussed above have been observed time and again over the last
fifteen years in post-conflict disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration processes.
They are repeated here, however, because they have not yet been fully incorporated into
programming. The international community, which provides most of the financing for DDR
processes and has a significant impact on their design and implementation, has a special
responsibility to absorb and implement these lessons.
Draft August 2004 1
1 Introduction
In spring 2004, Creative Associates International Inc. (CAII) was commissioned to

carry out the final evaluation of the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
Program (DDRP) and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund Supporting the Disarmament,
Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process. After a decade of war and several
failed attempts to achieve sustainable peace, combatants from the main fighting
forces, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), the Civil Defense Forces
(CDF), and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), were successfully disarmed,
demobilized, and reintegrated by the National Committee for Disarmament,
Demobilization, and Reintegration (NCDDR) and its partners. The CAII evaluation
team finds that the DDR process, led by NCDDR, did more than achieve a high degree
of success in its main objective as a peace-building and conflict mitigation mechanism.
Under a difficult working environment, the DDRP managed to disarm, demobilize, and
reintegrate ex-combatants to the extent that a foundation could be built on which the
peace process could stand. The program also has valuable lessons for countries
undertaking similar endeavors in the subregion and beyond.
According to the team’s terms of reference:
The main focus of the evaluation is on the processes involved in maintaining a

government-led, and regionally and internationally assisted, response to issues
related to demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration of ex-combatants as a
key conflict management measure aiming at reconstituting an enabling social
environment for early recovery and development.
The strategic objective of the evaluation is to learn lessons from Sierra Leone’s
experience with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of male/female
and child ex-combatants, and apply these to national poverty and conflict
mitigation strategies, as well as to increase the conflict management capacity of
regional organizations.3
Accordingly, this evaluation report focuses on the DDR process and seeks to
understand how the main institutional actors and stakeholders interacted and
collaborated to create an effective partnership. The report examines different facets of
the complex process of disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating combatants. It
demonstrates the linkages between DDR and the peace process (or conflict
mitigation), as well as between DDR and long-term economic and social rehabilitation
and poverty reduction. Its findings are particularly relevant for countries that have
undergone similar types of conflicts to that which occurred in Sierra Leone between
1991 and 2002.
The report does not, however, explore in detail the multitude of issues that are related
to the DDR process but were not actually part of the formal NCDDR program. As the
DDRP is only one aspect of the peace process, it is possible to have a successful
3
See annex 10 for the complete Evaluation Terms of Reference.
The Final Evaluation of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund Supporting DDR
Draft August 2004 2
“There is the impression that the war brought

disarmament, demobilization, and all our woes. Not true. Sierra Leone was
reintegration program without fully mismanaged for twenty years before that. All
addressing the root causes of the war. of us agreed. We were all disenchanted with
This is because a DDR process is first the government. The difference with the
and foremost a conflict-mitigation tool rebels was that they picked up arms and we
hoped to do it through constitutional means.
and not necessarily a conflict- They were alienated from the state. There
prevention tool. was deep disenchantment.”
—Sierra Leone official, 2004.
That said, the evaluation team
recognizes that in order to prevent
future conflicts, many issues that go beyond NCDDR’s mandate nonetheless need to
be tackled. These are much broader issues that need to be addressed in Sierra
Leone’s journey toward sustainable peace: strengthening the country’s economy;
improving social justice; ending social, political, and economic exclusion; and making
significant strides in government accountability.4
A successful DDR process helps to create an environment in which these fundamental

issues can be addressed. DDR processes are not, however, intended to deal directly
with these issues. Thus, while some 56,000 ex-combatants participated in NCDDR’s
reintegration activities, and many gained new skills and self-confidence, they face the
same problems as those citizens of Sierra Leone who did not take up arms: lack of full-
time, long-term employment opportunities, particularly for youth; a weak social and
economic infrastructure; serious questions of governmental accountability at all levels;
and an uncertain regional environment.5
2 The Operating Environment
2.1 DDR and the Root Causes of War

The Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) understands the need to address the root
causes of war if peace is to be consolidated. According to the government, the root
cause of the conflict is poverty in all its manifestations and dimensions: political, social
and economic exclusion; poor governance and weak rule of law; lack of access to
services; absence of personal security; and inadequate employment opportunities.
The roots of conflict go back to the early 1970s when then-President Siaka Stevens
gained economic and political dominance by controlling the diamond industry,
exploiting the system of patronage, destroying many political institutions, and ruling
4
These issues are highlighted in several reports reviewed by the evaluation team, including Paul
Richards, Steven Archibald, Khadija Bah, and James Vincent, Where Have All the Young People Gone?
Transitioning Ex-combatants Towards Community Reconstruction After the War in Sierra Leone,
November 30, 2003; Stelios Comninos, Aki Stavrou, and Brian Stewart, Assessment of the
Reintegration Programmes of the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and
Reintegration, November 8, 2002; and Sierra Leone DDRP Review, October 5, 2000.
5
Approximately 72,000 individuals were disarmed and demobilized. Not all of these chose to
participate in the reintegration programs. Additionally, some of those who were disarmed were killed in
subsequent flare-ups.
Draft August 2004 3
with an autocratic approach. The 1980s were marked by a widening gap between the
political elite, who had access to diamond revenue, and the rest of the population, who
struggled to survive in a collapsed economy and under a corrupt government that
provided few basic services. Years of mismanaged resources, poverty, and corruption
had a particularly significant impact on youth, who grew increasingly frustrated by the
lack of opportunities and deeply disenchanted by a future which held very little
promise. This became a critical factor in the war.
It was against this backdrop that, in the late 1980s, Foday Sankoh went to a military
training camp in Libya, where he met Charles Taylor. The two agreed to support each
other in overthrowing their respective governments using the diamond mines in Sierra
Leone to finance their efforts. Disillusioned and unemployed youth became the rebel
army needed to start the conflict.
To address the root causes of the conflict, the GOSL must take into two factors: the
regional element and internal social, political, and economic inequalities. Regional
issues are dealt with in the following section. One of the major tools the government is
using to address internal factors is its poverty reduction strategy. In view of the
prevailing conditions in Sierra Leone, the government has adopted a phased approach
to poverty reduction. Addressing the immediate challenges of the transition from war
to peace (“the transitional phase”) was the core objective of the Interim Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper (IPRSP).6 The long-term development and poverty
reduction agenda will be fully defined during the production of the Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper (PRSP). The transitional phase was expected to run from 2001–2002,
but the process of developing the PRSP was in fact still ongoing when this evaluation
took place in mid-2004.7
During the transitional phase, “rebuilding the war-ravaged economy as well as

addressing the urgent and basic needs of war victims” was the government’s highest
priority. Accordingly, it emphasized: “a) restoration of security for life and property,
including the protection of human rights; b) re-launching the economy; and c) provision
of basic social services to the most vulnerable groups as well as enhancing access to
productive assets.”8
The IPRSP was not formally integrated into the peace process because both the Lomé
Peace Agreement and the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement were concluded before the
IPRSP was developed. It would have been better, both from the perspective of
contributing to peace-building and in order to be true to the participatory nature of the
IPRSP process, if the warring parties had been given the opportunity to contribute to
6
The IPRSP was to be implemented 2000–2002, a period when the country was initially still at war, and
after May 2001 slowly emerging from conflict. See Republic of Sierra Leone, “Interim Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper [hereafter IPRSP],” Freetown, June 2001,
http://poverty.worldbank.org/files/Sierra_Leone_IPRSP.pdf.
7
The full PRSP was intended to run from 2003–2005.
8
IPRSP, p. 26.
Draft August 2004 4
its formulation. Nonetheless, the government recognized that the resolution of the
conflict and the attainment of peace and security were necessary conditions for the
success of any poverty reduction strategy. Consequently, the IPRSP notes that “the
Government remains committed to the principle provisions of the Lomé Peace
Agreement and to subsequent recent agreements signed in Abuja and Freetown.”9 In
particular, the IPRSP states:
In order to provide the enabling environment to facilitate poverty

reduction, the highest priority would be given to the creation of a
security environment that allows the free movement of persons and
goods. A secure and peaceful environment will also enhance the
participation of private sector operators and will facilitate the
implementation of anti-poverty programs with a maximum impact on
target beneficiaries.10
The IPRSP integrated DDR as a core program. In programmatic terms, DDR was an
explicit objective, a strategy, and an indicator of the success of the IPRSP (table 1).
The government viewed DDR as advancing the cause of poverty reduction by helping
to achieve an environment of peace and security. Through the provision of social
safety nets to former combatants, DDR helped to jumpstart the economy in war-
affected areas. Training and education provided through the DDR program to the ex-
combatants as a vulnerable group enhanced their capacity to support themselves and
their families, as well as to make contributions to the welfare of their communities.
Finally, the pre-discharge orientation helped sensitize former combatants to the modes
of behavior appropriate during peacetime, which further contributed to the peaceful
environment necessary for poverty reduction.
The DDR process was also essential to the implementation of Sierra Leone’s National
Recovery Strategy. Until an area had been declared safe, it was impossible to begin
large-scale rehabilitation efforts. The government viewed the National Recovery
Strategy as laying the foundations for the PRSP and as a means of engaging “Sierra
Leonean society in the reconciliation and democratization process.”11 The National
Recovery Strategy had four main objectives: (1) consolidation of state authority; (2) the
rebuilding of communities; (3) peace-building and human rights; and (4) restoration of
the economy. “Youth” was a crosscutting issue. The National Recovery Strategy
recognized that “disenfranchisement of youth was one of the primary factors that led to
the war, creating resentment and a sense of hopelessness in the first place, and
ensuring the existence of a willing pool of recruits for the fighting factions … As a result
[of their wartime experiences], they are now more politically aware and carry greater
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
Sierra Leone Government, National Recovery Strategy, 2002-2003, p. 9.
Draft August 2004 5
expectations for involvement in decision-making and desire for economic opportunity

than ever before.”12
Table 1. Policy Matrix, IPRSP
Policy Area Objectives Strategies and Broad Indicators 2000 Base Level
Measures
• Improved • Disarm and • Physical security • 1.9 (Max. 4 on
National Security
personal safety demobilize all (popular Smiley Scale)
and Good
Governance • Improved combatants except benchmark)
safety of the national army • Percentage of • 59
Transitional Period personal • Engage in combatants
property peaceful political disarmed and
dialogue demobilized
• Restructure and • Percentage of • 29
retrain the Sierra ex-combatants
Leone Army and reintegrated into
prison officials civilian life
• Implement • Percentage of • 47
immigration chiefdoms under
program government
• Provide Social control
Safety Nets Funds
(RRR, NGOs)
• Retrain the police
• Initiate community
policing on a pilot
basis
Source: Republic of Sierra Leone, IPRSP, annex 3.1a.
Note: The percentages of combatants disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated are based on an anticipated
caseload of 45,000 adults and children.
Taking that larger context into consideration, a DDR process can provide space to only
begin to address the root causes of war. As many of those interviewed for this
evaluation have noted, the DDR process played an important role in the peace
process but could not be expected to resolve most, if any, of the problems that led to
the initial conflict. This is equally true for the internal and regional aspects of the
conflict. As far as the internal factors were concerned, youth, both combatants and
non-combatants, faced a similar situation—few economic opportunities, a stratified
society where paramount chiefs hold almost unlimited power, and little government
accountability.13 The issues of government accountability are particularly important.
The youth problem can be resolved only in the context of greatly strengthened
12
Ibid, pp. 14-15. At the same time, it is important to note that the National Recovery Strategy was not
published until 2002, at which point many decisions about reintegration of ex-combatants had already
been made. It was of course not possible to develop a sense of needs in areas formerly held by the
rebels until after they were disarmed and demobilized.
13
The advent of local government introduces the possibility of more participatory systems of
governance at the local level. Time will tell, however, to what extent the power of the paramount chiefs
will be eroded and whether the concentration of power at the central level will be reproduced at the local
level.
Draft August 2004 6
democratic accountability at all levels. While it is important to improve economic

opportunities for the youth of Sierra Leone, it is also important to ensure, for example,
that decentralization does not merely reproduce the same power structures that
existed previously at other levels of government. It is also important to ensure that the
Anti-Corruption Commission and other efforts to combat corruption are empowered,
that Sierra Leone’s new security bodies are not operationally effective, and that
appropriate civil oversight bodies are capable of carrying out their responsibilities and
have the necessary political backing to do so.
2.2 DDR and the Regional Dimension

The Sierra Leone conflict had a strong regional dimension, from its genesis to its
resolution. The conflict was both a reaction to the general malaise prevailing in the
subregion and a reflection of the nature of intrastate relationships at that time. It was
an integral part of a regional conflict that was played out mostly within the confines of
state borders but that also witnessed a high degree of overt and covert cross-border
interventions. Changes in the internal dynamics of states in the subregion tended to
affect the course of the conflict in Sierra Leone, both positively and negatively.
Regional actors and institutions played an active role in supporting and exacerbating
the conflict. Subregional animosities and alliances contributed significantly to the
intensity and duration of the conflict. At the same time, institutions, subregional
governments, and individuals from the subregion played a critical role in advancing the
peace process and conflict resolution in Sierra Leone. The Government of Nigeria, for
example, strongly supported the Government of Sierra Leone both diplomatically and
through the deployment of Monitoring Group of the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOMOG) troops against the rebels, and it pressed the parties to the
Sierra Leone conflict to reach the compromises necessary for peace at Lomé and
Abuja.
Despite this, there was no concerted regional approach to DDR, probably reflecting the
different stages at which individual states joined the peace process. However, at this
juncture a regional approach is essential to consolidate the gains of DDR in Sierra
Leone as well as to provide a more conducive environment for the success of DDR in
neighboring countries. The widespread proliferation of arms throughout the region
requires a concerted regional approach, which only began to get underway in mid-
2004.
Nonetheless, lessons were drawn by those developing the Sierra Leone DDR program
from earlier efforts at DDR in the subregion. For example, the failed attempt at DDR in
Liberia in the mid-1990s was based on a social justice approach to DDR, which
focused assistance on war-affected communities. Key Sierra Leone DDR planners
drew from this the need to provide targeted assistance to ex-combatants. Additional
lessons were drawn from other parts of Africa as well, notably Mozambique (where the
Draft August 2004 7
RUF was turned into a political party) and Uganda (particularly the initial structure of its
DDR program).14
Although there are many political, economic, and socio-cultural similarities among the
states in the subregion, and there is a high degree of interdependence in economic
and security matters, there is also a need to factor in the unique features of each
country in designing DDR programs. Nonetheless, one lesson does seem clear: It is
possible to have a truly successful, government-owned DDR process.
2.3 DDR and the Peace Process

Bringing peace to countries that have experienced war is a complex process that
requires action on many fronts. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
processes can be an important component of this process, but there are also other
factors that affect the consolidation of peace. Chief among them are the political
process and commitment to peace by warring parties, the ability to reconcile, social
justice, the reintegration of war-affected civilians, the rehabilitation of infrastructure,
economic recovery, restoration of state authority, and reform of the security sector.
The Government of Sierra Leone identified five immediate peace-building priorities

following its restoration in 1998: (1) rehabilitation, reconstruction, and resettlement of
war-affected communities; (2) disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of
combatants; (3) reestablishment of state authority, including the civil police; (4) military
restructuring and security-sector reform; and (5) creation of the legal framework for
transitional justice and natural resource management. Although this evaluation is
limited to an examination of the DDR process, because DDR has political, security,
and social welfare objectives, it is closely linked to other elements of the peace
process. These linkages run both from the peace process to DDR and from DDR to
the broader peace process.
The effort to end the civil war in Sierra Leone that began in 1991 went through a
number of stages. Starting in 1996, there were several corresponding phases in the
effort to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate combatants. Prior to 2000–2001, DDR
was subsumed within the greater strategy of achieving a military solution to the
conflict. The military solution was not only an option for both sides, but in practical
terms, it was the preferred option. Thus, peace efforts collapsed in 1997, 1999, and
2000. Not only did these breakdowns interrupt efforts to disarm and demobilize
soldiers, they also led to the re-arming of some fighters who had previously been
disarmed. [Since this was really minimal, I believe it should be mentioned: 1580 were
“lost” in phase I, and 1447 were “lost” in phase II, i.e. a total of 3027 (4.1% of the total
of 72490). Of these, in all likelihood a certain percentage were killed, and another
percentage self reintegrated. As an issue, it’s important, I only believe it should be
quantified]
14
Because Uganda experienced essentially a peacetime demobilization, some individuals interviewed
for this evaluation expressed doubts about the transferability of lessons to countries that have
undergone extensive periods of civil war.
Draft August 2004 8
The final phase of the DDR process, which got underway in May 2001, was successful
largely because the parties to the conflict had all realized that, for a variety of reasons,
military victory was not within their grasp. The government came to fully understand it
could not eliminate the insurgency and could not rely on the allegiance of the army.
For their part, the rebels factored in British military intervention and regional
developments, particularly the embargo on Liberia and the precarious position of that
government. These, together with the change in the leadership of the RUF, resulted in
a more robust commitment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The commitment of
all parties to the peace process consequently deepened and DDR became a means to
achieving peace, rather than a tactical maneuver aimed at buying time.
While the experience in Sierra Leone confirms that the existence of a disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration process is not sufficient to create the political will
necessary to end civil strife, it also confirms that the DDR process is a necessary
component of achieving and sustaining peace. As long as a large number of people
have access to weapons and command structures remain intact, the peace process
will be held hostage to their demands. As one UN official interviewed for this
evaluation noted, “Peace and DDR are inextricably linked. Peacekeeping missions
and peace treaties are important steps toward peace. To unlock the door to peace,
disarmament and demobilization are key.”15 In sum, DDR in conflict-affected countries
has essentially security and political objectives.
While political and security objectives are paramount, DDR programs in conflict-
affected countries also have important social and economic objectives. A DDR
process is the first step in attitudinal change on the part of former combatants that
must take place if they are to return to civilian life. It provides opportunities for former
combatants to interact with non-combatants and to acquire skills that will help them
become productive members of society once again. There are also benefits, such as
cash payments and toolkits, which can have a positive economic impact. Cash
payments can jump start local economies and toolkits can make ex-combatants more
marketable, providing much needed income.
At the same time, it is important to underscore that the political and security objectives
that can be achieved by DDR processes are themselves limited. A DDR process
provides the mechanism for the separation of combatants from their weapons and the
break up of command structures. In particular, it provides rebel groups with a way of
laying down weapons without being seen as having surrendered. It also helps to build
confidence among the former warring parties. In Sierra Leone, the DDR process
achieved these objectives. But achieving these objectives does not guarantee the
consolidation of peace. In consequence, it is important to underscore that the
evaluation team agrees with those who argue that if the broader peace process were
to break down again, it would not be because the DDR process made the wrong
15
Interview with authors, Freetown, May 2004.
Draft August 2004 9
choices or was poorly executed.16 Rather, it would be because fundamental political,

economic, and social problems that generated the war in the first place have not been
resolved.
3 Evolution of the DDR Process
3.1 Before 1998

The peace process began in 1995, when the leaders of the National Provisional Ruling
Council (NPRC) met with the RUF to discuss peace. Some saw this as an effort to
forestall a return to democratic civilian rule, since the military rulers argued that
elections could not be held until a peace agreement was concluded. Nonetheless, an
election was held in March 1996 in those parts of the country that were not under RUF
control. The Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), headed by Alhaji Ahmad Tejan
Kabbah, gained control of the government. Immediately following his inauguration,
President Kabbah resumed peace talks in Abidjan, which led to the signing of the
Abidjan Peace Agreement in November 1996.
In his first speech, President Kabbah had announced the creation of an administrative
mechanism for DDR in the Ministry for Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, and
Resettlement. The Abidjan Agreement committed the GOSL and the RUF to “a well-
planned national effort on encampment, disarmament, demobilization, and
resettlement linked to national development objectives.”17 The United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) provided technical assistance and the British
government provided seed money to jumpstart the DDR process. The responsibility to
develop this program was essentially subcontracted to international non-governmental
organizations. This effort had not advanced far, however, when the Kabbah
government was overthrown by an army mutiny, led by Johnny Paul Koromah, on May
25, 1997.
In October 1997, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

reached an agreement with Koromah's government, which called for a six-month
peace plan, an immediate cessation of hostilities, and the supervision of the cease-fire
by ECOMOG and UN military observers. Known as the Conakry agreement, the plan
provided for disarmament and demobilization of combatants and the restoration of the
constitutional order, including the reinstatement of Kabbah as president. The
16
While the DDR process in Sierra Leone can be considered successful, choices were made in its
design and implementation that remain the source of some discussion. In view of UNAMSIL’s role in
providing security, its departure will be a test of the degree to which peace has been consolidated.
17
“Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary
United Front of Sierra Leone, signed at Abidjan on 30 November 1996,” Article 6,
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sl/sierra_leone_10301996.html.
Draft August 2004 10
agreement was not respected by Koromah, however. This led to a resumption in

fighting, which prompted ECOMOG to expel Koromah and his allies from Freetown.18
3.2 1998–2004
In February 1998, ECOMOG forces liberated Freetown. With the return to democratic
civil rule, the government developed a comprehensive policy agenda to end the
conflict and pursue peace and reconciliation. This policy framework was based on the
1996 Abidjan Peace Agreement and included a DDR program. In April 1998 [trust you
checked the date, can’t check that], the World Bank inaugurated technical assistance
for the DDR process, making its $2 million Project Preparation Facility (PPF) available
to hire consultants to assist the government in developing its DDR program. The
government’s framework was endorsed by the United Nations and other international
donors at a special UN meeting in July 1998.
The DDR process begun in July 1998 was implemented in three phases that reflected
the stops and starts of the peace process. These three phases took on distinct
characteristics based on the political and security situation, lessons learned from
earlier phases, and the amount of funds available. The Ministry for Reconstruction,
Rehabilitation, and Resettlement was transformed into the National Commission for
Resettlement, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction (NCRRR), in order to focus attention
and resources on the critically important tasks of reconstruction and recovery.19 The
NCRRR Commissioner held Cabinet rank.
The DDR unit in the NCRRR was subsequently upgraded to an autonomous

committee, the National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization, and
Reintegration (NCDDR), headed by President Kabbah, in order to reinforce and
consolidate the preparatory work of the Disarmament, Demobilization, and
Reintegration Advisory Group and the DDR Unit of the NCRRR. This reflected the
belief that attention and resources should be focused on this critical activity, bringing
all relevant actors into the decision-making sphere. The NCDDR oversaw the
development of DDR policy, while the program was managed on a day-to-day basis by
the NCDDR’s Executive Secretariat, led by the Executive Secretary.20 The core
principles, program design and content, and implementation modalities were
established at this stage.
It was recognized from the outset that the support offered through the DDR program
would not suffice for long-term socio-economic reintegration, but would provide ex-
combatants with short-term support while they began the process of readjusting to
civilian life. The original plans foresaw a close linkage with ongoing activities
supported through the NCDDR, donor agencies, and non-governmental organizations.
18
Mark Malan, Phenyo Rakate, and Angela McIntyre, Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL Hits the
Home Straight, (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2002),
http://www.iss.co.ca/Pubs/Monographs/No68/Content.html. See in particular chapter 2, “Overview of
Pre-UNAMSIL Interventions.”
19
NCRRR was later renamed the National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA).
20
Details on donor support for the DDR process are found in section 4.2.
The degree of political commitment to the peace process as a whole influenced the
time frame required to implement DDR as well as the success that could be achieved
at each stage. Although one of the central aspects of the DDR process was group
disarmament, the DDR program initially focused on individual combatants in order to
entice them to surrender. The main fighting groups were not, at that point, sufficiently
committed to the peace process to allow large-scale, group disarmament to proceed.
Thus, prior to 2001, each person presenting him/herself for disarmament had to bring
in either a functional weapon or ammunition and demonstrate participation in combat.
As political will to implement the peace process strengthened during Phase III, the
program moved to group disarmament, with each commander bringing in both
combatants and weapons.
Annex 1 provides the numbers disarmed, demobilized, and discharged during each of
the phases of the DDR process. Annex 2 provides numbers for reintegration. In
Phase I, the potential caseload for demobilization and reintegration assistance was
estimated at 33,000 people. This was raised to 45,000 by the time Phase II got
underway.21 Eventually, by January 2002 an estimated 72,000 men, women, and
children were disarmed and an estimated 56,000 took part in reintegration
opportunities.22
3.2.2 Phase I
Phase I of the post-1998 DDR program was inaugurated in July 1998 with the
assistance of the World Bank, the UK Department for International Development
(DFID), the Monitoring Group of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOMOG), the UN Observer Mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), and other UN
agencies. The bulk of the caseload during Phase I of the program was Sierra Leone
Army (SLA) soldiers who had surrendered to ECOMOG forces in 1998. However,
because political conditions did not permit group disarmament, the focus of the DDR
program was on encouraging individual combatants to surrender. [I believe it was a
little more complicated: the main focus of the program was on the disarmament, Formatted
demobilization and reintegration of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces, encamped at
Lungi. At the same time, the program was offering an opportunity to the RUF, and
only the latter was targeted at individual combatants]
The DDR process was designed and overseen by the newly created NCDDR, which
benefited from strong World Bank support. Field support for disarmament and
demobilization was provided by ECOMOG and, to a lesser extent, UNOMSIL.23 It also
21
For the 33,000 figure, see the Government of Sierra Leone, National Committee on Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration [hereafter NCDDR], “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
Programme,” July 15, 1998, p. 3. The 33,000 figure includes 7,000 Armed Forces of Sierra Leone
(AFSL) ex-combatants and 1,000 RUF ex-combatants detained by ECOMOG in 1998 plus an estimated
25,000 members of the CDF. The 45,000 figure appears in the Government of Sierra Leone, National
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme, Revised Programme Budget (subsequent
to the Lomé Peace Agreement), September 1999 and is broken down by groups in annex 2.
22
Annex 2 gives a figure of 48,000, as it does not include those still undergoing training at the time of
the report.
23
NCDDR, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme.”
benefited from UK financial and technical support through the Emergency Response
Team (ERT) to the Lungi demobilization center which housed the surrendered
soldiers. The DFID-funded ERT took over the management for the camps from
ECOMOG. They were responsible for provision of water, food, shelter, and health
care.24 ECOMOG was in charge of security at the sites, disarming the ex-combatants,
and disposing of collected weapons as monitored by UNOMSIL.
The reintegration component of the program was designed to provide ex-combatants

with a package of assistance that would include both short-term reinsertion benefits
and up to six-months’ reintegration support. Given the fluid nature of the security
environment during Phase I, reintegration assistance consisted primarily of paying
reinsertion benefits through the Transitional Safety Net Allowance (TSA). The TSA
was a central element of the DDR support package. It was a monetized reinsertion
entitlement of Le600,000 (equivalent to US$300 at 1998 exchange rates).25 According
to the initial DDR program document, the TSA was to be paid in two installments. The
first Le300,000 was to be paid on departure from the disarmament/demobilization site.
The second tranche was to be paid three months later at the district NCDDR
headquarters. The reasons for paying the TSA in two installments were 1) to provide
incentives for ex-combatants to remain in their districts, 2) to prevent irresponsible use
of resources; 3) to inject cash into rural areas; and 4) to tide the ex-combatants and
their dependents over until reintegration activities could begin.26
It was felt that former RUF and AFRC combatants in particular would require extensive
support to transition into civilian life. Additionally, it was unclear in mid-1998 how the
civilian population would react to the release of RUF and AFRC combatants. What is
more, the surrendered SLA soldiers refused to demobilize and rejoin society. They
were deeply concerned about the possibility of reprisals after committing atrocities
during the war. [What is missing in the analysis of phases I & II, I believe, is the
absence of security sector reform which impacted negatively on the veterans’
willingness to demobilize. Veterans were looking for employment opportunity and
refused to disarm. My memory is that we had been urging the UK to expedite security
sector reform and increase collaboration, we had good working level contacts, but it
simply didn’t happen, only in phase III. This was the primary reason for the SLA
soldiers’ refusal to demobilize, and not reprisals. It is also one of the most important
lessons for other countries emerging from civil war, that DDR efforts need to be
accompanied by security sector reform and that these efforts need to be timed and
sequenced right] In general, the commitment to DDR was very fragile during phase I,
which led to a lengthy period of encampment for these combatants. CDF combatants
were expected to be encamped for a shorter period of time, as they were assumed to
be operating close to their homes in southern Sierra Leone where they were also
extremely popular with the local population.
24
“Report on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration”, UN Integrated Regional Information
Network (IRIN), January 31, 2000.
25
See box 6 for capacity restraints on reintegration programs.
26
Government of Sierra Leone, NCDDR, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme,”
July 15, 1998, p. 11.
Thus, flexibility in program design was essential to deal with concrete differences
among beneficiaries. At the same time, it was recognized that benefits provided to all
groups had to be perceived as equivalent. All groups were to receive the TSA and be
eligible for reintegration opportunities.
Renewed fighting in late 1998 and the rebel invasion of Freetown in January 1999
brought Phase I of the DDR program to a halt. At that point, nearly 3,200 combatants
had been disarmed and demobilized, although only 1,600 of those were ultimately
discharged. The remainder were unaccounted for following the January 1999
resumption of hostilities.27
3.2.2 Phase II
Phase II of the DDR program began in July 1999, following the signing of the Lomé
Peace Agreement.28 The Lomé Agreement committed the government to
“immediately request the International Community to assist with the provision of the
necessary financial and technical resources needed for the adaptation and extension
of the existing Encampment, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
Programme in Sierra Leone, including payment of retirement benefits and other
emoluments due to former members of the SLA.” The time frame specified for
disarmament in the Lomé agreement—90 days—was highly unrealistic because of the
absence of full political commitment to the peace process on the part of the warring
parties. [That seems an understatement. The 90 days deadline was not only
unrealistic but simply not feasible, even with political commitment. I doubt the UN
even managed to get a single additional soldier on the ground within that time {figure
to be checked} and the Government and partners (not the Bank) attempted to address
the political vacuum that was created by not having the UN peacekeeping force on the
ground by pushing the DDR Program forward in the place of progress with
peacekeeping and despite the obvious lack of political will. If I could do things again, I
would have cried “foul” earlier…that’s another lessen which you correctly mention later
in the review, that DDR cannot replace political will…another lesson for the future
would be, and I don’t think you mention that, to include technical expertise in support
of peace negotiations]
Although based on Phase I, the program was subsequently amended to take into
account the changed political and security environment and was to cover all
combatants irrespective of their affiliation who surrendered prior to the conclusion of a
new peace agreement, including the newly-formed Civil Defense Forces in the
northern and eastern parts of Sierra Leone.29
27
It is presumed that the unaccounted for ex-combatants either fled or were killed.
28
“Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of
Sierra Leone,” Lomé, July 7, 1999, Article XVIII.
29
Details of the review of the Phase I program can be found in Government of Sierra Leone, NCDDR,
“Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme: Addendum,” April 9, 1999.
The instability of the political situation and unwillingness of the different groups to fully
conform to Lomé overshadowed the DDR program and caused NCDDR staff to
repeatedly plan and re-plan as they tried to respond to the shifting realities on the
ground. The DDR process was also affected by internal constraints and design
issues, which are discussed in more detail below and in section 3.2.3
During the nine months that Phase II was operational, nearly 19,000 combatants were
disarmed, and approximately 17,500 were ultimately demobilized and discharged.
This was no small accomplishment given the environment in which the DDR program
was operating. (A number of ex-combatants were unaccounted for following the
resumption of hostilities. See box 1. Figures are shown in annex 1.) A high priority
was attached to sensitization campaigns aimed at the encamped ex-combatants, the
communities in the vicinity of demobilization camps, and the communities to which the
ex-combatants would eventually return. It was assumed that with the exception of
CDF fighters, combatants were to be encamped for a period of time. CDF fighters
were to be discharged from transit camps as soon as they met the discharge criteria.
The most significant aspect of the disarmament process was that it achieved the
central goal of the entire peace process, which was to separate combatants from their
weapons and to destroy as many of those “Phase II, however, was implemented in a
weapons as possible. During Phase II, hostile environment of comprehensive
disarmament and entry into the breaches of the cease-fire agreement,
demobilization and reintegration including movement of forces, assault on
components was still based on individuals UN forces, hostage taking, destruction of
voluntarily turning in weapons, since the DDRP camps and the renewed fighting in
political conditions for group disarmament May 2000.”
still did not exist. The requirement to —Sierra Leone DDRP Review, Final Draft,
present a weapon was primarily to separate October 5, 2000
combatants from their arms, and
secondarily to discourage fraud, since lists of combatants had not been submitted as
required under Article XIX of the Lomé Peace Agreement. However, as will be seen
with Phase III disarmament, the weapons requirement was not without its problems.
An unknown number of combatants did not enter the DDR process because they
either lacked weapons entirely or used communal weapons which were unavailable to
them for disarmament purposes.
The weapons collected were registered and stored. However, there were some
problems with their disposal. According to the Joint Operations Plan of November
1999, all weapons were to be immediately disabled by United Nations Mission in
Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) troops upon registration. Some places did not have the
necessary technical equipment and expertise to do this. Indeed, the World Bank
financed technical assistance on weapons registration, storage, and destruction
because this expertise was not available at this time to UNAMSIL or to the UN
Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Additionally, weapons were not
always destroyed immediately for public relations reasons—the preference was to
have large ceremonies. The result was that collected arms were eventually looted by
the RUF and others in the days leading up to the May 2000 breakdown of the peace
process. The number of arms available also increased following the looting of
UNAMSIL weapons by the RUF and the issuance of approximately 10,000 new
weapons each to the SLA and the CDF by the British.30
TSAs also proved problematic because they attracted non-combatants who wanted to
benefit from the allowances. Unfortunately, not all disarmament centers had a
sufficient peacekeeping presence to ensure security and enforcement of regulations,
so non-combatants who did not fully meet the criteria were able to enter the program.31
Eventually, TSAs were suspended when the peace process broke down and ex-
combatants were rearmed.32
Box 1. Variable Participation in the DDR Process

As in every DDR process, there was a variable degree of participation on the part of those involved in
the fighting. In Sierra Leone, 72,000 people participated in the disarmament and demobilization
component, and close to 56,000 participated in the reintegration component. Some combatants never
participated in any aspect of the program, while others disarmed and demobilized but did not participate
in reintegration activities.
Although exact numbers are not known, there are reports of former fighters who did not participate
because they went to Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, or Guinea; feared reprisal if they participated; fought without
modern weapons (as was the case with members of the CDF); or had their guns taken away from them
by their commanders, making the former fighters ineligible for the program. The last reason was
particularly prevalent with group disarmament in Phase III, where there were reports that commanders
took guns away from people who had actually participated in combat, especially women and children, in
order to include family members or others in their groups. The lure of the Le600,000 Reinsertion Benefit
encouraged corruption at the commander level.
30
Sierra Leone DDRP Review, Final Draft, 5 October, 2000, p. 18.
31
Ibid., p. 20.
32
As described above, the first tranche of TSA payments was to be made at the end of encampment,
when ex-combatants were demobilized. However, RUF ex-combatants were unable to return to their
home communities during Phase II of the DDR process. As encamped combatants began to riot, the
UK recommended providing TSA payments in demobilization camps prior to discharge. This led to the
perception among ex-combatants and others that money was being exchanged for guns. Resumption
of hostilities and pressure from British public opinion eventually caused the UK to suspend subsequent
disbursements to the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, while focusing on other, complementary programs such
as the Commonwealth Police Task Force (CPTF) and rebuilding the national army. Britain also
continued to provide bilateral support to the DDRP through the Community Reintegration Programme
(CRP).
As TSAs were financed through the Trust Fund, resources already committed to the fund continued to
finance DDRP costs, including the TSAs. When peace broke down, the World Bank instructed the
government to stop paying TSAs, although the Bank concurred with the government’s decision to
continue expanding reintegration opportunities in an effort to stabilize the situation. This encouraged
the Government of Sierra Leone to reassess the TSA program. For Phase III, TSAs were transformed
into Reinsertion Benefit Payments, payable when ex-combatants registered with the NCDDR on return
to the communities where they proposed to settle. This helped mitigate the perception that guns were
being exchanged for money. Authors’ interviews. See also, Ted Morse and Mark Knight, “Lessons
Learned from Sierra Leone Disarmament and Demobilization of Combatants,” prepared for the
Government of Sierra Leone and the World Bank, Final Draft, April 2002, pp. 41, 94-96.
There were also approximately 16,000 ex-combatants who were disarmed and demobilized but did not
participate in the reintegration portion of the program. Reasons for this range from the complications
that arose from the reintegration process (discussed in section 6.4) to lack of interest or need. Some
combatants, for example, were able to self-reintegrate because of previous connections with
communities and employers, education level, or the possession of specific marketable skills. Others
died in the flare-ups in Sierra Leone in 1999 and 2000, as well as in some of the regional conflicts.
Although the figures are not known, it appears that the number of non-participants is not sufficiently
large to pose a serious threat to peace and security at this point. The low crime rate in Sierra Leone to
date, unusual for a post-conflict society, suggests that these individuals have either self-reintegrated or
have left the country to fight in other regional conflicts. In fact, in late 2003 and early 2004, some 4,500
former combatants returned from Liberia. They were registered by the NCDDR and became eligible for
a $200 one-time cash payment.
Phase II was suspended in May 2000 as the security situation again deteriorated.
Some 60 percent of the country became inaccessible to the government, and the UN
peacekeeping mission nearly collapsed. The peace process broke down because the
political will necessary for full implementation of the peace agreement simply did not
exist. This was manifested, for example, in resistance to establishing demobilization
centers in areas held by the RUF in April; refusal to submit nominal rolls of combatants
to the Joint Monitoring Commission as stipulated in the Lomé Agreement; training of
new SLA battalions; and the taking hostage of 500 UN peacekeepers in April, shortly
after ECOMOG troops had handed over responsibility for security to UNAMSIL.
With the resumption of hostilities in May 2000, the UK abruptly withdrew its ERT.
Despite the loss of this critical support, the NCDDR was able to continue the DDR
process, underscoring the importance of national ownership. The NCDDR ran the
camps itself, with support from UNAMSIL, the World Food Programme (WFP), the
International Medical Corps (IMC), and local contractors who continued to provide
services to combatants in demobilization centers.33 Additionally, the NCDDR initiated
some training programs for ex-combatants during Phase II.34
UNAMSIL’s assistance became increasingly important as the DDR process

transitioned from Phase II to the Interim Phase, given the withdrawal of the ERT. The
ERT had played a key role in pre-May 2000 camp management, by providing the
logistical and administrative support necessary to operate the camps. Both NCDDR
staff and key international actors stated that Phase II demobilization would not have
been possible without the support from the DFID-funded ERT. When ERT staff left
33
IMC was originally contracted by the ERT [not only contracted but brought into the country because
none, repeat none, of the existing INGOs such as MSF, Medicin du Monde, etc was willing to provide
service to disarmed (!) ex-combatants]. to provide medical services in the camps as part of the ERT’s
responsibility for camp management. IMC did not withdraw from Sierra Leone after May 2000, and
continued to provide services until its contract expired in November 2000. NCDDR subsequently
contracted for medical services from the Ministry of Public Health. According to Morse and Knight, the
quality of medical care declined as a result. See Morse and Knight, “Lessons Learned,” pp. 56-58.
34
The World Bank, “The World Bank Administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund (TF022604) for the Sierra
Leone Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program, Progress Reports #2 and #3,” March
31, 2000 and June 30, 2000.
due to the resumption of fighting, its departure created a vacuum as crucial camp
leadership left virtually overnight. NCDDR could not step in—virtually overnight—and
fill this gap on its own. UNAMSIL assisted with the immediate need and increasingly
began to take responsibility for camp management. In addition to its support for
UNAMSIL, the UK continued military support to the GOSL, including reform of the
Armed Forces and support to civilian police. With the UK providing key support for the
peace process, and therefore DDRP, and UNAMSIL’s willingness to react to
emergencies, NCDDR was able to respond to many of the problems that arose during
the encampment stage. The fact that NCDDR was faced with an abrupt departure of
camp management did speak to the need for greater national ownership of the
process, something that was rectified in the Interim Phase and Phase III. (See results
from the Interim Phase assessment as listed below.) [Yes, one can see it that way. At
the same time, one could also say that the degree of ownership that existed only
enabled NCDDR to further step-up to the plate and fill the gap left by the sudden
departure of the ERT. It is however correct, that ownership, or at least the conscious
awareness of it, further increased following the ERT’s departure. One of my criticisms
of the ERT concept was less the technical expertise, but the way it was
provided/structured, accountable more to DfID than to the Executive Secretary,
NCDDR. This was a fundamental difference to the FMPU. Government had
negotiated the contract with PWC and “owned” the FMPU, so to speak. It is for that
reason that I am quite ambivalent to the evaluation team’s praise of the ERT support
and its alleged flexibility at several occasions in the evaluation. From my point of view
it only is a second best option with clear disadvantages, as we have seen. The much
better option would have been a contract of the same expertise through the MDTF. By
the way, just prior to the collapse of the peace process, Government had started to
negotiate the extension of the ERT contract with Crown Agents, this time to be
financed through the MDTF. The price came tumbling down… but the negotiations
were not concluded due to the collapse of the peace process]
3.2.3 Interim Phase
Between May 2000 and the resumption of the peace process in April 2001, the
disarmament and demobilization components of the DDRP operated at a very low
level, since only 2,600 people chose to enter the DDR process. (See annex 1.)
During this period, NCDDR continued to expand its capacity to provide reintegration
assistance to those who had already been demobilized and discharged. Of necessity,
the reintegration opportunities developed during this period were located in
government-held areas in the western and southern parts of the country. Some
11,500 former combatants registered for reintegration assistance by March 31, 2001,
and training places were created for just over 11,000 of them. An additional 3,000
training places were being developed by the end of the Interim Phase.35
NCDDR used this period as an opportunity to reflect on the strengths and weaknesses
35
Leone Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program, Progress Report #6,” March 31, 2001,
p. 5.
of the program. An assessment of the DDR program was conducted in consultation

with major stakeholders such as the World Bank, DFID, UNAMSIL, and other key
partners in Sierra Leone, in order to prepare for the resumption of the full DDR
program. In examining the DDRP to date, the assessment team determined that the
breakdown in the peace process was not due to a failure on the part of the DDR
process per se but rather to “non-compliance with DDR-related Lomé conditions by
every party.”36 There were a number of factors external to the DDR process that
limited its effectiveness during Phases I and II. These included: (1) the lack of
government control over 50 percent of the country, which impeded deployment of
peacekeepers, NCDDR staff, and others; (2) questions regarding the sincerity of the
RUF’s intentions to disarm; (3) doubts about the government’s intention to fully include
RUF leaders in the peace process; and 4) the fact that voluntary disarmament did not
take place for all combatant groups.
There were also internal factors that affected the implementation of the DDRP. The
assessment team stressed the following concerns:
• The unsynchronized implementation of program elements. Disarmament

began when demobilization camps were not ready to receive ex-combatants
from the disarmament sites. Early on, UNOMSIL and UNAMSIL were not
deployed to disarmament sites and demobilization camps at the time and in
the numbers necessary for providing camp security, as well as disarming,
collecting, and destroying weapons. Demobilization started before photos and
identity cards were uniformly available. Implementation started before data-
processing capacity was adequate to support the registration of ex-
combatants. Pre-discharge orientation was not always available in the places
and at the times needed to assure smooth through-put. The availability of
reintegration opportunities was not synchronized with the rest of the process.
• Inadequate program management. The program was not managed in a way

that could predict discontinuities and inform managers of bottlenecks, for
example by using some type of operations management approach or critical
path analysis. Management was also highly centralized and controlled, which
may have lessened malfeasance, but stifled innovation needed to cope with a
rapidly changing environment. There were also concerns that the RUF was
not sufficiently integrated into program management, and that the program
was consequently not being managed in a way that would truly promote
national interests.
• Inconsistant TSA distribution. NCDDR gave in to demands (expressed in the

form of camp riots) for early payment of TSAs, before combatants returned to
their homes. This was coupled with erratic and subsequently suspended
payment of TSAs. 37
36
Sierra Leone DDRP Review, Final Draft, October 5, 2000, p. 6.
37
Ibid.
NCDDR and key partners used this period to adapt programs to better respond to the
constraints. Some of changes made as a result were as follows:
• NCDDR assumed greater ownership of the program. One of the

assessment team’s recommendations was for the “GOSL to take full
ownership of the DDRP; to stress and encompass Sierra Leonean
national interests; and override partisan, special and self-interests,
which have earlier plagued the DDRP.”38
• NCDDR assumed greater responsibility for the management of the
DDR process. The abrupt departure of the ERT demonstrated the
need not only for national ownership, but also for more direct
involvement in the implementation of activities.
• Collaboration between UNAMSIL and NCDDR increased as called for
in the Joint Operating Plan (JOP). British funding for UNAMSIL helped
facilitate this collaboration.
• Weapons collected by UNAMSIL were destroyed immediately and on-
site to prevent a reoccurrence of the events that led up to the
resumption of fighting in 2000.
• The NCDDR created an operations center to facilitate the coordination
of its disarmament and demobilization activities and those of key
partners.
• Two UNAMSIL staff were seconded to this center.
• The JOP was revised once again, as were the operational plans and
budgets of NCDDR units.39
• Policy papers were developed during this period to help guide
subsequent activities.40
3.2.4 Phase III
The third and final phase of the Sierra Leone DDRP began on May 18, 2001, in
Kambia and Port Loko. As explained above, all aspects of the DDR process had
undergone some important adjustments in response to the altered political
environment. In addition, the change of RUF leadership and the deployment of British
paratroopers to shore up the security situation created a climate in which serious
disarmament could take place.
38
Ibid., p. ii
39
The JOP was revised to include greater collaboration with the UN. See section 5.6.1 for details.
40
Leone Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program, Progress Report #5,” December 31,
2000, and authors’ interviews, 2004.
During Phase III, the flexibility of the program came into full play. This showed both
the importance of having a plan and the ability and willingness to adjust that plan to
changing realities. For example, in order to capitalize on the improved political
climate, disarmament and demobilization were fast-tracked. During Phase III, nearly
47,800 men, women, and children were demobilized in groups. This was more than
the total number of ex-combatants anticipated at the beginning of Phase II
demobilization. Rather than concentrating combatants in a few demobilization centers,
disarmament and demobilization took place two districts at a time (one each from RUF
and CDF-controlled areas). Encampment for all combatants lasted three weeks or
less, and in some cases considerably less. The TSA was transformed into the
Reinsertion Benefit. Benefits were paid once ex-combatants registered for
reintegration assistance with a regional NCDDR office. The first tranche was paid on
registration; the second was paid three months later.
Phase III also demonstrated the importance of political will. Commitment to the peace
process enabled a shift to group disarmament. This had important consequences.
Commanders were required, for example, to bring in two weapons for every three
individuals demobilized.
The capacity-strengthening activities that had occurred both at headquarters and at

the district level during the preceding phases demonstrated their value during Phase
III. The NCDDR staff were able to manage the increased volume of through-put as
well as the accelerated tempo of the process. It was also during this period that the
reintegration component became more active. Those who chose to participate in
vocational training received a training stipend of Le60,000 for a maximum of six
months, plus a toolkit. Those who chose agricultural training received in-kind support
of roughly equivalent value.41
These adjustments and prioritizations necessitated some trade-offs. The fast-tracking

of disarmament and demobilization activity meant that the pre-discharge orientation
had to be severely curtailed. Group disarmament enabled commanders to determine
who would be considered a combatant and who would not. Giving commanders the
power of decision had a major impact on female combatants (both women and girls),
as commanders frequently eliminated them from their disarmament groups. It also
enabled commanders to inflate the number of individuals undergoing DDR, which
increased pressure on the budget. Some argue that many combatants were excluded
from the DDR process, particularly those in the CDF areas, who had defended their
homes with traditional weapons. The DDRP included only modern weapons. This
decision was hard but politically prudent, necessitated both by the basic goals of the
exercise and by the resource envelope.
Additionally, the greatly increased number of ex-combatants and the speed with which
they were demobilized outstripped the capacity of implementing partners to provide
training opportunities in parts of the country that had been under RUF control for much
41
Initially, the value of the agricultural package was assessed by ex-combatants to be less than the
Le60,000 per month training stipend; the amount of rice provided was eventually doubled.
of the past decade and had little of the necessary infrastructure. This meant that ex-
combatants in the potentially most volatile parts of the country had to wait months
before entering training programs. In order to provide some means of mitigating
resultant discontent, to win the confidence of communities in newly-disarmed areas,
and as a cooling-off measure for former combatants, UNAMSIL designed stop-gap
programs. These were not part of the DDRP, but sought to complement it.
According to UNSAMIL [you ever saw an evaluation of these programs?], stop-

programs were
small (approximately $15,000 each), labour-intensive, community infrastructural
projects, implemented by partners, focused on volatile areas with high
concentrations of ex-combatants, and designed to engage both ex-combatant
and community youth in community infrastructural rehabilitation projects. This
provide[d] a time-window to NCDDR to get ROPs [Reintegration Opportunities
Programs] operational … The projects and the resulting interaction within the
communities [made] a significant social impact and contribution to
Reintegration.42
The projects were funded by a combination of UNDP and DFID resources and run by
United Nations Volunteers (UNVs), who lived in the relevant communities and worked
with the communities to identify projects. [I am very skeptical. Do you know how long
it takes to get a UNV? And then, they were living in the communities…. DDR must
have been long, long completed in these districts!!!] According to UN sources, UNVs
found working with female community members most rewarding. [you are joking?, are
you? … needs rephrasing as this could be understood as an unintended joke] They
identified the best projects, did not abscond with project money, and saw projects
through to completion.
Opinions on the significance of the stop-gap programs are mixed. Some individuals
interviewed for this evaluation suggested that, while such quick impact programs can
theoretically be useful, the stop-gap programs were not implemented as rapidly as
they could or should have been, and their actual value has been exaggerated. In
contrast, others interviewed for this evaluation, including senior NCDDR staff, felt that,
overall, stop-gap programs had a positive impact. While the number of stop-gaps was
not large, NCDDR, as a member of the approvals committee, was able to ensure that
projects with the greatest potential impact on newly-disarmed and demobilized soldiers
were given priority. Stop-gaps were considered helpful in reducing tensions among
ex-combatants who were unable to access training programs rapidly and for whom
other employment options were unavailable. They also assisted reconciliation
because they provided the first opportunity for ex-combatants and non-combatants to
work together at community level.43
42
UNAMSIL, DDR Co-ordination Section, “Aide Memoir on the Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Sierra
Leone,” March 6, 2003, p. 8,; and authors’ interviews, 2004.
43
According to UNAMSIL, the stop-gap programs also brought members of different fighting forces
together in constructive daily activities.
It is impossible for the evaluators to determine whether the resources allocated to

stop-gap programs could have been used more effectively in some other way, for
example if channeled through the NCDDR itself.44 Nor is it possible to determine if the
resources allocated to stop-gap programs were used in as cost-effective a manner as
possible. What can be said is that the involvement of NCDDR with the approvals
committee, along with of community member involvement in project design, was
essential. Any future effort to provide quick-impact projects of this nature should
prioritize close linkages among all local stakeholders.
4 The Challenge of National Ownership
Before turning to a discussion of the main findings of the evaluation, it is necessary to

underscore the importance of national ownership. While the principle of national
ownership is well recognized in the development arena, it is often difficult to achieve in
post-conflict settings. There are two main reasons for this. The first is that
international actors find it difficult to promote national ownership of post-conflict
recovery. The second is that government ownership is often taken to be the
equivalent of national ownership. Difficult as it is for governments in post-conflict
environments to achieve ownership over processes such as DDR, it can be even more
difficult to bring all parties to the conflict into such processes.
In understanding how to promote national ownership, it is important to differentiate

between responsibility and capacity. Local actors own a process when they have the
responsibility for decisions with respect to objectives, policies, strategies, program
design, and implementation modalities. If capacity is weak, as it almost always is in
post-conflict environments, it can and should be built. In the short term, capacity can
be supplemented in various ways. Inadequate capacity and the short time frame for
post-conflict peace operations should not become an excuse for members of the
international community to continue to exert control over activities that they support.
However, because conflict-affected countries are frequently heavily dependent on
external funding for the peace processes, they are not in a strong position when it
comes to driving implementation. What is more, peace operations involve security and
political actors who are often less sensitive than development actors to the concept of
ownership.
4.1 Government of Sierra Leone

Although Sierra Leone is a highly aid-dependent country, and its human and
institutional resources have been severely depleted by more than a decade of war –
issues that can influence the degree to which national ownership is established – the
government nonetheless made critical decisions about the shape of the DDR process
from its inception, especially after the interim phase assessment. The assessment
defined ownership as having three key aspects:
44
UNAMSIL reported spending $900,000 on 5,000 beneficiaries. [beneficiaries, not ex-combatants??
i.e. $180 per beneficiary?]
• First, the program must remain neutral to be credible and

acceptable to combatants who want to disarm and demobilize.
• Second, ownership does not imply that the Government of Sierra
Leone does everything itself. Rather, GOSL should manage others
to achieve results. The government, as owner of the process,
should define the desired results.
• Third, government ownership cannot become an excuse for
reduced international support. Such support must be provided in
ways that empower the government and its leadership of the DDR
process. 45
By Phase III, national ownership was solidified since the government could claim
ownership of the design of the DDRP, the institutional framework established to
implement the program, and the funding mechanism created to support the
government program.
There appear to be several reasons why the Government of Sierra Leone was able to
exert its ownership. First, it understood that, although Sierra Leone received
significant support from international partners, the international community would
eventually leave, and it would be up to Sierra Leone nationals to continue the process
of consolidating peace. This created a strong incentive to ensure that peace-related
processes such as DDR reflected Sierra Leone’s priorities and vision. Second, the
government had been elected in free and fair elections in 1996, elections that had
been demanded by many ordinary Sierra Leoneans as a first step toward achieving
peace. The government therefore had a degree of legitimacy that is often lacking in
other post-conflict environments. Third, there was a core group of government
officials, led by President Kabbah, who were wholly committed to the peace process
and worked extremely hard to make the DDR program and other key elements of the
peace process successful. Finally, the government made good decisions about how to
supplement its capacity to design and implement a DDR process in key areas.
Nonetheless, as the DDR process was implemented there were tensions between the
GOSL and donors. As one Sierra Leone official observed, although the key donors
were present when the DDR process was created and in principle signed on to it, in
practice, a number of them went their own way when it came to implementation.
Another participant from the government noted, “Everyone came with their own
institutional culture and their own models.”
4.2 Donors
Not all donors agreed that the government actually controlled the process. This
disagreement stemmed from various beliefs about the role the national government
should assume vis-à-vis international organizations, as well as from differing opinions
about the impact of financial inequities. As one UN official stated, “How do you define
45
Ibid.
ownership where 80 to 90 percent of a program is externally supported? At best, it

can be a joint venture.” This comment demonstrates that the GOSL had the greatest
responsibility but could make only limited financial contributions, as well as that some
of the government’s partners did not see the GOSL as owning the process.
While the UK provided important political, financial, and technical support to the entire
DDR process, it also made some choices that created problems for the government.
Having provided crucial logistic and administrative support to the disarmament and
demobilization phases, the UK abruptly withdrew the ERT following the resumption of
hostilities in April 2000. Additionally, while it had provided the initial funding for the
Multi-Donor Trust Fund and supported the concept of the Transitional Safety Net
Allowances, the UK did not fulfill its pledge to the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF)
following the breakdown of the peace process in May 2000. It also raised serious
questions about the TSAs.
Along with other donors, the UK also supported parallel reintegration programs that did
not go through the NCDDR, but were designed by donors and implemented by NGOs
or international consulting firms chosen by the donors. This limited the government’s
ability to locate reintegration programs in areas it deemed of highest priority. Some of
the parallel programs did not reduce the NCDDR caseload, as the implementing
partners did not punch, or mark, identity cards, or began to do so only after having
trained a sizeable number of ex-combatants.46 Donors also pressed the government
to enter into partnerships with international NGOs (INGOs) in order to more effectively
implement the reintegration portion of the DDRP, even when those INGOs were
philosophically opposed to key elements of the government’s DDR programs. While
the resulting parallel programs diluted government ownership, the government’s ability
to sign MOUs with major implementing partners ensured that it had a degree of
oversight over these activities.
4.3 RUF/GOSL
Important as government ownership of the DDR process is, it will be successful to the
extent that all parties involved feel ownership; that is, to the extent that ownership is
truly national. In Sierra Leone’s case, there was no RUF or AFRC participation in the
development of the 1998 DDRP, for obvious reasons. [Nice of the evaluation team not
to beat the program designers… but the Bank tried to obtain relevant knowledge. One
of the preparatory studies looked into the matter, focused on former RUF members,
tried to get resource persons involved, etc…But, perhaps that’s a little too sensitive to
write about, we certainly had to be very careful at that time….] However, some
observers of the Lomé negotiations feel that an opportunity to bring the RUF and
AFRC into the process was missed in mid-1999.47 The Lomé agreement merely
ratified the 1998 DDRP, without discussion with the armed opposition about the
46
Identify cards were issued to all demobilized combatants. These were punched upon receipt of
deliverables such as training and allowances.
47
Although there were RUF and AFRC liaison officers at the Executive Secretariat, it does not appear
that either the government or rebel organizations saw these officers as well-integrated into the process.
management or contents of that program. While it is impossible at this juncture to

determine whether efforts to include the armed opposition in discussions about the
DDR process at Lomé would have had any impact on the course of events in 2000, a
more inclusive approach would have been desirable in the view of the evaluators.48
The changes in RUF leadership in 2000 brought more pragmatic individuals into the
process, and the confidence-building measures that were put in place after the May
2000 breakdown in Phase II appear to have contributed to a sense of RUF ownership
of the process. In particular, the NCDDR Executive Secretariat staff was able to
maintain open channels to the RUF leadership, and continue the dialogue with all
fighting forces between May 2000 and April 2001, when the DDR process was
essentially in a holding pattern. This gave both the peace process and the Executive
Secretariat greater credibility in the eyes of the fighting forces, particularly the RUF,
when the DDR process resumed in 2001. Once the DDR process resumed, the
creation of the Tripartite Committee could be seen as a means of making sure that the
views of all fighting forces were represented at a high level. RUF representatives took
part in the meetings of the Tripartite Committee from that body’s inception. They also
participated in planning and implementing the DDRP through the NCDDR beginning in
August 2001. The RUF joined the government delegation at the June 2001 donor
meeting. Additionally, it pressured recalcitrant parties and was a means of helping to
reinforce political will and commitment to the peace process.
A high degree of national ownership on the part of all relevant stakeholders is

particularly important because, while countries can learn from one another’s
experiences, the ultimate form of DDR processes must be homegrown. As in other
sectors, key principles underlying successful programming can be identified. The way
in which these principles are applied must take into account each country’s specific
environment and needs. It is only when national authorities are responsible for making
decisions, and accept that they must be held accountable by their people for the
decisions they take, that DDR processes reflecting local conditions will emerge.
5 Core Issues
With every major undertaking, particularly one as important to the national destiny as
DDR, there are a number of core issues that largely determine the outcome of the
process. The Sierra Leone DDR process demonstrates quite clearly that this includes
a number of critical factors which are exogenous to the design and implementation of
the DDR process. This section focuses on issues that can be influenced or shaped by
those who are responsible for the DDR process, including:
48
This is a point that the external actors facilitating negotiations among warring parties in particular
need to take into account. There is a disturbing trend in peace negotiations since the Dayton
Agreement in the mid-1990s that seems to prioritize speed over taking the time to hammer out
compromises on key issues. Good point, see my earlier comment. This could be a point in its own
right, not only a footnote
• The institutional framework for the DDR process;

• Process management;
• Elements of program design, such as whether to provide targeted assistance,
how to address the special issues of women and children, the types of
assistance to be provided, funding mechanisms, and the development of a
database to track ex-combatants;
• Elements of program implementation, such as linking DDR to long-term
recovery and rehabilitation, human and institutional capacity, and the
existence of a secure environment;
• The extent to which reconciliation objectives can be promoted by the DDR
process; and
• Program financing.
5.1 Institutional Framework

The institutional framework within which a DDR program is designed and implemented
can help (1) maximize the positive linkages between the peace process and the DDR
process and minimize the negative linkages; (2) promote buy-in from key domestic and
external stakeholders; and (3) promote the effective and efficient use of resources.
The institutional framework within which the DDR process operated in Sierra Leone
evolved over time. NCDDR began life as a unit within the Ministry for Rehabilitation,
Reconstruction, and Resettlement. Following the failure of the Abidjan peace process
in 1997, and the restoration of the elected government in 1998, the government
decided, on the recommendation of the World Bank, that the body overseeing the DDR
process should have greater autonomy and a higher political profile. Thus, the
National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration was created
in July 1998.
The NCDDR was chaired by President Kabbah and supported by an independent

Executive Secretariat. With the breakdown of the peace process in 2000, the NCDDR
implemented a number of changes, including the creation of the Joint Committee on
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration, and the Technical Coordinating
Committees (TCCs). In addition, it implemented measures intended to strengthen the
capacity of the Executive Secretariat to carry out its tasks in the interests of the
country as a whole. By 2001, when the bulk of the demobilization occurred, the Sierra
Leone structure incorporated a number of features that helped achieve these
objectives. (A chart showing the central components of the institutional framework is
found in annex 4.)
5.1.1 National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
The NCDDR was a political and policymaking body. Reflecting the national ownership
of the GOSL and key stakeholders, the Committee was responsible for developing
policy on DDR and providing overall guidance to the Executive Secretariat.
Membership consisted of representatives of government, the RUF, the AFRC, the
CDF, UN peace operations, and donors.49 The establishment of the NCDDR was a
clear demonstration of the government’s commitment to the DDR process specifically
and to the peace process generally. The NCDDR provided a forum for key national
stakeholders to meet and discuss issues. The Committee met frequently prior to the
breakdown of the peace process in May 2000. The resumption of hostilities and the
taking of UN hostages indicated to the government that the RUF was not committed to
the peace process, and it significantly reduced the role of the NCDDR.
The government accordingly began to rely more on the Executive Secretariat and the
TCCs, both of which it found to be particularly effective in moving the process forward.
The TCCs deliberated on current issues and problems and considered next steps in
DDRP implementation. The TCCs were made up of technical representatives of the
government, the RUF, the CDF, and the UN. They submitted proposals to the
Tripartite Committee for consideration and decision.
5.1.2 Joint Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

(Tripartite Committee)
Once the NCDDR became less active, it became clear that it would be necessary to
create a body that could support the political and technical management of the DDR Deleted: focus on
Program, while the NCDDR remained the forum for discussing broader policy issues.
This led to the creation of the Joint Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization, and
Reintegration when the demobilization process resumed in 2001. This committee was
chaired by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and was
attended by representatives of the GOSL, the RUF, and the UN, with the Executive
Secretary representing the secretariat. [The ES was the secretary of the TCC, and
took responsibility for technical inputs to the TCC] The Tripartite Committee co-opted
the TCCs. The TCC for disarmament and development, for example, was chaired by
the Executive Secretariat of the NCDDR. Other ad hoc committees were also
established to monitor the overall implementation of the program.
The Tripartite Committee met regularly to discuss implementation of the DDR process.
It became quite effective in setting the pace of disarmament during Phase III, as well
as in tracking the implementation of the process and making necessary political
decisions. In doing so, it provided a parallel political mechanism that was very
important for the success of the peace process because other critical, non-DDR issues
were often raised in this forum, keeping the DDR process within the context of the
larger peace process.
The Joint Committee thereby provided a forum for building confidence that extended
49
Initially, the UK High Commissioner represented the donor community. He was later joined by the
U.S. Ambassador. According to Morse and Knight, although the international community was present in
advisory role, international community politics reportedly reduced NCDDR efficiency, because donors
were at times risk averse and/or had their domestic constituencies to consider. (“Lessons Learned,” p.
31.)
beyond the DDR process itself.50 As a critical confidence building measure, this
committee provided an impartial venue for resolution of problems that arose in
implementing Phase III of DDR. A similar mechanism was tried in Angola during the
United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) III. It was less successful there
due to the absence of political will, demonstrating that such mechanisms can
strengthen, but not create, that will.
5.1.3 Executive Secretariat of the NCDDR (ES/DDR)
Previous DDR processes have underscored the importance of a national body,

centrally located, with high-level political backing to manage DDR. The Sierra Leone
experience confirms this, as well as the importance of the choice of executive
secretary and other key staff. By all accounts, the second executive secretary played
a key role in relations with the government, donors, and with former warring factions,
particularly after the change in leadership of the RUF in 2000.51 An evaluation of the
disarmament and demobilization component of the DDR process concluded:
What made the ES/DDR institution effective? Most important were:

continuity of the institution; dedication to achieving the D&D objective;
singleness of purpose; detailed planning but flexible implementation;
honest openness to maximize partner contribution; willingness to use
expatriates and their experience without sacrificing Sierra Leone
ownership and overriding interest; barely adequate donor funding;
willingness to use the GOSL’s own funds and flexibility to shift sources of
funds to meet cash requirements; ability to motivate and keep dedicated
Sierra Leone staff even in the face of mortal danger and personal
threats; adequate internal management systems and procedures based
on tight accountability; accurate record keeping and data processing; a
dedication to operations; effective coordination of operations with
partners.52
As a Committee (rather than a Commission like the NCRRR), the NCDDR

enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy from the rest of government, which
insulated it somewhat from political pressures and bureaucratic constraints.
The Secretariat was able to forge a strong partnership with a complex set of
stakeholders, including the government and the other warring parties, donors,
international and national implementation partners, civil society, and community
50
For example, issues discussed at the Tripartite meetings included cease-fire violations, release of
RUF prisoners held by the government, deployment of UNAMSIL troops, post-disarmament weapons
collection plans, and the RUF’s alleged links to Al Qaeda.
51
The first executive secretary was reported to be an able administrator but, as a Sierra Leone national
who had lived outside the country for some thirty years, he was less able to manage the political
aspects of the job.
52
Morse and Knight, “Lessons Learned,” p. 36.
organizations. By and large, the institution came to gain the confidence not
only of the major actors but also of the individual ex-combatants it was set up to
serve. It ended up as the focal institution to which ex-combatants could bring
their problems and grievances, seek support, and even vent their anger or
frustration. The fact that it was viewed as an independent civilian institution
staffed by civilians, assiduously projecting a high level of neutrality and even-
handedness in its treatment of the combatants, also contributed to its success.
5.1.4 Informal Channels
The Sierra Leone DDR experience points to the important role that informal contacts
and channels play in facilitating and moving a DDR process forward. In addition to the
formal structures established to develop and implement the DDR process, as well as
the general peace process, there were numerous contacts among key stakeholders
outside formal channels. These involved, for example, extended family networks and
relations, back-channel dialogues, and other informal discussions. All of these
contributed to the resolution of issues, building confidence among the key
stakeholders. Of particular note, there were informal conversations on the margins at
formal Tripartite Committee and NCDDR meetings.
5.1.5 Financial Management and Procurement Unit
The Financial Management and Procurement Unit (FMPU) was created as a condition
of the Community Reintegration and Rehabilitation Project (CRRP.) It was a
mechanism to provide fiduciary safeguards and technical capacity not available locally.
Along with the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, coordinated by the World Bank, the FMPU was
critically important for reassuring donors, the ex-combatants, and the Sierra Leone
community at large, that money would be used for purposes intended. By minimizing
the opportunities for fraud and leakages, the FMPU protected the Executive
Secretariat from political and personal pressures and enabled Secretariat staff to
operate in a transparent and accountable manner. Price-Waterhouse-Coopers (PWC),
which implemented the FMPU for the government, following an international
competitive bidding process, employed a combination of local and expatriate staff.
PWC initially assumed that the FMPU’s internal control unit would function primarily on
the basis of desk studies, but it rapidly became evident that effective internal control
required the enhanced field-presence of FMPU staff.53
One of the most important challenges facing nations mired in or emerging from war is
the lack of or debilitation of institutional memory. Staff knowledge is weak with regard
to the various mandate, regulatory, and statutory frameworks and requirements,
operational modalities, and organizational cultures of various donors. The importation
or creation in Sierra Leone of such capacity, in the ready-made shape of the FMPU,
53
According to the bidding document, “All staff of the [FMPU] will be based in Freetown, Sierra Leone,
however, some travel will be required to the provincial capitals and district headquarters in order to
assist in monitoring the regional financial officers and implementing partners. It is expected that middle
level FMPU technical staff will be required to travel up-country approximately 5 days per quarter.”
(“Description of Services” [Appendix A], n.d., p. 10.)
was therefore essential to the success of the DDR process. Although the FMPU
served the NCRRR/ NaCSA, in addition to the NCDDR, it was essentially a stand-
alone venture separate from other public institutions. Moreover, the MDTF budget was
not integrated in the national budget. The FMPU’s procurement, disbursement,
reporting, and auditing modalities did provide a beneficial exposure to modern, above-
board business practices for the large number of implementation partners involved,
and the business community in general. The capacity-building element could have
been enhanced by designing opportunities for linkages, and knowledge and
experience transfers to line ministries, as well as other institutions entrusted with the
management and procurement of substantial public resources. [Only at additional
costs, and that should be stated!] That said, it is gratifying to note that NaCSA’s
Financial Directorate is benefiting from what the FMPU has left behind. Additionally,
PWC was able to help four Sierra Leone nationals qualify as certified accountants.
5.1.6 Influence of Key International Partners
The Sierra Leone experience underscores the importance for the success of a DDR
process of the positions adopted by key international partners. The Sierra Leone
peace process, as well as the DDR process specifically, benefited enormously from
the support of the international community, including its regional partners. The nature
and scope of the support provided exceeded that of many previous international
undertakings of a similar nature. This can be illustrated by briefly examining the
policies and activities of three major international partners: the United Nations,
especially UNAMSIL, the World Food Programme, and UNICEF; the World Bank; and
the UK.54
The political and security role of the United Nations evolved over time, growing after
the ERT pulled out in May 2000. The peace operation’s mandate was increasingly
strengthened, and UNAMSIL benefited from operational support from the UK.
UNAMSIL, in particular, played an important role in supporting the implementation of Deleted: implementing
the DDRP. Initially limited to monitoring and then operating under a Chapter 6
mandate that was interpreted rather conservatively, the UN peacekeeping mission
became progressively more proactive and its support more constructive.55 UNAMSIL
provided key logistical and administrative support for the camps after May 2000.
54
Regional actors are examined in more detail in section 7.
55
The initial UNOMSIL mandate of July 1998 was limited to monitoring. The first UNAMSIL mandate
extended beyond monitoring but was under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter. In February 2000,
UNAMSIL’s mandate was strengthened to Chapter 7, and the number of troops nearly doubled (from
6,000 to 11,000). After the UK withdrew logistical support for the demobilization process following the
resumption of hostilities in 2000, UNAMSIL, along with NCDDR, eventually picked up some of the slack.
UNOMSIL and UNAMSIL mandates are at S/RES/1181, July 13, 1998, http://ods-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/203/28/PDF/N9820328.pdf?OpenElement; S/RES/1270 (1999),
http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/315/02/PDF/N9931502.pdf?OpenElement; and S/RES/
1289 (2000), http://ods-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/283/50/PDF/N0028350.pdf?OpenElement> in March 2001, authorized
troop size reached its highest level (17,500). See S/RES1346 (2001), http://ods-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/312/19/PDF/N0131219.pdf?OpenElement.
NCDDR would not have been able to administer the camps without UNAMSIL support.
The UN was also responsible for disarmament during Phases II and III, and it provided
the essential security for the DDR process. Also of note was the role that the
UNAMSIL Force Commander assumed after May 2000, developing personal
relationships with the fighting forces, especially the RUF, and building confidence and
trust. In addition, UNAMSIL provided support through its DDR unit, including stop-gap
programs and technical support through the TCCs and the NCDDR Operations
Centers.
The World Food Programme provided important support to the demobilization process
from 1998 onward by providing food for the ex-combatants. UNICEF also played a
crucial role, assuming responsibility for reintegrating the child soldiers, which reduced
the burden on the NCDDR.56 Finally, the fact that the UN Resident Coordinator
became the Deputy SRSG promoted collaboration between the political and security
wings of the UN, on the one hand, and the development wing, on the other. This
increased the overall impact of the UN’s role.
The UN’s role was not without its shortcomings. Some of the negative aspects of UN
involvement included the initial weak mandate, a conservative interpretation of the
mandate, the varying quality of UN troops, the overly-liberal interpretation of criteria for
people being disarmed, and misinformation provided on program benefits to lure
combatants into disarmament process.57 The rapid turnover rate of UN troops and
military observers was also a problem, as there was little institutional memory and
relationships constantly had to be re-formed. In fact, NCDDR, with support from its
partners, eventually had to request that key UNAMSIL staff collaborating with NCDDR
be rotated less frequently.58
The United Kingdom’s contribution has been characterized as “crucial but inconsistent
leadership.”59 The UK provided critical political and military support for the
government throughout the peace process, but especially during the negotiations for
the Lomé agreement and after Lomé broke down in 2000. Britain assisted the UN in
strengthening UNAMSIL’s operational capacity. It also enhanced security through its
active military role in 2000 and its support for other pillars of the peace process. This
support included the strengthening and restructuring of the police, the development of
the new Sierra Leone Army, and other aspects of the Sierra Leone Security Sector
Reform Programme. The UK supported the DDR process from 1996, and, in
particular, provided critical logistical, technical, and financial assistance for
disarmament and demobilization activities. It also provided critical political support for
56
More detail on UNICEF’s role and the program for child combatants is found in section 6.3.6.
57
Ex-combatants and NCDDR staff interviewed stated that UN peacekeepers would sometimes
exaggerate when discussing the benefits to be provided in order to entice combatants into the program.
This caused problems later, as frustration arose over the fact that initial expectations were not met.
58
After a while, NCDDR developed an information packet for incoming UNAMSIL personnel and
undertook regular briefings, in an additional attempt to overcome this problem.
59
Morse and Knight, “Lessons Learned,” pp. 40-42. Additional information on the UK role is found in
section 5.1.
the DDR process in Sierra Leone and international fora. At the same time, Britain’s
withdrawal of support at a critical moment in the DDR process, particularly the
precipitous withdrawal of the ERT in 2000, created problems for the NCDDR.
The World Bank’s contribution was vital throughout the process. The World Bank’s
approach supported the government’s national ownership of the DDR process. At the
outset, the Bank provided critical financial and technical support through the PPF for
the design of the program. It reinforced national ownership, as well as national
management, by strengthening the capacity of the NCDDR at the headquarters,
regional, and district levels. Despite the high risk due to the uncertainty of the peace
process in 1998, the World Bank accepted responsibility of setting up the Multi-Donor
Trust Fund for DDR, which unified donor support on one set of program objectives. It
also unified support for one set of procurement, financial, management, disbursement,
and reporting arrangements. Furthermore, the Bank’s mobilization capacity, and its
fiduciary oversight, encouraged donors to support the DDR process, including several
countries without a presence in Sierra Leone. The World Bank’s part in the
establishment of the FMPU provided the level of comfort necessary for the
international community to devote adequate resources to the DDR process, in an
environment otherwise characterized by a high level of corruption. In addition to
administering the MDTF, the World Bank fielded personnel who were highly committed
and contributed to the success of the DDR program. The Bank even financed Deleted: also provided
technical support to UNAMSIL for weapons disposal. [We do not have the technical
expertise but drew up the TOR and recruited the firm]
More generally, through the Economic Recovery Support Fund and the CRRP, the
Bank assisted the rehabilitation of Sierra Leone’s economy and society. This provided
a conducive environment for the success of the DDR program. Furthermore, the Bank
supported the development of the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (IPRSP),
which provided the necessary linkage to address the root causes of the conflict.
However, the Bank’s role, vital as it has been, could have been strengthened if the
coverage of the MDTF had extended to include disarmament activities. Its role could Deleted: -related
also have been strengthened if the Trust Fund had come on track at the time the
DDRP got under way in 1998, and if there had been more robust support for capacity-
building among the implementing partners.
5.2 Process Management

The policy process is often equated with the formal institutional arrangements that are
its output: policy documents, improved organizational design, legislation, and the like.
In reality, policymaking is part of a complex process, reflecting institutional
relationships that are inherently political, subjective, and psychological. In order to
effectively manage a policy process, it is necessary to recognize its fundamental
political nature. A successful policy process also involves: (1) policy communication,
dialogue, and debate; (2) adequate human and institutional capacity; and (3) policy
analysis. The process of managing the DDR program in Sierra Leone scored well on
all four of these key factors.
The GOSL dealt with the political nature of the process at several levels. First, the
president took responsibility for making the DDR process work. He engaged both
formally and informally with key national and international stakeholders. Similarly, the
second Executive Secretary of the NCDDR developed important relationships, both
with the fighting forces and with key members of the international community. As a
group, the Executive Secretariat staff developed the capacity to manage a wide variety
of actors with vastly different agendas. It also developed mechanisms for helping to
shield the Executive Secretary from undue political pressures. [Who is “it”? I would
think that staff hardly protected the ES, rather the ES had to be protected from
pressure brought up through staff. I believe the Bank and enlightened partners, as
well as strong structures / institutions such as the FMPU, MDTF, regular meetings with
partners, etc.. helped protect the integrity of the ES and the DDR Program. By having
policies and guiding principles, NCDDR was able to avoid a certain degree of political
pressure. For example, pressure to provide additional benefits to one group versus
another was addressed based on the principle that all ex-combatants should have
access to the same set of allowances and opportunities. In general, NCDDR was able
to maintain a significant degree of impartiality and transparency, which was crucial for
implementation success.
The Executive Secretariat produced a series of policy papers, with options on a range
of issues relating directly and indirectly to DDR, including gender, child soldiers, the
TSAs, camp security, and program eligibility criteria. In developing its approach to the
many aspects of the DDR process, the Executive Secretariat considered: (1) the
principles on which the DDR process was to be constructed, and how those principles
might be applied; (2) the capacities of existing national and international actors to
undertake specific activities; and (3) which actor was best positioned to play a
particular role. This means that decisions about the shape and scope of the DDRP
were not taken on an ad hoc basis but were based on serious analysis and
consideration of options. It also means that the NCDDR had established principles to
rely on as events pushed implementation of the DDRP in unforeseen directions.
Equally important, the NCDDR secretariat was open to reassessing its position when
events did not work out as anticipated.
As far as acquiring adequate institutional and human capacity was concerned, the
NCDDR Secretariat benefited from having strong managers, who were able to develop
technical expertise in their areas of responsibility. They also developed institutional
partnerships with key actors such as the World Bank, UNAMSIL, the ERT, and
UNICEF, and hired short- and long-term consultants as required.
Lastly, transparency was a key organizational principle that NCDDR Executive

Secretariat staff believes helped it convince its funders and parallel partners to accept
the national approach to DDR.
5.3 Program Design

The Sierra Leone DDR program encountered a number of questions relating to
program design that will be faced by subsequent DDR programs in Africa and
elsewhere. The way in which the Sierra Leone DDRP addressed these questions can
provide insights for individuals designing future DDR programs. These questions
include:
• Should ex-combatant reintegration activities be the responsibility of the same

organization that is responsible for disarmament and demobilization?
• Should assistance to ex-combatants target the ex-combatants themselves or
the communities in which they settle?
• Are the eligibility criteria appropriate?
• What type of support should be provided to ex-combatants?
• How should the issue of gender be approached?
• How should the issue of child soldiers be approached?
• To what extent is the DDR program linked to long-term rehabilitation and
recovery?
• What types of delivery mechanisms are most appropriate?
• What types of funding mechanisms are most appropriate?
• How should the database be set up to maximize its effectiveness?
Each of these is discussed in turn, below.
5.3.1 One Organization or Two?
One of the major lessons of previous DDR processes is that organizationally de-linking
the process of disarming and demobilizing combatants from that of planning and
delivering reinsertion and reintegration support creates institutional rivalries that
undermine the effective and efficient delivery of DDR programs. The GOSL wisely
chose to create the NCDDR and its Executive Secretariat as an autonomous body,
with a mandate to provide and promote the reintegration of the former warring parties
(see box 2). It also chose to vest the responsibility for assistance to war-affected
populations in NCRRR. The expectation was that once combatants were demobilized
and returned to civilian life, they would also benefit from activities supported by
NCRRR. The assumption was also that NCRRR would address reintegration issues of
the general population.
Some of Sierra Leone’s external partners were of the opinion that disarmament and
demobilization should have been handled by one agency, while reintegration support
to ex-combatants should have been integrated into the work of NCRRR and its
successor, NaCSA.60 This view appears to reflect, at least in part, the fact that the
linkages between the short-term reinsertion program for ex-combatants, supported by
NCDDR, and the community-oriented reintegration, rehabilitation, and recovery
60
Authors’ interviews, Freetown, April-May 2004. See also, Simon Arthy, “Ex Combatant Reintegration:
Key Issues for Policy Makers and Practitioners, Based on Lessons from Sierra Leone,” consultant report
commissioned by DFID, August 2003, p. 4.
programs supported by NCRRR/NACSA, were not maximized.61
Box 2. NCDDR Mandate and Main Reintegration Objectives

Mandate: “The GOSL programme for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of ex-
combatants provides for a series of measures designed to promote the reintegration of former
members of Armed Forces of Sierra Leone, combatants from the RUF and members of the CDF. The
programme planned and phased for a period of three years, aims at consolidating and reinforcing
security as well as to provide a credible option for combatants still holding out in the bush.”
Main objectives: The main objectives of reintegration assistance for ex-combatants were:
to facilitate and support the return of ex-combatants to their home communities or preferred
communities of return;
to assist the ex-combatants to become productive members of their communities;
to utilize the potential of the ex-combatants for social and economic reconstruction;
to promote social acceptance and reconciliation; and
to reduce the fiscal impact of large defense budgets by providing alternative employment support
options for demobilized ex-combatants.
Source: NCDDR, Draft Framework of Reintegration Support for Ex-Combatants, p. 7, cited in Stelios Comninos,
Aki Stavrou, and Brian Stewart, Assessment of the Reintegration Programmes of the National Committee for
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, November 8, 2002, p. 21.
This is a common problem. Linking DDR to long-term recovery and development

programs, in order to provide sustainable reintegration for former combatants and their
dependents, is in many respects one of the most difficult objectives to achieve. The
way to bridge this gap, however, is not by eliminating the short-term reinsertion
support offered to ex-combatants, or by making it the responsibility of a separate body.
Rather, bridging this gap requires the creation of an institutional mechanism for
guaranteeing a close linkage between the bodies responsible for assistance to ex-
combatants, on the one hand, and assistance to war-affected communities, on the
other. Although the NCRRR commissioner sat on the Tripartite Committee, the FMPU
served both the institutions, and an NCRRR representative sat on the Project
Appraisal Committee (PAC), this was not adequate to ensure a close working
relationship between the two bodies. Further discussion on the ways in which closer
61
Authors’ interviews, April-May 2004.
collaboration between NCRRR and NCDDR might have been brought about is found in
section 7.2.4.
5.3.2 Targeted Assistance or Support to Communities?
It is widely recognized that in order to help convince combatants to disarm and

disband, some form of support is required to help them reintegrate themselves into
civilian life. There are two means of delivering this support: targeting former
combatants directly and targeting communities where ex-combatants settle. The
international development community, which funds most of the costs associated with
DDR programs not covered by assessed UN contributions, has tended to prefer
community-oriented support. Past experience indicates, however, that a combination
of support is most likely to be effective.
The GOSL decided to provide targeted short-term assistance to ex-combatants

through the DDRP, overseen by the NCDDR. It recognized that this decision could be
controversial, but it viewed it as necessary to obtain peace.62 It also envisioned that
assistance to war victims, such as internally displaced persons (IDPs) and amputees,
would be provided through other channels, such as the NCRRR/NaCSA. According to
an evaluation of the NCDDR’s reintegration programs, carried out in 2002, the problem
was
not the actual amounts spent on ex-combatants as opposed to other

groupings, but rather the nature and visibility of the assistance provided
by the NCDDR. For example, IDPs received assistance in terms of food
aid, resettlement allowances, and the like, which, if reduced to monetary
value, tend to be similar to the assistance provided to ex-combatants.
The visibility of support to ex-combatants is a result of the need that
existed to pull the combatants into the disarmament and demobilization
processes. Most respondents agreed that the targeting and its
perceived inequity was a necessary price to pay for peace.63
Similarly, focus group interviews conducted for this evaluation demonstrated that
members of communities where ex-combatants have settled simultaneously resent the
targeted assistance to the perpetrators of violence and welcome the financial
“We are trying to buy something from
the rebels that only they can provide:
we must buy peace.”
62
NCDDR, Draft Framework of Reintegration Support for Ex-Combatants, pp. official,
—Sierra Leone 8-9, cited in SteliosMay 2004
Freetown,
Comninos, Aki Stavrou, and Brian Stewart, “Assessment of the Reintegration Programmes of the
National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration,” November 8, 2002, p. 26.
NCDDR staff have reported that when the rational for targeted assistance was explained to paramount
chiefs, other community leaders, and community members, they understood its necessity.
63
Comninos, Stavrou, and Stewart, “Assessment of the Reintegration Programmes,” pp. 26-27. This
point was confirmed in conversations with Government of Sierra Leone officials and staff of the
Executive Secretariat.
resources that these payments to ex-combatants have brought to their communities.
The experience of Sierra Leone, therefore, demonstrates that targeted assistance for
ex-combatants is essential for the success of a DDR program, particularly in a
situation where the conflict is of a protracted nature. Nonetheless, although the
international community contributed to the MDTF, which supported the government’s
chosen approach to DDR, some also chose to finance parallel programs for ex-
combatants that targeted both ex-combatants and community members. Some of
these parallel programs initially did not have MOUs with NCDDR and, therefore, did
not directly support the NCDDR program.64 Two of these, DFID’s Community
Reintegration Program (CRP) and GTZ’s multi-sectoral training program, subsequently
did begin to certify that ex-combatants had received training that qualified as their
vocational training benefit under the DDR program.65 USAID’s Youth Reintegration
Training and Education for Peace Program (YRTEP) never reduced the NCDDR
caseload, as an MOU was never signed and, therefore, YRTEP could not be
considered a true parallel partner.66
This meant that NCDDR had to raise additional funds to provide training for ex-
combatants who completed courses without NCDDR certification.67 Additionally, even
when parallel programs reduced the NCDDR caseload, they increased its
administrative burden, through the need to coordinate with them and to monitor the
expectations created by these programs. What is more, parallel partners sometimes
posed a serious challenge to the national program, as they either provided more or
less support to the ex-combatants than the national program did, creating frustration
on the part of ex-combatants.68
64
The relationship between the international NGO community and NCDDR was often problematic and
never reached its full capacity for a variety of complicated reasons that can most delicately be described
as different cultures coming together. The 2000 DDRP Review suggested that a neutral facilitator be
provided by the World Bank or DFID to “reconcile the clash of cultures.”
65
UNAMSIL, DDR Coordination Section, Human Security Fund: Internal Monitoring & Evaluation
Report, August 2003, pp. 6, 16. The UN’s Human Security Fund Program for Reintegration involved
“collaboration between [the] DDR Coordination Section of UNAMSIL and UNDP Sierra Leone, in
consultation with [the] National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration.” The HSF
program provided training opportunities for ex-combatants and war-affected youth. By the end of June
2003, it had reduced the NCDDR caseload by approximately 2,600.
66
YRTEP did not punch cards for NCDDR because it was not an official partner. It also operated in
communities before disarmament and demobilization had taken place. This contradicted the NCDDR
approach, which tied benefits to disarmament and demobilization. Approximately 16,000 ex-
combatant—not all of whom went through the NCDDR process—participated in the YRTEP program.
67
The fact that these programs failed to punch cards for some or all of their ex-combatant caseload
does not reflect on the quality of training provided. For an evaluation of the YTREP, see Art Hansen,
Julie Nenon, Joy Wolf, and Marc Sommers, Final Evaluation of the Office of Transition Initiatives’
Program in Sierra Leone, August 2002. The DRP, GTZ programs, and the YRTEP are also discussed
briefly in Comninos, Stavrou, and Stewart, “Assessment of the Reintegration Programmes,” pp. 101-
104.
68
What is more, even donors who supported parallel programs acknowledged that it would have been
too expensive to provide high-end programs to all ex-combatants. Authors’ interviews, 2004.
From the government’s point of view, therefore, it is preferable for DDR-related funding
to be applied directly to the government’s program through the MDTF. From the
perspective of strengthening government, it is also preferable for DDR-related funding
to be managed by the government. From the perspective of providing the maximum
number of ex-combatants with training opportunities, it is preferable to have parallel
programs governed by MOUs with the government whenever possible. Donors,
therefore, need to consider the value they place on promoting national ownership.
5.3.3 Appropriateness of Eligibility Criteria?
Setting optimal eligibility criteria to meet the needs of a specific situation is a very
problematic issue in any DDR process. In the case of Sierra Leone, the fighting forces
were composed of regular, militia, and guerilla forces, made up of a mix of volunteers
and abductees, including women and children. This made the task doubly
challenging.
Eligibility criteria define who is or is not a combatant and have far broader ramifications
than determining who gets access to immediate benefits or support. The
multidimensional nature of war, incorporating political, economic, intelligence,
propaganda, and logistics tasks, in addition to military combat, may engulf a significant
section of the population. A large number of people could claim they have fought on
one side or the other, in one way or another. Making hard but politically prudent
choices and tradeoffs, setting limits to fit the resource envelope, and keeping focused
on the basic goals of the exercise, become critical.
In Sierra Leone, the eligibility criteria were set to respond to the core objective of
disarming the warring parties, although the principle of uniform and equitable treatment
of the parties, and the apparent need to have a prioritized and phased program of
arms collection, were also relevant. The criteria set to meet the conditions and
requirements of the different phases, and the process of individual and group
disarmament, were appropriate and quite effective in achieving their objective. This
was especially evident given the fact that the pace of disarmament was determined by
the overall political and security situation, the degree of commitment of the fighting
forces to the peace process, and an individual’s will to continue fighting, rather than
the efficacy of the criteria. Consequently, in Phase I, given the weak commitment to
peace, the program focused on enticing individuals to disarm. Similarly, in Phase II,
although the policies and guidelines were reviewed in consultation with ECOMOG and
UNOMSIL, in light of Lomé, the program still focused on the individual combatant.
In Phase III, with the signing of the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement and a clear
commitment of all the warring factions to a peaceful resolution, the necessary
conditions for group disarmament were created. The criteria for group disarmament
were essentially that units present themselves with all their members, weapons, and
ammunition. Moreover, eligibility depended on a standard of minimum acceptable
member-to-weapons ratio, which factored in the type and number of weapons handed
in, coupled with verification of combatant status. Group disarmament based on a
percentage of weapons presented provided commanders with the opportunity to
include in the program all people under their control, but it also enabled them to
determine who entered the program. As a result, certain combatants were excluded,
while individuals who had not been part of the fighting forces were included in the
program.
The appropriateness and efficacy of the eligibility criteria need to be evaluated

according to their objectives and within the context of their operational environment.
Although the objective of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of
combatants remained basically the same, the operational environment continued to
evolve. This changed what could be achieved or was feasible at each stage. The
DDR process cannot move ahead of the political reality. In a situation where genuine
political will is absent, the DDR process and its eligibility criteria must be designed to
take advantage of the results of individual combatants’ decisions and of military
developments. When the situation changes, as it did in Phase III, the criteria also
need to change to accommodate the new possibilities.
Therefore, in general the criteria were appropriate to the situation and effective in
achieving their objective, particularly with respect to drawing combatants into civilian
life. There are various estimates that indicate there may be significant quantities of
arms that have not been surrendered. The ongoing Community Arms Collection
Program may be able to address that. In the final analysis, what will matter is not the
availability of arms, but the mind-set of the people, particularly the youth, and
resolution of the root causes of the conflict.
It is important to stress that policy decisions produce trade-offs. Making a necessary

exception for child soldiers to be eligible without surrendering arms had the unintended
consequence of providing commanders the opportunity to shift these arms to
noncombatant elements. The focus on arms and on the member-to-weapons ratio
gave commanders leeway to exclude women and weak male combatants, to indulge in
favoritism, and to include bogus combatants. (See box 3.)
Box 3. Weapons Possession: Appropriate Criteria or Discriminating Factor?

Like many aspects of DDR processes, the decision to link entry into the DDRP to possession of a
modern weapon had both pros and cons. As with many conflicts, the roles people played were not
always clearly defined and did not fit easily into established criteria.
The decision to link program access to possession of a modern weapon meant that some ex-
combatants, and those who played supporting roles in the conflict, were excluded. Even the change to
demobilization by group, where only two-thirds of a group’s members had to posses a modern weapon,
meant that an undetermined number of former combatants, and those associated with the fighting
forces, did not have access to the DDRP.
There were two main reasons for exclusion. The first was corruption and manipulation at the
commander level. Commanders had control over the combatants and, therefore, had control of the
guns. Numerous sources report that before entry into the disarmament camps, commanders frequently
took guns away from fighters, in order for civilians—often friends and family members—to enter the
program. The incentives being offered were sufficient to encourage local-level corruption, and all
evidence points to the fact that such corruption did occur.
The degree to which it occurred is unknown. Estimates range from a small and insignificant amount to
over 50 percent. What is known is that it occurred, and that women especially were affected by this
practice because of social norms.
The second reason for exclusion is that the weapons criteria were problematic for those who fought with
traditional weapons, such as muskets, and, therefore, were not eligible. This disproportionately affected
the CDF, many of whom tended to fight with traditional weapons. Some sources suggest that the
majority of CDF was disqualified from the DDRP. At the same time, NCDDR was expected to remove
weapons used to promote the rebel war. It was not intended to focus on traditional weapons used by
communities to defend themselves.
From a practical standpoint, however, some tangible criteria had to be instituted or the government ran
the risk of being overwhelmed with people claiming to be ex-combatants.
Source: Richards, Archibald, Bah, and Vincent, “Where have all the Young People Gone?”. p. 16.
5.3.4 What Type of Support?
A DDR process typically consists of five major phases: disarmament, assembly,

discharge, short-term reinsertion, and long-term reintegration. Assembly and
discharge constitute demobilization, while short-term reinsertion and long-term
reintegration complete the process. Box 4 lists the types of support that other DDR
programs in Africa have offered to ex-combatants.69
Box 4. Potential Support to Ex-Combatants Undergoing DDR

Assembly: Food, shelter, clothing, sanitation, medical exams and care, basic education, leisure
activities, pre-discharge orientation (for both combatants and spouses), assistance to child soldiers,
census, discharge documentation.
Discharge: Short-term food supplies, transport and transport allowances, orientation on conditions in
districts of residence, first trance of reinsertion benefits.
Reinsertion: Food supplements, clothing and personal items, housing material, short-term medical care,
basic household goods, land, basic agricultural supplies (seeds and tools), severance pay and other
cash allowances, veteran and spouse information and counseling, assistance to child soldiers,
rehabilitation for psychically and mentally disabled veterans.
Reintegration: Job generation (including public works, community development, microenterprise
schemes, salary supplements to employers, cooperatives), job placement services, training (including
apprenticeships, formal vocational training, managerial and administrative training), credit schemes,
education, agricultural extension services, veteran and spouse information and counseling, rehabilitation
for psychically and mentally disabled veterans.
Source: Nicole Ball, “Demobilizing and Reintegrating Soldiers: Lessons from Africa,” pp. 88-89, in Krishna Kumar,
ed., Rebuilding Societies after Civil War. Critical Roles for International Assistance (Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers) 1997.
As can be seen from box 5, the DDR package proposed at the outset of Phase I in
Sierra Leone fits comfortably within the framework of box 4. The value of the
TSA/Reinsertion Benefit was calculated on the basis of a basket of commodities and
services. It was intended to support the ex-combatant and approximately five
dependents for the first six to nine months of civilian life. Food and basic medical care
was provided in the demobilization camps. When the disarmament and demobilization
process was fast-tracked in Phase III, the pre-discharge orientation was significantly
reduced in duration.
69
Details of the DDR package offered to ex-combatants in Angola in 1997 are found in Nicole Ball and
Kathleen F. Campbell, Complex Crisis and Complex Emergency. Humanitarian Coordination in Angola,
(New York: OCHA, 1998), http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/pub/angola/, pp 42-43. Packages offered in
Ethiopia, Namibia and Uganda are detailed in Nat J. Colletta, Markus Kostner, and Ingo Wiederhofer,
with the assistance of Emilio Mondo, Taimi Sitari, and Tadesse A. Woldu, Cases in War-to-Peace
Transition: The Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia, and Uganda,
World Bank Discussion Paper no. 331, Africa Department Technical Series (Washington, DC: World
Bank, 1996.)
Box 5. DDR Assistance Package Phase I

Demobilization
Medical screening, social-economic profile and other discharge-related activities;
Forge-proof ID card to be used to access program benefits;
Intensive pre-discharge orientation.
Reinsertion
Settling-in package of the equivalent of US$300;
Facilitation of land allocation in consultation with chiefdom authorities.
Reintegration
Vouchers redeemable for employment, vocational training and apprenticeships through a
Training and Employment Fund (or any other activity to increase income potential for ex-
CDF);
Information and referral service to link ex-combatants with national rehabilitation activities
Counselling services for individuals and communities;
Special assistance to vulnerable groups.
Source: Government of Sierra Leone, National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme,” July 15, 1998, pp.
8-9 and Authors’ interviews.
One major challenge was to ensure that the needs of combatants’ dependents were
adequately met during the encampment stage. It was assumed that the humanitarian
partners would attend to camp followers, as they would to IDPs or refugees. However,
this did not happen, as humanitarian actors were concerned with minimizing risk to
their staff and avoiding compromising their perceived neutrality. They also were highly
reluctant to deal with combatants or their dependents, a problem that was manifest in
all aspects of the DDR process. There were also considerations relating to the cost of
maintaining dependents. Donors would not have looked favorably on large budgets
for food and humanitarian assistance because they were already providing such
assistance to the population at large. Providing assistance to the dependents of
encamped RUF and AFRC combatants would likely have encouraged CDF
combatants to seek assistance for their dependents, which would have been extremely
costly.
This policy did cause some problems, particularly during Phase II, when RUF and
AFRC dependents were separated from the combatants and supported by
humanitarian NGOs and NCRRR. As Ted Morse and Mark Knight have observed,
“This was neither logical nor practical. The dependent populations in some
demobilization camps during Phase II greatly increased logistical and security
requirements and impeded the ability of ES/NCDDR and its partners to fully and
efficiently implement the program. But to try to exclude them causes social friction that
is inflammatory.”70 During Phase III, when the encampment period was significantly
shortened, WFP increased the food allocation to registered combatants, and
dependents were allowed to remain with the head of household.
70
Morse and Knight, “Lessons Learned,” p. 88.
This demonstrates the importance of ensuring that the needs of dependents are taken
care of. It also demonstrates that needs vary according to the length of the
encampment period. What was feasible during Phase III of the Sierra Leone DDR
process was not feasible during Phases I and II, given the different lengths of the
encampment period. [Also, and perhaps more importantly, NGOs and the WFP were
initially not ready to support the DDR Program]
5.3.5 What Approach to Gender?
Until quite recently, DDR programs tended to “In sum, the experience of women
assume that all combatants were male. and girls in the fighting forces was
While the majority of combatants tend to be complex. They were captives and
male, wars that involve irregular forces dependents, but they were also
invariably have a not-insignificant number of involved in the planning and
females associated with the fighting forces in execution of the war.”
different capacities. This was clearly the —Dyan Mazurana and Khristopher Carlson,
From Combat to Community: Women and
case in Sierra Leone, where women and girls Girls of Sierra Leone, p. 2.
engaged in combat; served as porters, cooks,
assistants to the sick and wounded,
messengers, communications technicians, spies, and sexual partners; and worked in
the diamond fields.71
There are two ways of incorporating females into DDR programs: by adopting a
gender-neutral approach or a gender-sensitive one.72 NCDDR adopted a gender-
neutral approach, and it is widely agreed that females did not fully benefit for this. This
was in part due to the multiple roles females played; traditional gender norms, which
deterred access; and the narrow focus of the DDRP’s objectives. Regardless, the
original program document contained only one short paragraph about female ex-
combatants.73 There were no gender specialists involved in the design of the DDRP.
This is not to say that NCDDR set out to establish a gender-unfriendly process or that
there were not positive results. (See discussion on sensitization campaigns, below.)
However, with a few exceptions, any differences in access and needs between female
and male combatants, as well as the other roles females played, were not fully taken
into consideration.
Of the over 72,000 ex-combatants who were demobilized, 5,275 were women (7.4
71
Dyan Mazurana and Khristopher Carlson, with Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, From Combat to
Community: Women and Girls of Sierra Leone, Women Waging Peace Policy Commission, January
2004, p. 12, http://www.womenwagingpeace.net/content/articles/SierraLeoneFullCaseStudy.pdf>.
72
Vanessa A. Farr, Gender-aware Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR): A Checklist,
(New York: UNIFEM, n.d.), http://www.networklearning.org/books/gender-aware-disarmament.html.
73
Government of Sierra Leone, National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration, “Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme,” July 15, 1998, p. 14.
While both child ex-combatants and disabled ex-combatants rated their own annexes, describing the
types of assistance that should be provided to them, there was no similar annex for female ex-
combatants, and, as indicated above, combatants’ dependents—many of whom were female—were
similarly slighted.
percent).74 Of the 6,787 children who went through the DDR process, 506 were girls
(9.4 percent).75 Although the exact numbers are not known, it is generally agreed that
these figures do not represent many females who served as fighters during the conflict
or those who played other roles. This is true both for the RUF, which was widely
known to have a large number of female fighters, as well as the CDF, which had
significantly fewer numbers but reportedly did have females serving as combatants.76
(See table 2 for details.)77
Table 2. Number of Women Ex-Combatants, by Faction
Fighting Force NCDDR Totals Survey Sample

No.=1,043 ex-combatants
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
SLA/AFRC 571 6.4 8 8.8
RUF 4361 17.9 89 24.4
CDF 303 0.8 10 1.9
Others 40 8.9 1 11.1
Total 5275 7.4 108 10.9
Source: Humphreys and Weinstein, What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-Combatants in Sierra Leone June-
August 2003.*
Note: The frequency and percentage is based on the male-to-female ratio for each faction.
The fact that females did not participate in the DDR process to the highest extent
possible demonstrates the complexity of designing and implementing DDR programs
that are female-friendly. Not only did females associated with the conflict face some of
the same fears that kept some men from entering the DDR process (fear of reprisals,
an unclear understanding of the purpose of the DDR program, and so on), they also
74
Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-Combatants
in Sierra Leone June-August 2003, Interim Report (Columbia University, Stanford University, and
PRIDE, July 2004), p. 14.
75
Mazurana and Carlson, From Combat to Community: Women and Girls of Sierra Leone, p.2.
76
There is debate over the role of women within the CDF. There are those who insist that women did
not serve as combatants for the CDF. Officially, there were no women in the CDF, so the number 303,
reflects a group who perhaps cheated their way into the process. However, this position contradicts
written and verbal reports the evaluation team received that state that a small number of women did
serve as fighters. See Mazurana and Carlson, From Combat to Community: Women and Girls of Sierra
Leone and Humphreys and Weinstein, What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-Combatants in Sierra
Leone June-August 2003 for more details.
77
Humphreys and Weinstein, What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-Combatants in Sierra Leone June-
August 2003, p. 14. This information comes from a survey based on a random sample of 1,043 ex-
combatants. The figures from the survey, while helpful, most likely still do not fully represent the role
females played in the conflict, due to the multiplicity of their roles, and how females define themselves.
In a separate correspondence, one of the authors stated that it is believed the numbers are understated
because many CDF women do not identify themselves as ex-combatants.
faced cultural dynamics and biases that prevented or discouraged their entrance.
Assuming that female were merely sex slaves or bush wives diminished the
understanding of the other roles that women and girls played in the conflict, including
that of combatants. Additionally, some females were ashamed to admit their
combatant role, and self-selected not to enter the DDR process.
Some women and girls also chose not to participate in the DDR process because they
did not want to be further associated with men who were responsible for their
abduction and who were taking part in the DDR process. The DDR process was not
designed to de-link women from their captors, and some women used peace as an
opportunity to get away from their bush husbands.78 This was primarily the case for
RUF ex-combatants, who represented the bulk of abducted females.
The shortcoming of NCDDR’s gender-neutral approach was further compounded by

the fact that, when it came to disarmament, many females could not produce a
weapon. The initial default criteria for inclusion as a combatant—possession of a
weapon or ammunition and ability to demonstrate participation in combat, which
essentially meant one combatant, one gun—clearly eliminated many women
associated with the fighting forces. Female fighters did not necessarily have control
over the weapons used because weapons were shared or because male commanders
took the weapons away prior to disarmament. Therefore, women could not always
produce a weapon or ammunition.79 The application of group disarmament criteria
similarly eliminated many of these women because commanders controlled who was
part of their group. Reportedly, many commanders selected non-combatant males
over females associated with the fighting forces.
That said, the TSA design was based on an understanding that each combatant would
have dependents. Further, NCDDR did recognize the weakness of a gender-neutral
approach and, on two occasions, attempted to provide additional support that primarily
targeted women in non-combatant roles. On one occasion, micro-credit funds were
offered to the bush wives, and, in another instance, a separate camp was started for
dependents. However, in both instances, the solutions only created additional
problems and the activities were halted. In the case of the micro-credit scheme, there
were reports of increased domestic violence as male ex-combatants wanted access to
the funds.
The lack of opportunities, combined with traditional attitudes towards females,

especially victims of sexual abuse, left many women and girls extremely vulnerable.
78
Because many women did not participate in the DDR program, and because there is debate over
published statistics on females associated with conflict, it is difficult to determine how many women and
girls self-reintegrated, how many remained with their former command units, how many were primarily
fighters, and how many served primarily as support for fighting forces.
79
For CDF female fighters, it is reported that the women were ordered to turn in their weapons prior to
demobilization. Then they were not included in CDF groups that presented themselves for
disarmament. Because of the perception that the CDF did not have female fighters, little outreach was
conducted to inform women of their eligibility to participate in the DDR process. Mazurana and Carlson,
From Combat to Community: Women and Girls of Sierra Leone, p. 3.
Shame over the roles that they played during the conflict, and the sexual and physical
abuse they endured, has meant social stigma in addition to psychological trauma. The
lack of programming that directly targets this war-affected population has only further
diminished its status, as there are only a few alternatives available for these women.80
Some community members have tried to improve the victims’ lives by opening skills-
training centers but, because of the generally depressed economy, social and
economic gains remain limited. As a result, many females who were part of the
conflict eek out a subsistence-level income.
It should be noted that, from a pragmatic stance, the fact that the process was gender-
neutral was not necessarily negative, given the objectives of the DDRP. In order to
adequately disarm combatants and break the chain of command, a sufficient number
of ex-combatants needed to successfully go through the program. As the majority of
combatants were men, females did not necessarily need special consideration, as they
did not pose a sufficient threat to be considered a security issue. As one NCDDR
official stated, “Our real focus was on de-militarizing the situation, to create the space
for more humanitarian and gender-sensitive partners who were initially far away from
the front-line and refused to touch ex-combatants and their dependants.”81 As a result,
the program can be claimed successful regardless of the number of females involved.
From a social perspective, however, this overlooks the complexity of the issue
surrounding women and girls who were associated with the conflict, and it leaves them
as a vulnerable group. This speaks to the need for a stronger understanding of
gender and for gender programming that goes beyond the confines of a DDR program.
(See section 5.3.6 and 7.2.10 for more details.)
The process had a positive impact in the area of sensitization. Activities that
addressed violent behavior and social norms, as well as activities in which women
were prominently featured in leadership roles or on radio broadcasts, assisted in
raising the status of women. Sensitization was a product of many different
organizations, but it was often credited to NCDDR, the most prominent body. The
cumulative effect was that men began to modify violent behavior, which had a positive
impact on women, and women began to see themselves as capable of going beyond
the limited roles defined before and during the conflict.82 Female community members
credited NCDDR for changing the status of women, even though it is well known that
many female ex-combatants were left out of the process. In Kailahun, women
interviewed specifically cited NCDDR’s campaigns as one of the reasons there was an
increase in the number of women running for local office in the upcoming elections.
80
Based on the amount of available programming, war-affected women and girls do not appear to be a
priority for the government or the international community.
81
Correspondence with NCDDR staff.
82
During the conflict, women and girls were often abducted and treated as slaves.
5.3.6 What Approach to Child Soldiers?
Until relatively recently, many fighting forces denied having children in their ranks.
Beginning with the demobilization process in Angola, under the Lusaka Protocol to the
Bicesse Agreement in the mid-1990s, fighting groups began to admit to having
combatants younger than 18 years of age (see table 3.) It is now widely recognized
within the international community that not only are children often present in conflicts in
significant numbers, but also that they should not go through the same demobilization
process as adults.
Table 3. Children as Percentage of the Fighting Forces, by Faction
Fighting Force Age Group
Adults Children
SLA/AFRC 7387 89% 917 11%
RUF/SL 20455 84.6% 3735 15.4%
CDF 35119 94.5% 2028 5.5%
Others 352 80.2% 87 19.8%
N/A 1538 91.3% 147 8.7%
Total 64851 90.4% 6914 9.6%
Source: Sierra Leone Government National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,
Executive Secretariat, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme—Statistical Report, February
2004, p. 12.
In contrast to female combatants, the need for a separate program to reintegrate child
soldiers was recognized from the outset in Sierra Leone. The 1998 DDR program
document outlined a program of assistance for child soldiers. It also specified that the
NCDDR would subcontract implementation of the program to “qualified agencies and
NGOs” while retaining monitoring and oversight responsibility. The Lomé Agreement
also included an article on child combatants that specified that the government was to
seek the support of the international community.
UNICEF was given responsibility for running the program as well as for raising funds
for it.83 The partnership between the NCDDR, the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender
and Children’s Affairs, and UNICEF was exemplary and effective.
UNICEF found that having the issue of children addressed in the peace accord was an
83
Government of Sierra Leone and UNICEF, “Memorandum of Understanding between Executive
Secretariat, National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR) and
UNICEF Freetown,” August 2002.
enormous advantage since it provided important political leverage and indicated a

level of understanding about the issue. UNICEF’s program applied the Cape Town
principles for child combatants in the following way. Children were defined as having
participated in conflict if they were able to cock and load a weapon. Children who
screened positive for combat experience were included in the program if they were
deemed to be separated children.84 This excluded 1,400 children, primarily CDF child
combatants in the southern part of the country. The UNICEF program therefore
focused on the approximately 5,400 separated children located primarily in the north
and east of the country.
One lesson that UNICEF learned from “The Government shall accord particular
these decisions was that there should have attention to the issue of child soldiers. It
been more follow up of child combatants shall, accordingly, mobilize resources, both
who were with one or more of their parents within the country and from the International
or guardians. There is no guarantee that, Community, and especially through the
simply because a child is in the custody of Office of the UN Special Representative for
its family, it will be well taken care of or sent Children in Armed Conflict, UNICEF and
other agencies, to address the special needs
to school. A second lesson for UNICEF
of these children in the existing
was that future peace processes in disarmament, demobilization and
countries such as Sierra Leone should reintegration process.”
include children associated with the fighting
—“Peace Agreement between the Government of
forces rather than only child combatants Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of
because the latter designation Sierra Leone,” Article XXX.
discriminated in favor of boys, who often
carried guns, and against girls, who carried bullets and food and were victims of sexual
abuse.85
The UNICEF reintegration program consisted of five main elements, which are
described in more detail in annex 4.
• Provision of Interim Care Center services (ICC)

• Family and community reintegration support
• Alternative care support
• Community Education Investment Program (CEIP)
• Training and Employment Program (TEP)
Children included in the UNICEF program were removed from demobilization camps,
ideally within 72 hours, and placed in interim care centers. They stayed at the ICCs for
approximately six weeks, at which time they were introduced to adult direction,
84
Separated Children are defined as children who find themselves without an adult care giver due to
reasons not directly related to war, abuse, abandonment and neglect by their parents.
85
UNICEF instituted a Girls Left Behind project that has found some 1,000 girls who were abducted by
the fighting forces and not officially included in the child combatant program. UNICEF estimates that
there may be another 2,000 girls, possibly more, who are eligible for this program.
encouraged to drop their bush names, and motivated to pursue education. A major
objective of the first stage of the program was to terminate the child’s identification with
his or her fighting group.86
Efforts were made to trace children’s families and return children to their homes and
enroll them in school. School enrollment was viewed as particularly important for
children under the ages of 17, as many children had been told they were fighting for
the right to an education. Because of the devastation created by the war, families of
returning child combatants received support through the family and community
reintegration support component. Where families could not be traced, or where
children were unable to return to their families, alternative care was provided in the
form of a group home, another family, an apprenticeship program, or independent
living. UNICEF stressed the importance of follow-up to ensure that children in
alternative care were treated properly; for example, that stipends to the care providers
were actually used to feed and clothe the children. UNICEF found that it was also
important to encourage implementing partners responsible for alternative care
arrangements to continue efforts to reunite children with their families. There had
been an incorrect assumption on the part of some implementing partners that
UNICEF’s support for the children would continue into the future. In order to
encourage schools to accept child combatants, the CEIP provided school fees and in-
kind support, such as supplies and teacher training.
Children 16 to 17 years of age received formal skills training through NCDDR TEP
activities. UNICEF concluded that this was not the best strategy. With only six to nine
months of training, children were unable to become more than apprentices, but there
was no formal linkage to apprenticeships or job placement.87
5.3.7 Adequate Linkage to Long-term Recovery and Rehabilitation?
While on the conceptual level there was a clear linkage between disarmament and
demobilization and long-term reintegration, the complementarity between NCDDR and
NCRRR/NaCSA programs was not fully realized. NCRRR/NaCSA and NCDDR had
different mandates, different implementation styles, and different timelines. Once DDR
was fast-tracked in 2001, completion of disarmament and demobilization became a
key criterion for entry of the NCRRR, government ministries, and most non-
governmental organizations into an area. As a result, NCDDR and NCRRR/NaCSA
were not always in the same area in time periods that would have encouraged
complementarity. Nor were they always conducting activities that would naturally
86
UNICEF acknowledged that interim care centers suffered from a number of shortcomings but felt
nonetheless that they played a very important role in the program. One of the problems identified was
that, if an interim care center was situated too close to a demobilization center, the children were subject
to frequent visits from fighters, which complicated the effort to remove children from the influence of
their fighting group. Girls were particularly likely to be subject to such visits. UNICEF–Sierra Leone,
“Protection of Children in the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme. Summary of
Lessons Learnt,” October 2003, pp. 5-6.
87
Authors’ interviews, Freetown, May 2004.
support each other. This meant that in some cases, there was not even the
opportunity to overlap.
The difference in implementation styles also discouraged linkages. In areas where

both NCDDR and NCRRR/NaCSA had activities, focus groups reported that they did
not see the link. NCDDR activities tended to have greater publicity due to the
sensitization campaign. They also had tangible individual benefits. In contrast,
NCRRR/NaCSA began with projects in response to proposals, which were then
implemented by NGOs. The activities often involved rebuilding a school or other
important public works, and were not perceived as equivalent to the targeted
assistance received by ex-combatants. Rather, they were viewed as general
rehabilitation activities that the GOSL ought to undertake. To develop greater
community ownership of NaCSA-sponsored activities and a better understanding of
the benefits received by the community, in 2004, NaCSA changed its approach from
activities based on proposals and implementation by NGOs to direct community-
financed activities.
Additionally, in 2001-2002, when communities felt the effects of group demobilization,

NCRRR had already committed much of its IDA funding and lacked the ability to
undertake a significant number of new projects. This meant even fewer peace
dividends for the communities at a time when a large number of ex-combatants were
receiving the reinsertion benefit and training allowances. This discrepancy increased
the lack of connection between NCDDR and NCRRR/NaCSA activities.
In the view of the evaluators, this was a lost opportunity in many respects, as the two
organizations did not build off of each other’s efforts. It also meant that individuals
who did not participate in the NCDDR program were even less likely to be covered by
NCRRR/NaCSA. For communities that resented the allowances received by the ex-
combatants, or who were dealing with issues of acceptance and forgiveness, the lack
of coordination meant they were less likely to see their own peace dividend or
understand the concept of the two-pronged approach.88
5.3.8 Appropriate Funding Mechanisms?
The DDR program was financed through multiple channels, including: (1) government
resources; (2) grants to the MDTF, executed by the GOSL and administered by the
World Bank; (3) the World Bank, specifically IDA credit, delivered through the
Community Reintegration and Rehabilitation Program and PPF; (4) peacekeeping
support for disarmament and demobilization; (5) UNICEF support for child soldiers; (6)
UK government support through ERT; and (7) parallel programs (administered in
88
Issues relating to the Poverty-Reduction Strategy, under development at the time the evaluators were
producing this report, are dealt with in section 8. Issues relating to employment are dealt with in section
6.4.2. Possible methods for linking DDR with rehabilitation and recovery are proposed in section 9.2.4.
particular by the British, the UN, and the Germans.)89 These funding sources will be
considered at greater length in section 5.6.
Two points need to be made here. First, the MDTF was the main vehicle for support to
the DDR process. It defined the shape and content of the process. The benefit of
maximizing resources channeled through the MDTF is that it helps focus donor
contributions on the government’s program and enhances national ownership and
leadership; it promotes resource mobilization; and it reduces the administrative and
financial costs of managing external resources. While a good deal of funding occurred
outside the MDTF, in the absence of the MDTF donor support would have been even
more diffuse and more difficult for the government to manage. The government is
convinced that, in the absence of the MDTF, the outcome of the DDR program—
especially the reinsertion and reintegration components—would have been less
successful. Where funding did not go through the MDTF, the government sought to
use MOUs to link parallel programs, as well as UNICEF support for child soldiers, and
to encourage major partners collaborate through the TCCs. It can therefore be
concluded that the MDTF was of critical importance to the overall success of the DDR
program.
Second, desirable as one funding mechanism may be in principle, the reality of

institutional politics requires more than one mechanism. For example, the UK
provided financing outside the MDTF. This gave the NCDDR and its partners needed
flexibility when urgent, unforeseen needs arose that could not be financed rapidly
through the MDTF. This was particularly important during the demobilization phase of
the DDR process. For its part, the World Bank does not allow disarmament-related
expenditures to be financed through its trust funds. Therefore, the availability of
ECOMOG support, UK funding and technical assistance, and UN-assessed funding
and technical support for disarmament were crucial at different points in the process to
the success of this component. Additionally, bilateral donors have legal conditions on
the types of expenditures that can be financed from particular pots of money. This
influences their ability to channel resources through multilateral trust funds. The Sierra
Leone DDR process benefited (???) from this diverse set of funding mechanisms. As
will be discussed in more detail in section 5.6, the contribution of each of these funding
mechanisms varied, depending on the phase and component of the program.
It can be concluded, particularly in view of Sierra Leone’s experience, that a multi-

donor trust fund is an optimal funding mechanism for DDR purposes. However, a
multi-donor trust fund must be in existence at the time the DDR process starts. Given
that a DDR process is organically integrated, with multiple components, it is equally
important that every constituent part be adequately funded. Gaps and under-funding
of any part will, in effect, compromise the success of the whole enterprise.
Consequently, the multi-donor trust fund should have no constraint with regard to
funding the disarmament component. Moreover, given the critical nature of DDR in
89
The parallel programs considered here are (1) the UK’s Community Rehabilitation Programme, the
CRP, (2) the UN’s Human Security Fund (HSF) program financed by Japan, and (3) the German
government’s bilateral program, implemented by GTZ.
establishing of peace and security, and for opening a new horizon for development,
donors should forego earmarking contributions. They should also overcome
reluctance to contribute to the common fund and preferences for stand-alone projects.
5.3.9 Database Structured for Effectiveness?
The database was designed based on the appropriate technology, given the significant
infrastructure and budget limitations.90 Given the importance of the database and the
vital role it played in DDRP implementation, these limitations are important to note. It
was housed in Freetown due to the sensitivity of the equipment and rough conditions
in the field, which included limited communication, electricity, and lack of adequate air
conditioning. However, this meant that information was not immediately accessible in
the field, and updates could not be made as quickly as changes occurred. Information
had to be collected at the field sites and transported to Freetown, where it was entered
into the database. The processing of top priority information happened within a few
days, such as the initial issuing of cards. However, other types of activities, such as
producing replacement cards or tracking an ex-combatant, took longer. Delays also
occurred because NCDDR, in order to prevent fraud and discourage ex-combatants
from registering for multiple trainings, instituted a waiting period that sometimes lasted
several months. (It was not feasible to set up a nation-wide system that could easily
and quickly check for fraud.)
In 1999, the database had to be destroyed because of leaked sensitive information.

[Is this correct – I doubt it!] The replacement system, which was also centralized,
remained secure throughout the life of the system. Security was imperative during the
disarmament and demobilization phases, when sensitive information on the location of
combatants was being recorded.
In the reintegration phase, again, to prevent fraud and due to the sensitivity of the
equipment, all information was centralized and any changes in training selection or
location, reissuing of lost cards, and tracking of the distribution of benefits went
through Freetown. This was complicated by the fact that the monitoring and
evaluation component was apparently not designed to fully track beneficiaries. The
result was most likely [or by all accounts?] a low degree of fraud. However, ex-
combatants (how many, can this be quantified”] sometimes had to wait months for new
cards, to have benefit payments sorted out, or to get into a new training.91
International community, ex-combatants, implementing partners, community members,
and several NCDDR staff stated that the centralized database made their jobs more
difficult because there was not the flexibility to respond to immediate needs. This was
90
For example, when the identity cards were designed, the only technology available for printing
secured ID photos was not field deployable. An entire box of printing ribbons was rendered unusable
even in Freetown, due to the high temperatures. Field deployment of ID card printers based on dye
sublimation ribbons was not a possibility in 1999 without a major investment in infrastructure at the
demobilization centers (like air conditioning, safe storage, electricity, and so on.)
91
We do not have precise information on the level of fraud, but the general consensus was that it was
low for this type of activity and not considered consequential.
especially true during the reintegration component, which has different database
needs than the DD portions.
5.4 Program Implementation

Sound program design must be complemented by sound program implementation.
Flexibility and the ability to think creatively are hallmarks of successful implementation.
In this regard, the DDR program functioned exceptionally well, particularly the
disarmament and development components. It evolved over time to reflect the
changing political and security context of the country, but it simultaneously maintained
the central elements of the program design: uniform, equitable, and consistent
treatment of ex-combatants from all factions; accountability; and transparency.
It is important to assess a program against its own objectives. This point needs to be
underscored because the DDR process in Sierra Leone, and hence the NCDDR, has
raised expectations that go beyond what it was designed to deliver. In terms of the
program’s own objectives, it was a success. The reintegration component was
intentionally short-term and designed to meet political and security objectives first and
foremost. It removed weapons from the hands of ex-combatants, began their
reintegration into society, and contributed to the erosion of rebel command structures,
thereby helping to move Sierra Leone from war to peace.
This section examines four key issues:
• Implementation of the disarmament and demobilization portion of DDR;

• Implementation of the reintegration portion of DDR;
• Human and institutional capacity; and
• Monitoring and evaluation.
5.4.1 Disarmament and Demobilization

Ted Morse and Mark Knight have reviewed the disarmament and demobilization
component of the DDR process extensively.92 Given the short period of time available
for this evaluation, the team makes no attempt to reproduce all of the findings of that
report. Rather, it highlights issues that it feels are particular noteworthy.
While the encampment period was designed to be as short as possible, fast-tracking

disarmament and demobilization in 2001 meant that the pre-discharge orientation was
severely curtailed. Although NCDDR personnel explained that they anticipated other
organizations would provide this type of assistance to ex-combatants once they were
discharged, with the exception of those participating in the YRTEP activity, this did not
happen to any significant extent.93 Some of the vocational training programs provided
92
Morse and Knight, “Lessons Learned.”
93
Morse and Knight suggest that PDO sessions in the community of resettlement could have been
linked to payment of the Reinsertion Benefit. Morse and Knight, “Lessons Learned,” p. 91. While this
no doubt would have been feasible in principle, in practice it would have required additional resources to
reach the dispersed ex-combatants.
basic literacy instruction, but other components of the PDO, such as civic rights and
responsibilities, human rights training, and conflict management techniques, did not
receive adequate attention. Nonetheless, there is widespread agreement that this was
an appropriate trade-off.94
On balance, however, NCDDR staff does not think that the very limited periods of
encampment, particularly during the last phases of disarmament and demobilization,
are ideal. There is general agreement among NCDDR staff that, all things being
equal, an encampment period of three weeks would be appropriate to provide
combatants with adequate medical services and pre-discharge orientation, as well as
issue ID cards, and undertake other tasks required for discharge.
If a major objective of DDR processes was to break the command structure of the RUF
and AFRC units, several aspects of the disarmament and demobilization component
may have worked against this. First, during Phases I and II, when the ERT was
responsible for camp management, combatant commanders were given the
responsibility of organizing the camps and maintaining security. This undermined the
authority of the disarmament and demobilization administrators and helped keep
command structures intact. Subsequently, in Phase III, the shift to group disarmament
gave the commanders control over who was and was not present for disarmament. In
the RUF areas, where there were more group members than could enter the program
under the people-to-weapons ratio, those individuals who were included in the group
had every incentive to remain loyal to their commander.95
It is unclear to what extent these factors have contributed to continued commander

influence over former group members. First-hand evidence obtained by the evaluation
team suggests that linkages remain, but it was impossible in the short period of time
that the evaluation team was in the field to determine what the nature of these linkages
are. They could be residual military ties or normal relations among individuals who
have spent many years together under difficult conditions. It seems clear, however,
that every effort should be made to carry out the disarmament and demobilization
phase in such as way as to minimize the commanders’ authority.
5.4.2 Reintegration
94
Despite the curtailing of many of the psycho-social reorientation activities, community mental health
workers, interviewed in a focus group, were in agreement that, in general, ex-combatants who went
through the DDR process have less psychological issues and have an easier time reintegrating than
those who did not participate.
95
Morse and Knight, “Lessons Learned,” pp. 58, 71, 95. Morse and Knight report that the shift from the
TSA, which was paid on discharge from encampment or even during encampment, to the Reinsertion
Benefit, which was paid when former combatants registered for reintegration assistance in their
communities, helped to break the ties between commanders and troops in the RUF areas, since it was
more difficult for commanders to demand partial payment of the Reinsertion Benefit. Because the CDF
were community-based, the same benefit was not registered in CDF areas.
The reintegration component of the DDR process has benefited from a number of prior
assessments.96 This evaluation makes no attempt to reproduce all of the findings of
those reports. Rather, it highlights points that the evaluation team feels are particularly
important based on interviews conducted for this evaluation.
While the disarmament and demobilization component of the DDR process is widely
regarded as successful, assessments of the reintegration component have been
mixed. It is generally agreed that NCDDR’s reintegration program did succeed in its
primary objective of providing ex-combatants with a cooling-off period that helped them
to readjust to civilian life, thereby buying time for peace to be consolidated.97 There is
less agreement on how the cooling-off period was structured. Eight issues are
explored further below:
• Transitional Safety Net Allowances/Reinsertion Benefit

• Choice of vocational training and education as reintegration opportunities
• Psycho-social impact
• Implementing Partners
• Pace of demobilization
• Provision of toolkits
• Employment
• Agriculture versus vocational training
1) Transitional Safety Net Allowances/Reinsertion Benefit. As far as the

TSA/Reinsertion Benefit is concerned, there is widespread agreement that “it is
doubtful if Phase III D&D would have gone peacefully forward had not the GOSL paid
the promised Reinsertion Benefit.”98 Cash payments, particularly when timed to occur
very close to disarmament, have been controversial among donors who provide the
bulk of the financing. Yet, it is widely accepted that ex-combatants and their
dependents require some sort of safety net to carry them through the first months of
civilian life.99 In the case of Sierra Leone, procuring and distributing in-kind reinsertion
96
Stelios Comninos, Aki Stavrou, and Brian Stewart, Assessment of the Reintegration Programmes,
November 8, 2002; Stavrou (2003), Paul Richards et al (2003), and Aki Stavrou, et al., Tracer Study and
Follow-up Assessment of the Reintegration Component of Sierra Leone’s Disarmament, Demobilization
and Reintegration Programme (Cork, Ireland: 2003).
97
Comninos, Stavrou, and Stewart observe, “The major impact of the training programs had been on
peace building itself – rather than on the individual ex-combatant.” (Assessment of the Reintegration
Programmes, p. 20.)
98
Morse and Knight, “Lessons Learned” p. 96.
99
There is some evidence that objections to cash payments are beginning to decline. Cash payments
being are offered to combatants in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, as well as through the Multi-Country
Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) for the Greater Great Lakes Region in Africa. The
experiences in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, where money is clearly being exchanged for guns, suggest,
however, that the lessons of previous DDR processes—and particularly that of Sierra Leone—have not
been fully learned.
benefits would have increased the cost of the program. It also might have reduced the
beneficial impact of the cash payments on local economies, for example, if items were
purchased in bulk and distributed through centers.100 In addition, because the majority
of the ex-combatants were demobilized during the 2001 rainy season, the logistics of
distributing in-kind benefits would have been extremely complicated. Under these
circumstances, the decision to provide monetized reinsertion benefits made good
sense. The eventual decision to de-couple the cash payments, geographically and
temporally, from the disarmament and demobilization sites had additional benefits.
The government felt so strongly that a cash payment was required that it was willing to
use its own funds to support the TSA/RB at certain moments, for example in early
2000 before the MDTF was fully operational [date correct?]. This was a clear
demonstration of government ownership.
2) Choice of Vocational Training and Education as Reintegration Opportunities.

The decision to provide reintegration opportunities in the form of vocational training
and education had a significant impact on the success of the program. Vocational
training gave a sufficient number of ex-combatants self-esteem, turning them into
semi-skilled workers, and reorienting them to civilian life. (These programs are
summarized in box 5.) Nonetheless, the vocational training program has been faulted
on a number of accounts: for starting too slowly; for providing sub-standard training
and/or training that was of insufficient duration; for an anti-agricultural bias; and for
delayed provision of training stipends, toolkits and training certificates.
One of the main principles behind the NCDDR reintegration program was that there is
a distinction between providing assistance to the target population, which enabled
individuals to return to civilian life and turning an individual into a productive member of
society. The NCDDR knew that it did not have enough resources to turn all ex-
combatants into productive members of society. It felt, however, that it had an
opportunity to help these individuals return to civilian life. A second principle was that
the length of time that an individual identified himself or herself as a combatant needed
to be limited as much as possible. This meant that targeted assistance had to be
terminated relatively quickly, and the NCDDR settled on a six-month training program.
There is no doubt that ex-combatants would have benefited from longer periods of
high-quality training. Had it been economically feasible to offer the type of training
some ex-combatants received from GTZ or ActionAid, for example, the NCDDR might
well have done so, but it did not have the level of resources to do that. Several people
outside NCDDR have argued that it is better to provide quality training to a few than
sub-standard training to all. If NCDDR had chosen to limit the number of participants,
in order to provide more substantial training, however, it would have violated a cardinal
rule of DDR programming: provide equal entitlements to all ex-combatants. It would
100
While community members interviewed did not like the fact that ex-combatants received cash
allowances, they nearly unanimously approved of the allowances anyway, because the funds offered a
much-needed cash infusion into a devastated economy. As one ex-combatant stated, “They did not like
the fact that we got money but they did not mind taking our money.”
have opened NCDDR to accusations of favoritism and quite possibly created

significant ill will. Limited enrollment would have meant also that many ex-combatants
would not have received several of the other benefits that came with the training, such
as a cooling-off period; an opportunity to assume a different identity; and the
acquisition of enough skills to get short-term, casual work as semi-skilled laborers.
The training courses may not have created cadres of skilled carpenters, masons, and
tailors, but according to focus group interviews, ex-combatants were able to get short-
term work as a result of skills learned. Community leaders said this benefited local
communities because they could hire locally for rehabilitation work instead of having to
bring people in, which would have been costly.
3) Psychosocial Impact. It is difficult to determine the psycho-social impact,

especially for activities like counseling. The team did not spend enough time in the
field to make such a determination, and previous DDRP assessments either made no
reference to this or had conflicting views. Furthermore, activities like counseling were
not uniformly implemented, due to changes in the length of time ex-combatants spent
in the camps and variations in counseling services was offered at the local NCDDR
offices. By most accounts, counseling services consisted large of giving advice. Most
likely, ex-combatants benefited from a combination of activities, since at no point has
anyone singled out one or two activities as making a significant difference.
Box 6. TEP: Sierra Leone’s Approach to Reintegration

The NCDDR Training and Employment Program (TEP) was the component through which ex-
combatants could choose their reintegration options. Started under the Community Reintegration and
Rehabilitation Project (CRRP), TEP was designed to provide support through targeted social and
economic reintegration assistance. The social reintegration aspect, which was to provide civic
education, psychological counseling, and community sensitization, would prepare people for the return
to civilian life by providing key psycho-social support. The economic reintegration aspect was to include
vocational education, counseling, and job-seeking strategies.
NCDDR started with the full range of services designed under TEP. However, budget constraints, a
greater than expected number of ex-combatants in the program, and pressure to increase the speed of
the DDR process and decrease the encampment period meant that the initial time frame for these
activities was compromised. In the end, all of the ex-combatants who participated in the reintegration
component went through some variation of psycho-social or civic education training, and either formal
education or vocational training. Few went through the training program as originally designed.
The psycho-social and civic education programs were delivered primarily in the camps, although some
occurred during the training courses, depending on the IP, and at the local NCDDR offices. As the
encampment period shrank, so did the amount of social reintegration assistance offered. Those who
stayed in the camps only a few days received very little counseling or civic education. Local community
mental health workers believe that the counseling offered, which was more advice than psychological
counseling, was seriously insufficient to address the psycho-social needs of the ex-combatants.
However, they also stated that there was a noticeable difference between those who went through the
DDR process and those who did not, with DDR participants generally coping better.
For economic reintegration, ex-combatants filled out a questionnaire at the demobilization centers,
which served as a preliminary determination of the types of trainings that would be appropriate. This
was used primarily to identify those who could return to school; those who had the skills to take advance
programs, such as computer training; and those who should study more general topics. When the ex-
combatant re-located to his or her area of choice, they signed up at the local NCDDR office and
registered for a training course. Vocational education training was offered for subjects such as
mechanics, carpentry, tailoring, gara tie dying, hairdressing, and driving. Courses generally lasted three
to six months, depending on the subject.
“The [INGOs] hated being

The 2002 assessment of NCDDR reintegration accountable to national [local]
programs states, “Whatever psycho-social institutions. The nationals had the
money and the expertise and were
support was made available was insufficient, or
holding [INGOs] accountable and
it failed to meet the psycho-social needs of the ignoring their models.”
majority of ex-combatants.”101 The report goes
on to say that the ex-combatants’ psychological —NCDDRS Staff Member, 2004
and behavioral problems could have
ramifications in the future. This sentiment was echoed by community mental-health
workers interviewed by the 2002 assessment team. In their opinion, the counseling
could not be considered counseling from a mental-health perspective and was woefully
inadequate in meeting the needs of the ex-combatants. According to the mental-
health workers, who were in the field on a regular basis, most ex-combatants still
suffered from traumatic experiences and had trouble coping.
By 2003, the tracer study, which was a follow-up to the 2002 assessment, captured a
slightly different picture. According to the study, ex-combatants reported that they had
little trouble with other people and tended not to quarrel. In general, they felt that
people could be trusted, felt close to people in their neighborhood, and felt either
happy or moderately happy.102 The report goes on to say, “Contrary to expectations,
ex-combatants displayed few psycho-social difficulties…”103
The debate over mental health aside, reintegration has occurred. This suggests that
the counseling was sufficient enough to allow an adequate number of ex-combatants
to assimilate into civilian society. This assertion is supported by the comments of the
community mental-health workers, who say that, although the counseling was
inadequate, there is a noticeable difference between those who went through the DDR
program and those who did not—with DDR program participants demonstrating a
greater degree of coping skills.
Reintegration has not been a painless process, and there are still pressing psycho-
social issues that need to be addressed, particularly for rape and abuse victims.
Further, youth are not benefiting from the social cohesion offered through the many
youth groups. However, there has been a remarkable amount of forgiveness and
acceptance on the part of both the communities and the ex-combatants. All evidence
points to a country that is moving beyond conflict.
4) Implementing Partners. One of the greatest challenges in implementing

reintegration activities was finding a sufficient number of qualified implementing
101
Comninos, Stavrou, and Stewart, Assessment of the Reintegration Programmes, p. 4.
102
Stavrou et al., Tracer Study and Follow Up Assessment, pp. 31, 32, 37 and 39.
103
Stavrou, Vincent, Peters, Burton, and Johnson, Tracer Study and Follow Up Assessment, p. 39.
partners. Very few international NGOs with the capacity to provide high-quality
training to large numbers of people chose to participate in the DDR program. Many
did not want to work with ex-combatants, and many did not want to be constrained by
a government-led program. MOU negotiations with those INGOs that did participate in
the program took a long time to complete, in no small measure because of differences
in approach between the NCDDR and the implementing partners. Additionally, after
several failed-attempts at disarmament and demobilization, there was a psychological
barrier that had to be overcome on the part of potential implementing partners before
they were willing to become involved in Phase III reintegration. Lastly, there was a
general wariness on both sides, which did not help to facilitate a close working
relationship.104
As far as local organizations, the quality of local implementing partners varied. There
simply were not enough quality local partners to implement the program. Local
partners ranged from legitimate training organizations, usually with limited capacity to
expand their operations, to organizations that opened overnight with virtually no
capacity at all. In the case of the latter, NCDDR officials admitted that sometimes they
were misled by those who established centers with little to no intention of providing
training, but had considerable interest in receiving funding from NCDDR. Monitoring of
the training sites exposed the most egregious cases, such as implementing partners
that collected the first tranche of their grant and disappeared. When it proved possible
to identify these false training centers, some alternate means of training the ex-
combatants had to be found.
Even if INGOs or consulting firms had been used in greater numbers, many would still
have been reliant on local partners to actually carry out the training. The problem was
particularly serious in the north and east of the country and was exacerbated by the
rapid pace of demobilization during the second half of 2001. This is not to say that IP’s
should not have been used but to demonstrate the need for significant pre-planning
and incorporating more in-depth capacity building measures to better ensure
programmatic success.
5) Pace of Demobilization. While military observers might have better managed the
flow of combatants waiting to be disarmed, a fast-track disarmament and
demobilization process meant that the number of demobilized soldiers was always
going to outstrip the ability of the reintegration component to provide training programs
in a timely fashion. (See box 7.) Simply stated, the political imperatives were at odds
with optimal program implementation, and political imperatives carried the day. It is
important for those engaged in designing and implementing DDR programs to
understand this fact. Under these circumstances, it was regrettable that some parallel
partners initially did not punch cards for the training they provided ex-combatants,
thereby missing an opportunity to reduce the NCDDR’s caseload. At the same time,
the ability of UNAMSIL and several donors to create stop-gap programs helped
104
It was not uncommon to hear complaints from the INGOs that they were not properly included in the
NCDDR reintegration activities and for NCDDR that the INGOs were not overly responsive to its needs.
alleviate some of the problems created by delays in providing training opportunities.105
Box 7. Capacity Constraints on Implementing Reintegration Programs

A report to MDTF partners in September 2001 noted, “As the north and east continue to open up, the
reintegration unit will find it more and more difficult to identify capable organizations especially with
adequate infrastructure to support activities in these areas. This lack of capacity and/or infrastructure
could likely lead to delays and higher unit costs to the program. This challenge is exacerbated by the
current rapid pace of disarmament, and has potentially negative spill-over affects [sic] for the upcoming
elections.”
Source: World Bank, The World Bank Administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund (TF022604) for the Sierra Leone
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Program, Progress Report #7, September 30, 2001, p. 7.
6) Provision of toolkits. Toolkits were another problematic aspect of reintegration.

In interview after interview, and report after report, former combatants who had
undergone vocational training cited the delayed delivery of toolkits as a major source
of grievances. There were two main reasons given for these delays.
The first, and probably most important, reason was that the NCDDR did not procure
toolkits until nearly the end of each training course. Advance procurement,
recommended by the World Bank and the FMPU, was resisted because of cash flow
problems caused by the late disbursement of donor pledges to the Trust Fund.
Additionally, NCDDR staff pointed out that the numbers of individuals registered for
courses and the numbers of individuals completing courses were invariably different.
NCDDR staff preferred to wait until the number likely to complete each course firmed
up. Consequently, the FMPU reported receiving requests for toolkit procurement three
to six weeks before the end of each training course. Under these circumstances, the
MDTF’s preference for international competitive bidding, and the difficulty in Deleted: requirement
establishing some sort of draw-down relationship with preferred suppliers, were
reported to lead to serious delays in toolkit procurement.106
While fiscal prudence dictates not overdrawing a trust fund account, subsequent DDR
programs that find themselves in the same position may want to proceed with
procurement if the pledges are firm. It may be desirable to review World Bank trust
fund regulations for their suitability to post-conflict environments. The rules governing
procurement are strict, however, because it is precisely in the area of procurement that
corruption is prone to occur. As Bank officials pointed out, toolkits could have been
procured based on the number of individuals registering for particular training courses,
and any extra toolkits could have been sold on the domestic market to recoup costs.
105
See section 4.4 and Box 2 for additional information on the stop-gap program.
106
Selective tendering is not impossible under Bank rules as of late 2003, and toolkit procurement was
expedited by inviting no fewer than five known firms with proven capacity to provide the necessary items
to tender for toolkit contracts. Selective tendering does not, however, appear to have been employed
on a regular basis in Sierra Leone prior to that point. Authors’ interviews. The MDTF itself is discussed
in more detail in section 5.6.1.
A second reason cited for the delays in distributing toolkits related to stock. If, at the
end of a training program, there were not enough toolkits in stock to provide one to
every member of a training program, then the NCDDR would postpone delivering the
toolkits to all participants until enough became available. This problem was, of course,
compounded by the NCDDR’s reluctance to procure toolkits until it had a good sense
of the numbers it needed to procure. Had toolkits been stockpiled, this problem would
presumably have arisen less frequently, if at all.
7) Employment. Unemployment is a systemic problem in Sierra Leone, but the

country also suffers significantly from underemployment. Employment issues are a
source of frustration. A root cause of the initial conflict, employment is of great
concern for those who monitor peace in Sierra Leone.107
It is estimated that almost 33 percent of the ex-combatants who went through the DDR
process considered themselves employed in 2003.108 Being employed is generally
defined as having a full-time job, as opposed to temporary work.109 About half of those
who considered themselves employed reported needing 18 months or longer to find
employment once they had completed a training program. According to the tracer
study, 71.6 percent of ex-combatants have had a job related to the skills trainings
received.110 Anecdotal evidence also supports this conclusion. Ex-combatants
interviewed in focus groups for this evaluation reported that the training programs
assisted with procuring short-term work, apprenticeships, full-time jobs, or starting their
own business, as well as with general reintegration. However, the training programs
were limited as far as securing permanent employment is concerned. Like other Sierra
Leoneans, the ex-combatants have had to struggle to find sufficient work. The
trainings were too short—in many cases, too weak—and the general economy was too
poor to have resulted in ex-combatants having stable employment opportunities.111
This is not to say that such training is not without merit. Experience in other war-torn
107
This is especially true for youth. Many ex-combatants are still considered youth and are unemployed
and underemployed just as they were when the war started.
108
Stavrou, et al., Tracer Study and Follow-Up Assessment, Appendix 1, p. 10.
109
There are variations in the figures regarding employment of ex-combatants. Some figures of
employed combined those who stated they were employed with those who did not but later admitted
they recently received income. The ex-combatants interviewed by the evaluation team considered
themselves unemployed when they had received income from short-term jobs. When pressed, all
except one had worked in some sort of capacity in recent months. The tracer study of 2003 does not
explain if the 48 percent who considered themselves unemployed were actually completely
unemployed, or, as with our focus groups, did a little work here and there but were never fully employed.
This is an important distinction to make as the training programs did help to increase the types of short-
term jobs available to the ex-combatants. The short-term implication is that people are able to get by
with an increased portfolio of skills. The long-term implication is that there are a sizable number of ex-
combatants who are chronically underemployed and very frustrated.
110
Stavrou et al., Tracer Study and Follow-Up Assessment, p. 25.
111
It should be noted that it employment creation was not a specific objective of the vocational training
program.
African countries strongly suggests that it has multiple benefits (see box 8). However,
the training received by ex-combatants did not transform the Sierra Leonean economy
[how could it???] or ensure that the ex-combatants would have sufficient marketable
skills to ward off unemployment or underemployment. Because the training programs
did not prevent unemployment or underemployment, there was considerable debate
within Sierra Leone about the appropriateness and the role of trainings.
Box 8. Value of Ex-Combatant Training

“It often remains uncertain whether ex-combatants will find work after the completion of a training
course. However, reintegration programmes in Ethiopia and Mozambique have shown that training
courses in and of themselves can have a positive effect. They create temporary positions for ex-
combatants. Training courses can be seen as just one form of support and employment for ex-
combatants at times when they need money, a civilian job and future prospects. These measures buy
time for consolidation of peace and for the reconstruction of war-torn countries.
“Training is not only a matter of professional qualification. The social effects of training courses are
often underestimated and are hard to measure. For many ex-combatants, the training courses offered
as part of a reintegration programme are their first chance to receive some sort of professional training.
The experience of learning and applying this new skill can in itself be a positive effect. The completion
of a training course also elevates participants’ social status. By the time the training courses are over,
the individual ex-combatant might have established more contacts and have a clearer idea of what
he/she can do for a living.”
Source: Colin Gleichman, Michael Odenwald, Kees Steenken, and Adrian Wilkinson, Disarmament,
Demobilisation, and Reintegration. A Practical Field and Classroom Guide, Swedish National Defence College,
Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Forsvarets skolesenter, GTZ, 2004, p. 84.
Another explanation for the low numbers of ex-combatants [low numbers, as

compared to what??] who considered themselves employed is the generally weak
economy. Even if the training programs had been of better quality, it is doubtful that
the economy could have handled, for example, hundreds of skilled tailors entering the
market within a relatively short period. What was not part of the DDRP, and has been
missing in Sierra Leone in general, are programs, such as micro-credit and other types
of entrepreneurship initiatives, aimed at stimulating growth. Much of this goes beyond
the mandate of NCDDR but does emphasize the connection between the DDR
process and the general rehabilitation of the country. Training is not enough if the ex-
combatants lack opportunities to work after completing their courses.
Ex-combatants participating in early focus groups reported a preference for vocational

training over job-creation types of activities like rebuilding of roads. Their reasons
were two-fold. First, education offers more prestige in Sierra Leonean society.
Second, many ex-combatants realized that vocational training offered them a chance
to gain some marketable skills, which would outlive the income earned from short-term
rehabilitation projects. The ex-combatants also received greater stipends for
vocational education than for other activities like agriculture, an incentive that cannot
be under-estimated.112
112
This expressed preference has other effects. It exacerbates the problem with implementing partners
and limits the degree to which ex-combatants and non-combatants can receive training simultaneously,
since public-works programs offer an excellent source of integrated training.
Because many ex-combatants need to work multiple jobs in order to survive, it is hard
to determine the exact nature of their employment. Low crime rates and the general
poverty levels of most Sierra Leoneans (which call into question the degree to which
family members can support unemployed ex-combatants) as well as evaluation
interviews suggest that ex-combatants manage to survive despite the reported
unemployment rates. According to a 2002 report, 30.9 percent of ex-combatants said
they engaged in petty trading, 21 percent in carpentry, and 14 percent in tailoring.113
These were the three most popular types of work listed. Some ex-combatants have
gone into business for themselves, for example, forming biker associations in cities like
Bo to provide cheap transportation services. Given the frequency with which
community leaders cited local labor for rehabilitation as a positive outcome of the ex-
combatant training programs, it is presumed that small-scale construction must have
also provided a significant amount of short-term work.
8) Agricultural versus vocational training. About 85 percent of the total

population is dependent on semi-subsistence agriculture.114 Yet, very few ex-
combatants chose agriculture as a reintegration opportunity. There are two primary
reasons for this.
The first is that the structure of the training programs encouraged ex-combatants to
enroll in vocational training programs, and it created disincentives for re-entry to the
agricultural sector. The agricultural package was initially assessed by ex-combatants
to be of lower value to the vocational training package. The number of ex-combatants
choosing agriculture rose somewhat when the number of bags of rice offered in the
agriculture package was increased from three to six.
There was also no serious attempt to promote commercial farming, which could have
meant attracting a greater number of ex-combatants. Training in commercial
agriculture might have helped to fill the gap that currently exists in the country’s labor
force. Of businesses interviewed for a 2002 study, one quarter noted the need for
agrarian and agri-business skills.115 It appears that NCDDR missed an opportunity to
begin transforming the agricultural sector, for example by introducing improved seeds
and farming methods, small agro-business skills, and the like. [seems a little beyond
the NCDDR’s core expertise!]
Had it been possible to promote commercial farming, the numbers choosing

agricultural training might have been higher. At the same time, it is unclear just how
attractive the agricultural package ever would have been for younger combatants.
Furthermore, there is some evidence to suggest that combatants viewed vocational
training as a means of maximizing their employment opportunities, since they could
then combine farm and non-farm income-generating activities.
113
Comninos, Stavrou, and Stewart, Assessment of the Reintegration Programs of the National
Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration, p. 46.
114
Stavrou et al., Tracer Study and Follow-Up Assessment, p. 17.
115
Comninos, Stavrou, and Stewart, Assessment of the Reintegration Programmes, p. 29.
While the reintegration portion of the DDRP clearly did operate under a number of
constraints, Comninos, Stavrou, and Stewart concluded that “measured against their
remit, it must therefore be said that the NCDDR have been successful in creating
economic opportunities for the ex-combatants.” Further, they said, “Even if ex-
combatants do not find employment opportunities related to their training, this is by no
means wasted. The obtained skills have practical value in terms of their usage during
the life-time of the ex-combatant and the technical skills process itself is an investment
into the life-skills process of the ex-combatant.116
Additionally, evidence is beginning to emerge that a higher proportion of ex-

combatants are making some use of the skills they acquired during training.
Information collected during focus group sessions with ex-combatants for this
evaluation supports this conclusion.
5.4.3 Capacity. Whereas there was a high degree of capacity to implement the
disarmament and demobilization portion of the DDR process [true, but how come?
National staff competitively recruited, but also competitively remunerated. Then,
NCDDR staff were complemented by carefully tailored TA. , capacity was an issue
during the reintegration phase.
This was recognized by the World Bank implementation completion report of the
CRRP, which provided support both to the NCRRR and the NCDDR:
One of the constraints mentioned in many reports and during the

ICR [Implementation Completion Report] mission was the limited
capacity of NGO partners, who were contracted to implement each
of the two components. While the project did include funding to
provide training and technical assistance to the NGOs, the project
should have been proactive in developing and delivering up-front a
series of training workshops and on-going technical assistance to
NGOs at various stages of the project cycle. Topics covered might
include participatory needs assessment and planning, proposal
development, financial management, procurement, and monitoring
and evaluation. This should have been an integral part of project
design. 117
Capacity for local organizations is an issue in many conflict and post-conflict countries.
Unfortunately, many donors see capacity building for local organizations as either a
small component of another activity or as something to be addressed once the country
has made the transition from humanitarian relief to development. As a result, local
organizations rarely have the necessary capacity and expertise to fully respond to and
116
Ibid., pp. 66-67.
117
ibid, p. 6
participate in transitional activities. In such cases, the expertise and capacity remains
almost entirely with the international community.
Local organizations are caught in a quandary. They cannot substantially participate in

the development of their country because they do not receive sufficient funds to
implement substantial activities. Donors will provide only low levels of funding
because local organizations do not have the capacity or the track record to justify
larger amounts. From a local organization’s perspective, how can it build its capacity
and demonstrate its expertise if it is repeatedly limited to very small-scale activities?
A partial explanation for why the capacity of local organizations was not considered
earlier is the fact that one of the original assumptions was that INGOs would act as
implementers of the DDRP. This did not work well because of the culture clash
between the INGOs and NCDDR. As a result, not many INGOs applied to participate.
INGOs had greater capacity than local organizations and more sophisticated
administrative and financial structures, and many were already working in areas
targeted for encampments and training centers. On the other hand, many INGOs were
geared towards humanitarian assistance and, therefore, could not quickly make the
change to training. In addition, some INGOs also relied on local organizations to
implement activities. This meant that NCDDR and INGOs were both competing for the
same group of qualified local implementing partners. That said, it should be noted that
international organizations like GTZ and ActionAid made a major contribution to the
reintegration process.
NCDDR attempted to compensate for the limited capacity of many local organizations
by providing some basic workshops and encouraging local organizations to outsource
financial management. The workshops did not have a noticeable impact on
performance, and many implementing partners used the funds allocated for
bookkeepers in other ways. This meant that some ex-combatants went through quality
training courses run by well-established implementing partners, and others received
minimal training. Still others had to wait months before training was even offered in
their area. This generated frustration among ex-combatants and hampered the
effectiveness of the reintegration component.
While there is a limit to which the problem of insufficient local capacity can be
overcome in war-affected countries such as Sierra Leone, the evaluation team concurs
with the Bank assessment that more could have been done. Projects like Catholic
Relief Service’s Emergency Preparedness and Response Training show that capacity
building can take place during emergency situations and that by providing such
training, local organizations can play a significant and necessary role in relief
activities.118 It also has shown that capacity building during emergency phases helps
to prepare the country for transition because it increases the number of credible local
actors who can respond to reintegration and development needs. In the future, those
118
See “EPRT II: Emergency Preparedness and Response Training in Angola, Catholic Relief Final
Evaluation, FALL 2003” by Julie Nenon and Ken Polsky.
in charge of DDR processes may wish to consider how to make use of methods such
as this to bolster local capacity.
5.4.4 Monitoring and Evaluation
The Monitoring and Evaluation Unit of the DDRP was strongest in its role as managing
information systems. Its effectiveness could be considered, in retrospect, as one of
the critical hallmarks of the DDRP and contributed in a significant way to the success
of the program. The flexibility that the program needed in order to meet changes in the
overall operational environment and in the narrow program arena would not have been
possible if a robust and effective system of monitoring and evaluation was not in place.
The importance of M&E, especially the MIS functions, were recognized from inception
and well integrated into the different stages of the process.
The systematic monitoring process started at the disarmament centers were MILOBS
filled out forms prepared by the M&E unit for each combatant. The forms were
designed to establish a detailed profile of each combatant. These forms were sent to
the M&E unit together with a photo of the individual to be inputted into the database
and further processed. The combatants, who were subsequently moved to
demobilization centers, were issued within a week a photo ID which enabled them to
access all programmed benefits. The integrity of the system was always a paramount
concern and they sought for ways and means to maintain a foolproof system within a
context of a program of an urgent nature. A laminated Polaroid photo ID system which
was used from 1998 was substituted by a much more secure digital card in 2000.
Introducing finger printing was considered but found to be untenable given the
operational environment.
The next tracking point was at the community level when ex-combatants came to
register for reintegration opportunities. At this stage the particulars of the individuals
were sent back to the M&E for validation. The validation process was also
complimented by the counseling activities of the DDR field officers. The training
opportunities on offer emanated from the Implementation Partners but were evaluated
and approved by the Project Approvals Committee which was composed of
representatives of many relevant institutions and included the Head of M&E. At this
stage, the M&E unit carried out the dual tasks of monitoring the attendance of the ex-
combatants enrolled and the performance of the IPs. Attendance was sometimes
problematic due to motivational factors and M&E personnel were expected to ensure
compliance by monitoring attendance sheets. A minimum attendance of 12 days per
month was a requirement for payment of the 60,000 Leone monthly support.
With respect to the IPs, the M&E staffs were expected to audit the expenditures for
training purposes incurred by the enterprises to ensure that allotted funds were
properly spent. Although more problematic, the staff also tracked and monitored the
quality of the training provided through onsite inspection and interviews and actual
tests of trainees. The monitoring activities of the staff were complimented by the
monthly financial and activity report which was required from the IPs and by the
auditing and inspection support provided by the FMPU. The payment for services to
IPs was apportioned into tranches and was conditioned on the submission of
acceptable regular periodic reports. According to the estimate of the M&E there were
about 200 training opportunities that required their monitoring through the life of the
program.
The M&E had four field staff, one for each region, to do the onsite inspection. The low
number of staff in combination with the enormity of the tasks meant it was harder for
the M&E Unit to carry out the more qualitative aspects of their jobs. Reporting on
trends, weaknesses, and successes to determine impact was difficult under these
circumstances. The field staff, reportedly, could attend approximately one training per
activity.119 This allowed for an overview and helped to weed out the most egregious
cases of fraud. However, it did not allow the M&E Unit to report on the actual impact
of the activities and for managers to make necessary revisions. This combination was
reportedly and understandably overwhelming and meant that the M&E Unit focused on
activities necessary to ensure program implementation such as processing of
information for delivery of benefits, reporting information necessary to ensure
payments, confirming that trainings existed, issuing cards, etc.120 These functions
alone provided a wealth of information and did serve an important management tool.
Where more qualitative monitoring and evaluation did come into play was with larger
activities such as the assessment conducted during the Interim Phase. This allowed
senior policy makers and managers to review the impact to date and candidly discuss
what worked and what did not. As discussed above in the section on the Interim
Phase (see section 3.2.3), changes were made to the DDRP as a result of the
assessment. The MIS functions and the use of assessments combined meant that,
despite the enormity of the situation in comparison with the size of the M&E Unit, the
DDRP had an effective monitoring and evaluation system that served the program
well.
5.5 Reconciliation
While reconciliation is a process that occurs over a long period of time, effective DDR
is dependent on a certain level of reconciliation. If ordinary people are unwilling to
take steps toward reconciliation from the start of the peace process, all activities
necessary for implementing a peace agreement will be more difficult to achieve.
The people of Sierra Leone demonstrated early on a strong capacity for reconciliation,
based in large part on deep religious faith and war weariness. This grassroots
phenomenon was supported in a variety of ways by different players, including local
organizations such as the Inter-religious Council and women’s groups, local
authorities, the government, and INGOs such as Talking Drum Studio. Activities
included Track 2 diplomacy, sensitization campaigns, and healing rituals. All played
their part with different levels of impact. Combined, they contributed an atmosphere
conducive to reconciliation.
119
Authors’ Interview
120
Authors’ Interview
This is not to say that complete reconciliation occurred. Evidence shows that many
RUF did not want to return to their original communities. There were various reasons
for this. Some had developed close ties, including new families, in the areas in which
they were demobilized, and some wished to remain close to the members of their
former fighting groups. However, others feared returning to their communities
because of their wartime conduct. Although there was extreme generosity among
Sierra Leoneans in general, not everyone welcomed ex-combatants back. In cases
where ex-combatants wished to return but communities did not wish to receive them,
more intensive interventions are needed to assist communities and ex-combatants in
dealing with very traumatic conditions. NCDDR conducted general sensitization
campaigns, but there never was a major effort to address the individual needs of all
ex-combatants who wanted to return.
NCDDR contributed to reconciliation, and it also benefited from reconciliation activities

and the general positive attitude toward reconciliation that prevailed among the
population. In addition to conducting sensitization campaigns, NCDDR maintained
contact with the RUF during lulls in the peace process, and in some cases it facilitated
the return of key ex-combatants to their communities of origin. These types of
activities were important in setting the tone for the reintegration process.
5.6 Program Financing

Countries such as Sierra Leone that are emerging from prolonged periods of war are
typically cash-starved and face considerable demands on available resources. While
DDR is central to the success of the peace process, it has to compete with many other
urgent demands, both for national resources and for funding from international
sources. What is more, DDR programs almost always cost more than the original
estimates, and donors may prefer to finance non-governmental DDR-related activities.
These factors confront those responsible for mobilizing resources to support a
government-led DDR program. DDR managers face additional challenges in obtaining
external resources in a timely fashion and in accounting for their use. This section
examines how the NCDDR and the Government of Sierra Leone responded to the
three key challenges of:
• Mobilizing resources in support of government programs

• Disbursing resources in an effective and timely fashion,
• Managing resources effectively, efficiently, and accountably.
5.6.1 Mobilizing and Disbursing Resources

The NCDDR initially estimated that they would require some US$33.6 million to
demobilize 33,000 combatants. This sum did not include any costs incurred by
ECOMOG or UN forces in support of DDR activities. When the DDRP concluded,
senior United Nations officials estimated total program costs at approximately $100
million.121 Although this remains an estimate, table 4 suggests that the estimate is
credible, if not low.
Table 4. Estimated Cost of DDR Program
Funding Source US$

Government of Sierra Leone 6.3
World Bank (IDA credit through the CRRP plus PPF) 7.7
a,b
MDTF 39.5
c
UK 26.5
UNICEF 8.3
WFP 2.1
Human Security Fund 3.0
d
Germany, bilateral aid through GTZ 2.9
e
UNAMSIL 3.7
f
Total 100.0
a
Includes investment income.
b
Contributors to the MDTF include Canada, Denmark, the European Commission, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.
c
Estimated costs of the Community Rehabilitation Programme, the ERT, and the Emergency Response Team.
d
Estimate based on total German government allocation of approximately $10 million for DDR in Sierra Leone.
In view of the changes in the dollar-Euro exchange rate during the period under consideration, this figure is
approximate.
e
Based on estimate of total expenditure provided by UN officials. The actual total is unknown. The figure
provided here is a residual.
f
This total does not include any support provided to the DDR process by ECOMOG.
Source: Authors’ interviews; World Bank, The World Bank Administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund (TF 022604)
for the Sierra Leone Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program, Progress Reports #12 and
#13, June 30, 2003 and September 30, 2003; Jeremy Ginifer with Kaye Oliver, Evaluation of the Conflict
Prevention Pools: Sierra Leone, Evaluation Report EV 647, London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
Cabinet Office, Ministry of Defence and HM Treasury, 2004; personal communication from Donald
Robertshaw, UNICEF, July 8, 2004..
The GOSL established a peace and security fund from which it could draw Le1 billion
quarterly at its own discretion [and audited by the Bank].122 The existence of such a
fund proved critical to the government’s ability to carry out key activities at times when
international funding was not forthcoming. In some cases, these payments constituted
the government’s own contribution; in other cases, they were reimbursed from the
MDTF.123 The government’s decision to set up this fund was particularly important
121
Authors’ interview, May 2004.
122
This arrangement was acceptable to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
123
For example, the World Bank reported in September 2000: “The increase of almost $1.5 million in
the level of previously reported TSA payments [from the MDTF] during a period when TSAs had been
because occasionally there was a need to front-load the government’s contribution to

cover delays in external flows.
The Multi-Donor Trust Fund was an important mechanism for several reasons. First,
the World Bank’s reputation for fiduciary accountability and its mobilizing capacity
helped the government raise funds. Second, the MDTF was a mechanism through
which donors that were otherwise not active in Sierra Leone were able to contribute to
the DDR process. Third, the MDTF simplified procedures for government and reduced
the burden of managing external resources by using one system that incorporated a
common set of financial management procedures and procurement, audit, and
reporting requirements. This increased efficiency and reduced costs.
Fourth, the MDTF helped to promote government ownership of and control over the
DDR process. Donations to Bank-administered trust funds are not subject to
earmarking.124 This made it harder, although not impossible, to set up parallel
projects, and it made the donors who did set up parallel projects somewhat more self-
critical and aware of how their projects related to the government’s program.
Additionally, the MDTF enhanced national ownership in several ways. First, the MDTF
supported a DDR program that manifested national objectives, priorities, policies, and
modalities. Second, it put extensive resources at the disposal of the national entity
entrusted with the implementation of the DDR program. Third, the MDTF, as well as
the World Bank PPF, contributed to creating national capacity that was necessary to
guarantee national ownership.
The MDTF also had shortcomings. First, there was a time lag. The World Bank-
administered trust fund did not come on line until March/April 2000, but the DDR
process had been under way since July 1998. Therefore, other sources of financing
had to be found. Second, there was a coverage gap. Bank-administered trust funds
are unable to finance disarmament activities. Third, donor disbursements to the MDTF Deleted: -related
were not always made in a timely manner. Bank quarterly reports constantly speak of
barely having enough to cover expenses, and they raise concerns about the demands
that rapid disarmament and demobilization could place on expenses. This, however,
is not a trust fund-related problem per se. It is a chronic problem facing governments
reliant on aid donors. It is possible that disbursements would have been even later
had the Bank not been involved in the trust fund. Nonetheless, it was a problem that
affected the MDTF.
World Bank funding through the PPF provided strong support for a range of activities
such as undertaking studies, preparing manuals, and assessing and building the
capacity of the NCDDR. It also provided technical assistance. Bank funding through
suspended is due to the fact that payments made from GOSL resources in the early part of the year
were reimbursed by the Multi-donor Trust Fund during the quarter under review.” The World Bank, The
World Bank Administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund (TF022604) for the Sierra Leone Disarmament,
Demobilization, and Reintegration Program, Progress Report #4, September 30, 2000, p. 5.
124
In contrast, trust funds administered by UNDP permit multiple earmarking. Many donors naturally
prefer this flexibility, but from the perspective of governments in post-conflict countries, such earmarking
can undermine their policies.
the CRRP paid NCDDR operating costs and, through it, the full range of reintegration
activities. This support, along with the support provided through the MDTF, facilitated
the transition of 72,000 former combatants to civilian life, helping to change their mind-
set, providing them with resources, and enhancing their skills, which contributed
importantly to changing the environment in Sierra Leone from one of war to one of
peace.
Peacekeeping support for the DDR process through ECOMOG, UNOMSIL, and
UNAMSIL was never included in the budget, but the peacekeeping missions provided
critically important security, logistics, and technical support. If this component had to
be fully costed and money raised by voluntary contributions, it is likely that there would
be constant shortfalls in DDR budgets [that’s not really logic, is it? It’s tantamount to
saying that development partners who agreed to finance the DDR Program (and
UNAMSIL) would fail to do so if financing of one part would be shifted from UNAMSIL
to the MDTF?] . DDR programs have historically had problems obtaining the
necessary support from peacekeeping missions.125 The Joint Operations Plan
established in Sierra Leone helped to integrate UNAMSIL into the DDR process.126
UNICEF was given responsibility for financing the child soldiers program and did so
entirely to the satisfaction of the government. UNICEF’s willingness to take the lead
on developing, funding, and implementing this program reduced the burden on the
NCDDR. Nonetheless, even with the MOU between UNICEF and the government,
UNICEF felt it had considerable latitude in implementing the program. [what’s the
point?]
Great Britain provided the NCDDR with considerable support. It provided the
resources to jump-start the DDR process in 1996/97 and again, with the World Bank,
in 1998. The support provided in the 1998–1999 period was crucial for the
achievement of phases I and II of the DDR process before the MDTF came on line.
Moreover, the UK was the first donor to the MDTF. The UK also provided important
political support to the DDR process both in Sierra Leone and in international fora
throughout the life of the program. Although it subsequently opted out of the MDTF
and pursued bilateral activities, it continued to mobilize support for the MDTF.
Although UK support to the demobilization component through the ERT was very
important during phases I and II of the DDR process, Britain’s precipitous withdrawal
following the resumption of hostilities in 2000 created significant problems for the
government.
Parallel programs offered a means of making additional resources available to the

NCDDR program without requiring the donors to contribute the resources directly to
the MDTF. Donors such as Germany and the UK financed community-oriented
rehabilitation and training programs that targeted on ex-combatants. This, of course,
125
For example, see Ball and Campbell, Complex Crisis and Complex Peace, pp. 46-48.
126
Security Council Resolution 1346 of March 30, 2001, called for an enhanced management role by
UNAMSIL. It referenced the March 2000 SRSG report which states that “a consensus emerged with
regard to the contribution of UNAMSIL … UNAMSIL is expected to assume a broader responsibility.”
undermined national ownership of the DDR process. Therefore, it is preferable for all
financial resources to be included in the trust fund. Additionally, while parallel
programs reduced the fundraising burden on the NCDDR, the vocational training
program offered various terms for participants, thereby damaging the principle of
uniform treatment of ex-combatants. Nonetheless, if the alternative is to forego those
funds entirely, governments may decide to accept the trade-off.
5.6.2 Managing Resources

The $100 million DDR process involved multiple sources of finance, numerous
conduits, and various implementation arrangements. It was a complex program that
required a high degree of planning, coordination, accountability, monitoring, and
harmonization of diverse institutional cultures and operational modalities. Successful
management was based on robust national ownership, coupled with effective
partnerships. The MDTF and FMPU, the NCDDR and its Executive Secretariat, the
World Bank, various organizations of the UN system, DFID, GTZ and others were
critical institutions and vehicles that had a role in the management of these resources.
The $100 million estimated cost incorporates the MDTF funds, resources channeled
through the parallel programs, and the costs directly contributed by UN. By far the
largest financial input, $39.5 million, was channeled through the MDTF. The main trust
fund was divided into two smaller trust funds: the first a government-executed fund,
which became the major receptacle for most of the financial resources, and the other,
a World Bank-administered fund with about $2 million. This split execution of the trust
fund was an innovation. Previous DDR trust funds were either government- or World
Bank-executed but never a combination. This special arrangement was optimal as
speed was of the essence, particularly at the initial stage. The World Bank facilitated
the fast procurement of critical services, such as the provision of four core consultants
for the Executive Secretariat. The World Bank-administered fund also financed the
studies, reviews, and evaluations that were commissioned at various stages of the
program, as well as the donor meetings and pledging sessions that were organized
outside of the country.
One of the positive characteristics of the MDTF, which simplified the management task
and enhanced effectiveness, was the condition that there should be no earmarking of
funds by the contributing donors. The World Bank, when faced with the possibility of
losing U.S. funding or allowing the U.S. Government to finance only one part of the
program, set up, with GOSL approval, a separate trust fund that was used exclusively
for a U.S. contribution for the payment of reinsertion benefits.
The FMPU provided the financial management, procurement, auditing, and reporting
services for the Executive Secretariat. Given the suspicions and negative perceptions
of the public financial management and procurement system, the FMPU provided the
necessary environment and capability to gain the trust of the donors and, by and large,
the confidence of the beneficiaries and the Sierra Leonean community. The
transparent and uniform set of procurement rules and regulations not only simplified
financial management and enhanced probity, but also assured quality. There were
significant delays in the procurement of toolkits that could not be attributed solely to
financial management or the procurement system, particularly in view of the adequate

time allowed for forward planning and procurement. A look at the staffing levels of the
FMPU shows that there may have been too few procurement personnel [I still tend to
disagree, ….]. In future operations, it may be worthwhile to strengthen the
procurement arm of FMPU, as is done with financial management. Given the
importance and sensitivity of delivering and positioning goods and services on time in
the DDR process, the World Bank may also consider Indefinite Quantity Contracts to
additionally enhance the flexibility of its procurement rules in the context of similar
operational environments.
The FMPU was set up to serve not only the NCDDR but also the NCRRR. Table 5
shows the breakdown of the management cost of the MDTF, which totals 15.8 percent.
A closer look reveals, however, that the major part of the $4 million cost of the contract
for the FMPU was initially borne by the NCRRR. By some accounts, more than 65
percent of the cost was charged to the NCRRR. From this perspective, the $4 million
cost of the FMPU would be only about 5 percent of the combined funding of the DDR
and RRR. Factoring in DFID’s administrative and technical assistance inputs, CRP,
and others, the total management cost is about 13 percent. The 2 percent World Bank
charge for administering the fund is relatively low compared with the cost of similar
services. The overall management cost seems reasonable, particularly in view of the
fact that it was essential to employ an independent international organization and to
deploy a significant number of international consultants.
Table 5. Multi-donor Trust Fund Management Costs
Item US$ Share total MDTF

Consultant services (World Bank-administered) [these 1,603,173. 4.3%
are not overhead / management costs but direct TA to
the Program]
Operating costs 3,585,548. 9.6%
Trust Fund administrative charges (World Bank) 688,425. 1.9%
Total management costs 5,877,146. 15.8%
Total trust fund expenditure 39,489,675.
Source: World Bank, The World Bank-Administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund (TF 022604) for the Sierra Leone
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program, Progress Report #13, September 30, 2003.
6 Post-NCDDR Activities
The DDR process was designed as a medium-term [or short-term?]program response.

Its framers nonetheless recognized that certain components and needs could be
addressed only over the long term. The DDRP needed to have an end date to
prevents ex-combatants from becoming dependent on assistance and because the
focused and substantive support of the international community could be sustained
only for a limited period. The NCDDR structure itself was “too much a reminder of the
war and needed to cease to exist” at a certain stage in order to signal normalization of
national life and the transition from relief to development.127
Although the DDRP concluded as a resounding success on March 31, 2004, there are
still major issues and concerns that require sustained attention. Although a huge
cache of arms was collected from the warring factions during the disarmament
program, there are still significant amounts of weapons in the country. Disarmament
programs, including the Community Arms Collection and Development Program, need
to be continued and complemented with a relevant legal framework to reduce the
presence of lethal weapons in the country.128 It will be necessary to forge a regional
security arrangement and to design and implement effective programs that reduce the
availability of arms in the subregion.
Providing reintegration opportunities to more than 50,000 combatants within a war-

devastated economy and polity, and in such a relatively short time, is one of the signal
achievements of the DDR process. This, however, is only a first step in the long and
difficult task of successful reintegration. The mind-set transformation has only begun.
There are more than 70,000 ex-combatants with varying degrees of expertise,
experience, predilection, and familiarity with violence. They may constitute a national
threat and a regional risk. These youth and adults may have achieved a significant
change in their self-identification, but it must be recognized that they do have a
common past, a shared experience, and a social network. Young ex-combatants now
find themselves immersed in the large body of youths, whose aspirations for a better
life and society confront a weak post-conflict economy. What role the ex-combatants
will play within this larger pool, whose disaffection is clearly manifested, among other
ways in popular songs, merits careful study. The ex-combatants have been
transformed; they have not disappeared. There is an important task of monitoring and
tracking the former combatants, including women and children, which should be
entrusted to a specific agency or agencies, with the Ministry of Youth and Sports
playing a lead role.
The DDR process has, in the words of one GOSL minister, “given us a second chance.
That is why we should not lose the opportunity and time to address the root causes of
the conflict. There is one grave danger. We should never leave anyone, especially the
young, in a situation where they have nothing to lose.”129 The conducive environment
created by the peace process, the successful implementation of the DDR process, and
the heightened presence of the international community should be used to address the
political, economic, and social grievances that triggered the conflict. The DDR process
by itself cannot guarantee peace. The massive unemployment needs to be
significantly reduced. In Sierra Leone’s post-conflict economy, the immediate
opportunities for meaningful private-sector investment may be limited, necessitating
127
Authors’ Interviews
128
Through its Arms for Development Programme, UNDP is supporting the design and implementation
of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives legislation.
129
Authors’ interview, 2004.
continued dependence on foreign assistance and loans to further stabilize the situation
and consolidate the peace. The draw-down of UNAMSIL, aside from its implication for
security, will also have a negative economic impact, exacerbating the employment
situation.
One minister interviewed for this evaluation characterized the traditional system as
follows: “Youth and women are never to be heard [from] and do not matter.” That
system must be changed. Persistent issues of mismanagement, governance, and
equity—perceived or real—should be addressed as a matter of great urgency. Party
politics need to conform to the requirements of building a national consensus and
inclusiveness and reducing marginalization. The comprehensive and complex set of
issues and requirements necessary for consolidating the achievements of the DDRP
demand a concerted effort. With the termination of targeted assistance, NaCSA needs
to integrate the ex-combatants into its programs in a systematic way, particularly in
areas lagging in services and opportunities. To this end, there should be an organized
hand-over of responsibilities and information.
The draft PRSP, as it stands, seems to target the root causes of the war and give due
focus to vulnerable groups. The following are its three pillars:
1. Promote good governance, security, and peace-building.

2. Promote pro-poor growth in a healthy macro-economic environment.
3. Promote human development .
These pillars are in consonance with what is needed to address the root causes of the
war and advance the reintegration of the ex -combatants and Sierra Leonean society
in general.
7 Lessons Learned
All of the lessons discussed below are particularly relevant to West Africa in view of
the political, economic, and social similarities among the countries in the subregion
and the regional nature of conflicts taking place there. Critical elements of the Sierra
Leone experience that should inform other DDR processes in the subregion include:
• The importance of national ownership and commitment on the part of all

major political and military actors to the peace process;
• The recognition that DDR primarily has political and security objectives and
must be an integral part of moving the peace process forward;
• The provision of targeted assistance directed at individuals rather than at

weapons;
• The development of a participatory process, such as that embodied in the

Tripartite Committee;
• The need for flexibility in implementation, including flexible funding

sources; and
• The importance of a coordinated and integrated financial management

system under government control that guarantees probity, accountability in
terms of service delivery, and fiduciary management for all stakeholders.
7.1 Political Level

7.1.1 A post-conflict DDR process is aimed first and foremost at achieving
political and security objectives.
The primary objective of any post-conflict DDR process is to contribute to a sufficient

level of security to enable the peace process to move forward and to build confidence
among former warring parties. In the case of Sierra Leone, the key objectives were to
disarm combatants and to break the command structures of the armed groups.
7.1.2 A post-conflict DDR process is a conflict mitigation mechanism; as such,

it can make only an indirect contribution to conflict prevention.
Irrespective of how successful it might be, a DDR process cannot eliminate the root
causes of conflict, which must be consciously addressed in all aspects of national
economic, social, and political life after the formal peace process concludes if future
conflicts are to be avoided. In Sierra Leone, for example, despite the successful
completion of a DDR process, issues of youth, unemployment, equitable development,
and governance need to be given high priority in the design and implementation of the
PRSP and other government policies. The DDR process provided the government
and the people of Sierra Leone with an opportunity to achieve an environment of
peace and security within which these more fundamental problems can be addressed.
7.1.3 Sufficient commitment to the peace process is crucial for the success of a
post-conflict DDR process.
The design and implementation of the Sierra Leone DDR process was crucial to its
success. However, even the best design would have failed in the absence of sufficient
political will on the part of all key stakeholders. President Kabbah’s commitment to the
peace process, civil society’s active role in promoting peace, and the decision by the
post-Foday Sankoh RUF leadership to a political resolution of the conflict were the
defining factors in the success of the DDR process.
The NCDDR also demonstrated its commitment to the peace process. Even when the
peace process broke down, channels for dialogue were kept open. DDR officials
remained receptive to informal discussions, keeping the door open and helping to build
trust. This was especially important once the decision was made to fast-track DDR in
2001.
Political will cannot be manufactured. It can, however, be nurtured. Individuals

involved in DDR processes should think carefully about how these processes
themselves can promote the development of political commitment.
7.1.4 National ownership of a DDR process is essential.
There are three aspects of national ownership that need to be given particular
attention.
First, the distinction between responsibility and capacity must be acknowledged.

National authorities must be in charge of making policy decisions concerning the
shape and implementation of a DDR process. As the Sierra Leone experience has
shown, capacity can be acquired in a variety of ways. A lack of capacity does not
mean an inability to accept the responsibility to make key decisions.
Second, representatives of all fighting forces need to own the DDR process. Broad-
based ownership will be facilitated to the extent that genuine discussion takes place
between the government and the armed opposition about the structure and content of
the DDR program.
Third, there must be buy-in to the concept of national ownership on the part of the
members of international community who are supporting the DDR program. Buy-in
must consist of more than rhetorically accepting the government program. It must
include providing resources in a way that supports the government program and
promotes genuine national ownership.
7.2 DDR Program Design and Implementation

7.2.1 Collaboration between key actors can be pivotal to the success of a DDR
program.
It is unrealistic to assume that governments of war-torn countries can respond to all
postwar needs on their own. It is essential that a variety of actors—local and
international— engage in the DDR process. The challenge for those managing the
DDR process is to identify the comparative advantage of each participating
organization and to develop working relationships that maximize the strengths of each
of these organizations. It is particularly important that international actors take this
lesson to heart. There often is a tendency among international actors to assume that
they can provide a broader range of inputs to DDR processes than is optimal, given
their areas of expertise.
7.2.2 In designing a DDR program, it is essential to understand the political and

security objectives that reintegration must serve.
In Sierra Leone, the reintegration component was intentionally short-term and sought
to remove as many weapons from circulation as possible and to help break the
command structure of the armed groups. These types of objectives are typical of the
needs of conflict-affected countries. Desirable as it would be to provide ex-combatants
with reintegration support that would turn them into high-performing members of
society, the fundamental objectives of the reintegration component of DDR are to

provide ex-combatants with:
• a much-needed transition period,

• sufficient skills to begin a new career,
• an opportunity to begin the process of reintegrating into civilian life, and
• changes in identity through education and skill development (for example,
an ex-combatant will see himself as a tailor, not a fighter) and greater self-
esteem.
The objectives of reintegration are also to provide society at large with improved
security by
• removing weapons from circulation,

• attempting to break or at least diminish the chain of command of the armed
groups, and
• changing the habits of ex-combatants.
7.2.3 Splitting the institutional responsibility for disarmament and

demobilization from that for reintegration will hamper the ability of a DDR
process to achieve its main objectives.
One of the lessons of DDR processes in the 1990s was that placing the responsibility
for disarmament and demobilization with one organization and reintegration with
another organization created program disconnects and institutional rivalries that
undermined the effectiveness of DDR programs. It would be unfortunate if this lesson
were not retained. While long-term reintegration of former combatants into civilian life
should be the responsibility of civil bodies, activities intended to begin the reintegration
process should remain the responsibility of a central DDR entity. The Sierra Leone
experience demonstrates once again that the challenge for those in charge of
designing and implementing DDR processes is to develop at the outset institutional
mechanisms that will link the reintegration component of DDR to long-term efforts to
promote rehabilitation and longer-term recovery.
7.2.4 Coordination between the DDR process and the rehabilitation and
recovery process is essential to start addressing the root causes of conflict.
Mechanisms must be developed to ensure tighter linkage between these two related
functions. There are a number of ways in which such linkages might be achieved:
• Both DDR and rehabilitation and recovery activities should be on budget so

that the ministers of finance, planning, and development can coordinate
them. [I still don’t understand the point. The DRP Program contributions
were part of the Government’s investment budget, MoF signed all the
agreements and the Bank kept MoF constantly up to date on

expenditures…]
• High-level policy bodies, such as the NCDDR, should address issues of
collaboration and coordination.
• A joint mechanism charged with facilitating coordination and collaboration
should be created.
• Methods of developing understanding among key local and international
stakeholders regarding the importance of coordination and collaboration
should be pursued.
• Mechanisms should be created for developing hand-over plans from the
body responsible for DDR to organizations responsible for rehabilitation
and long-term recovery.
In general, it is important to view DDR as a phase that helps prepare the ground for
long-term recovery.
7.2.5 Targeted reinsertion and reintegration assistance significantly aided ex-

combatants in returning to civilian life.
Despite criticisms of the reintegration component, evidence suggests that the

assistance offered by the NCDDR was sufficient to enable ex-combatants to return to
civilian life and to provide the security that communities require to transition out of
conflict.
In particular, the Sierra Leone experience demonstrates that monetized reinsertion

benefits offer multiple advantages. They can help those individuals who receive the
allowances to provide for themselves and their dependents in the period between
discharge and the beginning of reintegration training. These benefits also offer a
means of injecting cash directly into local economies.
7.2.6 Monitoring at the community level for social trends during the DDR
process is essential to promote the linkage between DDR and long-term
rehabilitation and recovery.
Monitoring during the DDR process will help to ensure that demobilized combatants
receive all their benefits and have access to program opportunities. Because ex-
combatants can be a mobile population, and because they may change their minds
about which training opportunity they wish to pursue, monitoring can ensure that no
one falls through the cracks or is able to take more benefits than others.
It is also important to monitor the attitude of communities toward returning ex-

combatants in order to best deploy sensitization resources and to promote
reconciliation.
Monitoring during the DDR process may also help identify combatants and other
individuals associated with the fighting forces who are not included in DDR programs
for one reason or another. These people can then be targeted by other means, such
as the Girls Left Behind program established by UNICEF to provide support to girls
associated with the fighting forces who did not qualify for the DDR program.
7.2.7 Monitoring ex-combatants after the completion of the DDR process is

necessary in order to identify trends affecting the success of the overall peace
process.
Because addressing the root causes of conflict will require attention over an extended
period of time, and because the potential for ex-combatants to return to violence
remains, it is necessary to continue monitoring former fighters even after targeted
assistance has been terminated. This could serve as one element of an early warning
system of the potential for conflict both in Sierra Leone and other countries in the
region.
7.2.8 It is important to invest in reconciliation efforts and to prepare the

community for the reintegration of ex-combatants.
Reconciliation in Sierra Leone benefited from the combined efforts of a number of

actors. In particular, the role played by the Sierra Leone population in reconciliation
should not be underestimated. Sierra Leoneans were, in general, willing to forgive ex-
combatants for the atrocities they committed. The country benefited from its spirit of
putting the past behind and moving forward. The desire for peace was a major
motivating factor.
While this type of attitude greatly increases the chances of success for DDR
processes, it cannot be assumed that such attitudes will prevail in all circumstances.
Therefore, efforts to promote reconciliation need to be given a high priority in designing
and implementing reconciliation efforts.
7.2.9 Establishing eligibility criteria involves trade-offs among different security

and political objectives.
In developing eligibility criteria, it will always be necessary to assess the trade-offs that
must be made in order to achieve the DDR process’ main political and security
objectives.
7.2.10 A multi-pronged gender-specific approach should be considered in future

DDR exercises.
A gender-neutral approach is not appropriate in countries such as Sierra Leone
because it does not take into consideration either the various roles that women played
during the conflict or the social and cultural dynamics between men and women that
affect access. In order to address the complexities of these roles and relationships, a
gender-specific approach is needed.
A gender-specific approach may be implemented directly through the DDR process.

When women do not fit the standard eligibility criteria used in implementing a DDR
process, complementary programs could be used. Better yet, a combination of the two
approaches is recommended to more fully address this complex issue. Some specific
recommendations based on the lessons learned in Sierra Leone are:
• Ensure early on that there is a firm understanding of the roles females played in
the conflict and the numbers of women and girls involved. This can serve as a
basis for more appropriate programming.
• Include one or more gender specialists in program design, implementation, and

M&E teams. This would ensure that someone is monitoring access and
opportunity issues within the DDR program so that the program is not
unintentionally biased against females. Gender specialists should also
coordinate with other development actors to ensure that women associated
with fighting forces—who may be excluded from a DDR program due to
eligibility criteria—do not fall through the cracks.
• Promote cross-sectoral coordination. This would go beyond the DDR

implementers, as cross-sectoral coordination is an issue best addressed by a
variety of national and international actors within the development community.
This calls for the government and lead international actors to understand clearly
the variety of roles females play during conflicts and to advocate for activities
that can address the various resulting issues.
• Develop a strong sensitization campaign that both features women’s issues

and has female voices prominently displayed, regardless of the topic. This
most likely will not impact the number of women in the DDRP. It did not in
Sierra Leone. However, it may assist in changing the dynamics and norms that
restrict female roles.
• Make DDR processes more gender friendly. There are not many concrete
examples; however, checklists such as Vanessa Farr’s or UNIFEM’s may prove
of use in designing and implementing a more gender appropriate approach.130
7.2.11 Child combatants are a special vulnerable group, and it is important to

include expertise in this area from the beginning of the program design process.
Because the welfare of child combatants is a specialized topic, the Sierra Leone
experience reconfirms that it is essential to ensure that the appropriate expertise is
included from the beginning. Because large numbers of children are involved in
modern conflicts, it is unlikely that a DDR program could do the issue justice without
external assistance.
7.2.12 DDR processes must incorporate the principles of transparency,

neutrality, and equity.
130
Vanessa Farr, “Gendering Demilitarization.” [This doesn’t seem to be her work previously cited, but
the title could be wrong here or above. Pls. check ] See also UNIFEM’s “Gender-aware Disarmament,
Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR): A Checklist.”
Once combatants enter a DDR process, it is important that they have equal access to
the same entitlements and that the rules for accessing reintegration opportunities are
clear. Once established and communicated, these rules must be adhered to.
It is also important to provide DDR funders with accurate, up-to-date information on a

regular basis. If funders are confident that the resources they provide are being used
for the purposes intended, they are more likely to increase their contributions or to
encourage others to provide financing.
7.2.13 Efforts to enhance the capacity of the Implementing Partners need to be

undertaken to the extent possible before implementation of reintegration
activities begins.
The capacity of the implementing partners in Sierra Leone determined the quality of
training. Initial assumptions that training programs would largely be executed by
international NGOs were unrealistic in two regards. First, many INGOs chose not to
engage with ex-combatants. Second, even those who did participate in the DDR
process were themselves dependent on local partners to execute their programs.
These constraints caused numerous problems and frustrations for the NCDDR staff
and ex-combatants. For future DDR programs, the issue of capacity building needs to
be examined long before the reintegration component becomes operational.
This is not to say that the body that develops and oversees the DDR program should
itself institute a capacity-building program. This is beyond the typical mandate and staff
capabilities of such organizations. Rather, the Sierra Leone experience demonstrates
that a strong understanding of the need for capacity building during conflict and post-
conflict situations and strong coordination between donors and the national body in
charge of the DDR process is crucial. Without adequate attention to capacity issues,
reintegration efforts in any sector that require implementing partners run the risk of
coming up against the same problems. This suggests that a broad-based effort to
assess and build capacity will improve the chances that key programs will succeed.
7.2.14 Options for retaining capacity developed to deliver DDR training should
be actively pursued.
In situations such as Sierra Leone, where significant capacity shortfalls exist at all
levels of the public and private sectors, it is desirable to make every effort to ensure
that investment in developing training capacity for DDR is not lost once the DDR
process terminates. It might, for example, be possible to transfer training facilities to
community-based organizations and to channel future training assistance through
these bodies.
7.3 Financial Management

7.3.1 Multiple funding sources provide flexibility in responding to the varied
needs of a post-conflict DDR process.
While a proliferation of funding sources can make the management of a DDR process
more time-consuming and complex for post-conflict governments, which typically lack
managerial capacity, the Sierra Leone experience suggests that achieving the
necessary flexibility to respond in these situations requires several sources of funding.

DDR processes require early money, flexible money, fiduciary responsibility, and the
ability to finance security and other activities. The challenge is to combine these
attributes in the smallest number of funding sources possible and to find methods of
minimizing the management burden.
At present, costs associated with disarmament and with providing security for the DDR
process cannot be financed through World Bank trust funds. The main external
donors to post-conflict DDR processes tend, however, to prefer World Bank
involvement since that is seen as a guarantee of fiduciary responsibility. If the DDR
process takes place under the auspices of a UN peace operation, the security-related
costs will be provided through the assessed budget of the United Nations. In this
circumstance, the challenge becomes one of fully integrating the UN mission into the
DDR process. If the DDR process does not have access to UN-assessed
contributions to meet these security-related needs but is funded through a World Bank
trust fund, the challenge will be to identify alternative arrangements for financing these
security-related costs.
Similarly, World Bank trust funds are not nimble, and in post-conflict environments
problems frequently arise in financing unanticipated expenditures in a timely fashion.
The demobilization component of DDR typically requires highly flexible funding. In
Sierra Leone, the UK stepped in to meet this need, and the establishment of the
government’s own peace and security fund also provided a mechanism that enabled
rapid disbursement of funds. Even where governments are able to create their own
contingency funds, it is highly unlikely that they will have adequate resources to meet
all such needs, and it is therefore important that access to quick-disbursing, flexible
financing is anticipated from the beginning of every DDR process.
7.3.2 Failure to fund DDR programs in a timely manner hinders implementation.

Because of the political sensitivity of DDR processes, it is important to have adequate
resources on hand to respond to needs as and when they arise. In common with other
DDR processes, donors in Sierra Leone were often slow to make and fulfill pledges.
Post-conflict countries do not have an abundance of ready cash. and slow
disbursement of pledges risks compromising the integrity of the program.
7.3.3 A strong FMPU is critical for program implementation and integrity.

The importance of an independently-administered FMPU cannot be underestimated.
In the case of Sierra Leone, the FMPU provided the structure and procedures that
enabled large sums of money to be managed while providing confidence that it would
be managed well. In the future, it will be important for FMPUs to give equal weight to
procurement oversight and financial management.
7.4 Programmatic Management

7.4.1 Strong management leadership is key to operationalizing a DDR process.
The management of the NCDDR was critical to program success. This included not
only the senior level management but also management at lower levels that allowed
the program to go forward. The debate over conceptual design was important, but it
was management leadership that allowed the design to be well implemented.
Management includes not only program design and delivery, but also relations with
other government departments and ministries, with the fighting forces, and with
international actors.
7.4.2 It is equally important that the government’s key partners deploy

personnel with a high level of commitment, understanding, familiarity with post-
conflict situations, and expertise with respect to their own rules and regulations.
Sierra Leone benefited from a cadre of dedicated professionals among key partners
who were able together to support the DDR process in a way that was consistent with
the government’s objectives, thereby helping to ensure its success. At the same time,
most INGOs were averse to working with ex-combatants or even the wives of ex-
combatants. INGOs need to understand the importance of a successful DDR process
to the achievement of peace and to re-examine certain operating assumptions that
prevent their engagement in this crucial area.
7.4.3 The DDR database serves a multiplicity of needs, and it may require
redesign as the program moves from disarmament and demobilization into
reintegration. The database also increases the importance of exploiting
technological advances wherever possible.
In Sierra Leone, the database was appropriate for the disarmament and demobilization
phases, given existing constraints such as limited consistent electricity supply, poor
communications infrastructure, and the need to secure information. These were the
realities within which the database was created and implemented. However, the fact
that it was centralized and that delayed response times were used as a major fraud
prevention tactic caused frustrations and, in general, hampered the effectiveness of
the reintegration component. For future DDR processes, advances in technology
should be examined to see how in-country constraints can be overcome. The
database should be designed with an understanding that the needs and demands for
the disarmament and demobilization phases differ from the reintegration phase.
7.4.4 DDR processes produce a treasure trove of information that needs to be

maintained and made accessible.
Aside from the historical significance of such information, access to information
collected during the DDR process will be important for future monitoring and follow-up
activities. Developing a plan for maintaining an accessible archive should be part of
program design.
7.5 Assistance Targeting Individuals and Communities

7.5.1 The payment of monetized reinsertion benefits and training allowances to
former combatants can have a positive impact on local economies. In Sierra
Leone, financial allowances for ex-combatants were controversial. While, initially, non-
combatants expressed the willingness to do whatever was necessary to achieve
peace, over time, as conditions became more secure, community members expressed
growing resentment that the perpetrators of violence received financial support while
the victims received no individual compensation. What is more, many in the

international community, which funded the allowances, took moral issue with the idea
of targeted assistance.
However, the financial disbursements ended up playing a positive role at the

community level. The Sierra Leonean economy is so cash-poor that opinions on the
appropriateness of the allowances gave way to the general need for cash in local
economies. The reportedly low levels of crime suggest that allowances also meant
that ex-combatants had means to support themselves and their families and therefore
were less likely to engage in illegal activities. Disincentives for crime can only help a
peace process.
7.5.2 Training programs, even if not structured optimally, can produce a semi-
skilled labor force.
Evidence is accumulating that many of the ex-combatants who went through training
courses are using the skills acquired to earn a living. Additionally, because Sierra
Leone experienced such extensive devastation of infrastructure, the increase in semi-
skilled labor resulting from the DDR training has been a boon for local economies.
The fact that laborers could be found locally kept costs down and facilitated community
rehabilitation. Community members appreciated the fact that they could find
reasonably priced labor locally. For the ex-combatants, the fact that they had skills—
even at a minimal level—meant that they could cobble together some support through
a combination of short-term labor and farming.
7.5.3 The DDR programs can assist ex-combatants to make the psychological
transition to peace.
To a large extent, the DDR process succeeded in preventing the emergence of a

dependent group of ex-combatants. Individual ex-combatants are engaging with their
communities, carrying out productive activities, and by and large do not expect
additional assistance.
7.5.4 Populations excluded from the DDR process still require assistance.
DDR programs need to have eligibility criteria that are enforced. Otherwise, the
process can become too unwieldy as DDR tries to respond to all those who can claim
some association with a fighting force. Nonetheless, even well enforced eligibility
criteria can be manipulated, and people who are ineligible for DDR benefits may
nonetheless require some form of assistance. In Sierra Leone, soldiers who had their
weapon confiscated by their commanders, who used communal weapons and could
not produce a weapon at the time of disarmament, who used a non-modern weapon,
or who provided logistical and administrative support, as well as other camp followers,
did not directly benefit from DDR programs because they did not meet the criteria.
Unfortunately, such individuals often do not benefit from other programs targeting
vulnerable groups. The international community has been reluctant to work with such
excluded people because of their association with the fighting forces. Additionally,
broad community initiatives rarely address the specific needs of these people, such as
the stigma and trauma suffered by women forced to become bush wives.
There is a need for a detailed understanding of the different sub-groups within the
general rubric of war-affected populations. Methods of adequately addressing the
needs of the vulnerable groups, including those excluded from the DDR process, then
need to be developed. It is essential to understand that that DDR programs address
only one segment of the population associated with fighting. A thorough analysis is
needed to determine whether individuals associated with the fighting forces who do
not receive DDR benefits will remain vulnerable and may pose a continuing threat, will
reintegrate by themselves with little difficulty, or will have their needs addressed by
other programs.
7.6 Learning from Past Experience

7.6.1 It is imperative that all stakeholders make a serious effort to learn from
past experiences. Many of the lessons discussed above have been observed time
and again over the last fifteen years in post-conflict disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration processes. They are repeated here, however, because they have not yet
been fully incorporated into programming. The international community, which
provides most of the financing for DDR processes and has a significant impact on their
design and implementation, has a special responsibility to absorb and implement these
lessons.
Annex 1. Levels of Disarmament, Demobilization and Discharge by Program

Phases
INTERIM
PHASE I PHASE PHASE PHASE TOTAL
II III
DISARMAMENT *
Children 189 1,982 402 4,272 6,845
Adults 2,994 16,91 2,226 43,509 65,645
6
Sub-Total 3,183 18,89 2,628 47,781 72,490
8
DEMOBILIZATION *
Children 189 1,982 402 4,272 6,845
Adults 2,994 15,46 2,226 43,509 64,198
9
Sub-Total 3,183 17,45 2,628 47,781 71,043
1
DISCHARGE *
Children 189 1,982 402 4,272 6,845
Adults 1,414 15,469 2,226 43,509 62,618
Sub-Total 1,603 17,451 2,628 47,781 69,463
NOTE: Discrepancies between disarmament, demobilization and discharge numbers are the
result of “lost” combatants during the January 1999 Freetown attack and May 2000 resumption
of hostilities following RUF hostage-taking of UNAMSIL troops.
Source: The World Bank, The World Bank Administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund (TF022604)
for the Sierra Leone Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Program, Progress
Report #13, June 30, 2003, p. 3.
Annex 2. Ex-Combatants Participating in Reintegration Services by Funding

Source and Region*
REGION IDA/AD DFID GTZ ICRC UNDP TOTAL

B
East 11,936 141 688 453 979 14,197
North 12,158 1,469 202 416 14,245
South 10,241 59 10,300
West 9,498 9,498
TOTAL 43,833 1,610 949 453 1,395 48,240
Percent 91% 3% 2% 1% 3% 100%
of Total
Source: The World Bank, IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (TF-23248 IDA-33120

PPFI-Q0050 PPFI-Q0051 TF-50389) on a Credit in the Amount of US$ 25.0 million to the
Republic of Sierra Leone for a Community Reintegration and Rehabilitation, December 22,
2003. p. 9
* This is the most recent breakdown of ex-combatants, reintegration, and funding source the
evaluation team found available. However, it is not complete as the total number who
participated in reintegration activities. That number was close to 56,000.
Annex 3. Target Ex-combatant Beneficiary Groups and Current Program

Participation (Minus Child Combatants)
Original Estimated Participation to Date
Population
Target Beneficiary Group Percentage
1. Revolutionary United Front 15,000 24,352 162%
2. Civil Defense Forces 15,000 37,377 249%
3. AFRC/ex-SLA 13,000 8,527 66%
4. Other Paramilitary Groups 2,000 2,234 112%
Child combatants 5,400* 6,845* 127%
Program Total 45,000 72,490 161%
NOTE: Child combatants are not included in total as they are already counted in the estimates for
individual forces
Source: The World Bank, The World Bank Administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund (TF022604) for the
Sierra Leone Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Program, Progress Report #11,
December 31, 2002, p. 3.
Annex 4. DDR Institutional Framework
NCDDR
H.E. The President
Tripartite Committee
GOSL/RUF/UNAMSIL Executive Secretariat
FMPU
Chair: SRSG Executive Secretary
Discuss political and
security issues which A&L
enhance implementation of
Operations
the DDR programme I&S
Co-ordinator
M&E
Technical Technical
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Committee Committee
(TCC) D&D Disarmament and Reinsertion and (TCC) R&R
Demobilisation Unit Reintegration Unit
Manager Manager/Advisor
Joint Operations
UNAMSIL DDR Centres (JOC)
Cell UNAMSIL/UNICEF/
Reintegration
WFP
Operations Centre
Demobilisation
Regional and District
centres
Disarmament Reintegration Offices
- Contractors
Centre - Contracted partners
- Suppliers
- MOUs
- Programme partners
Implementing Partners,
UN agencies, Private
Source: Stelios Comninos, Aki Stavrou, and Brian Stewart, Assessment of the Reintegration
Programmes of the National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, November
8, 2002, p. 33.
Annex 5. UNICEF Programs for Child Combatants
1) Provision of Interim Care Centre Services (ICC)
Services: (Human • Documentation for family tracing

Resource) • Psychosocial counseling - including specialized counseling for
survivors of sexual violence
• Education and skills training
• Medical care
• Services for children with special needs – disabled children, girls,
mothers etc.
Services: (Supplies/ • 1 sleeping mat, 1 blanket, 3 sets of clothes, 3 pieces of underwear, 1

Cash) on departure pair of sandals, 1 plastic bowl with lid, 1 small bag ;
from ICC • Provision of tooth brush & paste, soap
• Baby package – where applicable.
Time Frame 6-12 weeks
Comment Time frame in ICC is dependant on security, context of family and

community for reunification. Each child will be reviewed at the 6th week to
ensure that there is a clear reintegration plan and children are not
institutionalised and this will be monitored by UNICEF. Each child will
leave the ICC with the prescribed personal kit.
2) Family and Community Reintegration Support
Services: (Human • Structured follow-up to families – clarity of objectives, time limited and
Resource) geared to developing community links for sustainability
• Assessments by social workers to report to Regional Reintegration
Offices for payment to families of Family and Community Reintegration
Support
• Ongoing family and community mediation post – reunification through
social work visits – key staff training needs for tracing, mediation and
reunification
• Assessment of the capacities of local rites / cleansing ceremonies for
purification and acceptance
• General community sensitisation on the objectives of reunification,
constraints and types of family/ community support needed
• Assessment of community’s attitude towards the child and protection
concerns prior to reunification
• Development of referral services for health and psychological support
within community
• Assistance for children with special needs: clear assessment of child’s
psychological, educational and health needs from interim care to link
with assessments of family’s and community’s capacity - disabled,
young mothers etc.
• Engagement of communities in dialogue to assess likely difficulties for
children’s reintegration and ways of addressing these difficulties
• Technical support to families / communities on income generating /
small enterprise schemes via linkages to broader NCDDR
reintegration framework
Services: (Supplies/ • Child returns with supplies from ICC / demobilisation - see above
Cash) • Cash for income generating activities - administered in the manner
described above
Time Frame • Minimum of one social work visit per month for first 3 months after
reunification
• 3 month review to plan support (and submit report to Regional
Reintegration Office for final installment of family support money) and
thereafter a minimum of 6 monthly monitoring within the first year and
12 monthly within the assistance period (3 years)
Comment • Contracts will be made with families in collaboration with communities

to ensure that targeted funds benefit directly re-integrated children and
link to the needs of the community as a whole (where appropriate) i.e.
clear criteria for assistance to be monitored and followed up by
responsible agency.
3) Alternative Care Support
Services: (Human • Care by foster carers with adequate training programs and support
Resource) networks
• Resources for alternative care - placement in group homes,
Independent living programs
• Development of policies and procedures for foster care – follow up,
monitoring and evaluation
• Education in formal / non-formal sector
• Placement in vocational / skills training
• Mobilisation through sensitisation of communities and follow up
through NGO’s / MSWGCA
• Ongoing tracing for families pending security or family / community
context
• Establishment and support to foster care associations
• Separate programs including medical services for young mothers
having "rebel" babies, sexually abused women to include counselling /
training
Services: (Supplies/ • Basic supplies as per all children leaving interim care
Cash) • Provision of tools for workshops / learning materials for school (as per
strategies below)
• Identified additional assistance according to needs of child e.g. medical
• Support for income generation activity / revolving loans - through foster
care associations/ community networks
Time Frame • Review of placement by NGO / MSWGCA after 3 months

• Minimum of 1 visit / per month in the first 3 months - further follow up
decided at review within government’s reintegration assistance overall
time frame.
• At least 1 visit after 12 months
Comment • Children in foster care will be subject to monitoring and reviews under
the statutory responsibilities of the MSWGCA
• Children in group homes will be older youth (5-6 youth) attached to a
caregiver with a time limited program towards independent living. They
will usually be engaged in skills training with a core component of life

skills.
• Children for independent living will have to demonstrate in interim care
/ alternative care a degree of responsibility to care for themselves –
both at social and economic level
• Follow up will focus on developing linkages for the children within the
community for support and activities – youth groups, women’s groups
etc.
• Ongoing support for youth in group homes and independent living
programmes will be contingent upon criteria set by the supporting
agency - attendance for skills training, education, conduct within the
community etc.
• It is estimated that 40% of the targeted population will need some form
of alternative care during the 3 year period.
4) Community Education Investment Program (CEIP)
Services: (Human • Assessment of the resources currently available at community level:

Resource) school buildings, learning material and teachers
• Assessment of curriculum – need to include child’s rights peace
education, life skills etc.
• Assessment of government / NGO capacity to support community
through inter-face between NCDDR/ NCRRR
• Assessment of educational level in ICC to link with community formal /
non-formal school
• Teacher training for children with special needs – psychological,
physical and learning disabilities
• Promote psychosocial programs in school such as; Drama, Dance,
singing, story telling, art, sport, recreation, group discussion
• Linkage between follow-up social workers and teachers/ trainers in
skills training workshops
• Structured personal career interviews
• Contract between youth, workshop and social worker to set goals for
training - child participation in decision making, program development
Services: • Provision of Uniforms – 2 pieces (where necessary)

(Supplies/Cash) • School bags
• Charges for desk and chair
• Copy books – 20 pieces
• Pens – 5 pieces, pencils five pieces
• School text books
• Other charges
Time Frame • Assistance will be framed over three years from children’s
demobilisation
• Assistance will be given to family, school and PTA (with well defined
assistance packages) at the point of re-unification to ensure child’s
entry to school.
• Continued assistance will be subject to review
Comment • Assistance to schools will be negotiated by placing agency in

collaboration with Ministry of Education and / UNICEF
• Conditions on assistance should include the waiving of school fees for
the target child and clear markers of how assistance can benefit other
children in the community with emphasis on the needy – disabled,

poorest, girl children etc.
• Assistance will be targeted over 3 years and will depend on certain
criteria being me i.e. enrolment, level of attendance, child / family’s
commitment to ongoing education
• Non-formal education programs (Rapid Response Education Program,
Accelerated Learning Programs etc.) will also receive the assistance
that should provide for large numbers of children in the community.
5) Training and Employment Program (TEP)
Services: (Human • Orientation in ICC / community towards marketable skills – life skills
Resource) and not just quick impact skills
• Linkages between follow-up social worker and workshop / trainer
• Contact between youth, workshop and social worker to set goals for
training
• Establish links with jobs and small enterprises before encouraging /
starting training programs
Services: (Supplies • Supply of tools to workshop

/ Cash) • Start up kit for youth on completion
• Overalls and boots
• Additional costs / supplies to start up (transport / writing supplies)
Time Frame • Support will be framed within three years of reintegration assistance
but will be staggered to fit within the time frame of skills / vocational
training and apprenticeships
Comment • The emphasis will be on supporting existing community structures

workshops, artisans, garages etc. – using existing structures
• Technical support in book-keeping and identifying skills that are
marketable will run along side training schemes
*Costs subject to review
Source: Executive Secretariat of National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

(NCDDR), Strategy for Reintegration of Child Ex-Combatants, Draft Proposal Developed in consultation with
United Nations Children’s Fund and the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs Child
Protection Network, June 25, 2000.
Annex 6. People Interviewed
Government of Sierra Leone
1. National Committee for Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration
Dr. Francis Kai Kai Executive Secretary

Dr. Mustapha Kella Head of Disarmament and Demobilization
Mr. Peter Lansana Head of Reintegration
Mr. Fona Head of Monitoring and Evaluation
Mr. Sheik Bakkar Kamara Head of Public Information
Mr. Abu Bakar Bah Regional Reintegration Officer – North
2. National Commission for Social Action

Mr. Kanja I Sesay Commissioner
Mr. Sylvanus Joe Fannah Executive Director
Mr. Saidu Conton Sesay Director of Community Driven Programs
Mr. Unisa Sesay Head of Information, Education and Communication
3. Financial Management & Procurement Unit NaCSA/NCDDR

Mr. Ben K. Tamakloe Accounting Manager
4. Office Of The President

Mr. Sheka Mansaray Secretary to The President
5. Office of The Vice President

H.E. Solomon Berewa Vice President
6. Ministry Of Finance
Mr. J. B. Dauda Minster
Dr. James O. C. Jonah Former Minster
Dr. Samura M. W. Kamara Financial Secretary
Mr. Gideon Gbappy Senior Economist,
Economic Policy and Research Unit
Mr. Almamy Bangura Senior Economist,
Economic Policy and Research Unit
7. Ministry of Trade and Industry

Dr. Kadi Sesay Minister
8. Ministry of Youth and Sports

Dr. Denis Bright Minister
Mr. Antony Koroma Director of Youth
9. Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs

Mr. Memunatu M. Koroma Vice Minister
Mrs. Teresa A. Vambi Chief Social Development Officer
Mr. Mohamed Ken Sesay Coordinator- Child Welfare Secretariat

Mr. Francis Murray Lahai Reintegration Officer-Child Welfare Secretariat
10. Ministry of Education Science and Technology

Mr. Abas M. Collier Deputy Minister
Mr. Olive Musa Head Non-Formal Education Division
Mr. Mohamed A. Siwey Non-Formal Education Division
11. Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Industrial Relations

Mr. Joseph M. Kallon Deputy Minister
Mr. Ahmed F. Musa Employment Information Services Center
12. Ministry of Defense

Mr. Joe C. Blell ooN Deputy Minister
Brigadier A. C.
Nelson- Williams Deputy Chief of Defense Staff
Lt. Col. Kestona Kabia Director Defense Personnel
Mr. Israel B. K. Jigba Director -Defense Management, Planning and
Performance
Col. Bashiru S. Conteh Director- Training, Education and Recruitment
13. Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Momodu Koroma Minister
14. Ministry of Internal Affairs

Mr. George Banda Thomas Minister
Political Parties
15. All Peoples Congress

Mr. Ernest Bai Koroma Leader of the APC
Mr. Osman Foday Yonsanah National Secretary General
Hon. Sheka B. B. Bumbuya Member of Parliament
Mr. Sanji S. Sesay National Treasurer
16. Revolutionary United Front Party

Mr. Jonathan Kposwa Secretary General
International Organizations
17. United Nations

Mr. Allan Doss Deputy SRSG and UNDP Res. Rep
Mr. Berhanemeskel Nega Governance and Stabilization Advisor –
Office of DSRSG
Mr. Desmond Molloy O/C DDR Coordination Section- UNAMSIL
Dr. Aderemi Adekoya Reintegration Coordinator
DDR Coordination Section UNAMSIL
Mr. Bengt Ljunggren Senior Program Advisor, UNDP

Ms. Sylvia Fletcher Senior Governance Specialist, UNDP
Mr. Daniel Ladouceur Project Coordinator,
Community Arms Collection Project -UNDP
Mr. Donald Robertshaw UNICEF
Lt. Cmdr. Jon Parry UNAMSIL- MILOBS
Major Ke Yi UNAMSIL- MILOBS
Mr. Justin Lamin UNAMSIL Community Facilitator – Kailahun
18. The World Bank

Mr. James Sackey Country Manager, SL Country Office
Mr. Florian Fichtl Former Task Team Leader- DDRP Deleted: e
Mr. Sean Bradley MDTF (DDRP) Coordinator- Consultant Deleted: MDTR
Ms. Raja Jandhyala Advisor to The Government of Sierra Leone
Mr. Anton Baaré DDR Specialist, World Bank Consultant
Mr. Marcelo Fabre Unit Manager for Monitoring and Evaluation and
later, the Monitoring and Evaluation Adviser
19. Price Waterhouse Cooper

Ms. Victoria J. Cooper Price Waterhouse Cooper
Mr. Johnstone King Price Waterhouse Cooper
20. The British High Commission

Mr. Ian Stuart 1st Secretary (Development)
21. European Union

Mr. Rene Mally Economic Adviser
22. Embassy of the United States

Mr. Brenan Gilmore Political and Economic Affairs Officer
23. GTZ
Mr. Ferdinand Takatsch Program Manager GTZ, Sierra Leone
Mr. Christian Smida Project Coordinator, Reintegration
Ms. Djanabu Mahonde Project Coordinator,
Gender and Child Protection
Dr. Andreas Konig Consultant in Vocational Training Policies
24. World Vision

Mr. Leslie A. Scott National Director- Sierra Leone
Mr. Foday Sawi Child Protection Manager
25. Action Aid

Ms. Martha Lansana Program Officer -Emergencies
Mr. William A. Davies Project Accountant
26. Search for Common Ground

Ms. Frances Fortune Regional Director West Africa

Mr. Ambrose James Head of Programming- Talking Drum Studio
Mr. Dominic Yokie Kailahun Office
Mr. Rashid Sandey Makeni Office
Mr. Josef Kamara Bo Office
27. Centre for Victims of Torture/Kailahun

Ms. Sarah Crawford-Browne Clinical Advisor
Twenty-five Community Mental Health Workers
(eight women and seventeen men)
28. Agriconsulting S.P.A. Italy

Mr. Paulo Giralanda Program Director
Rehabilitation & Resettlement Program EU/GSL
Sourie Bayoh Deputy Programme Manager EC/SLRRP
Civil Society
29. Inter Religious Council

Rev. Alimamy Kanu Chairperson
30. Civil Society Movement

Mr. Bockarie Enssah National Youth Officer
31. Campaign for Good Governance

Ms. Valnora A. C. Edwin Human Rights Officer
Ms. Lovina E.A. Dumbuya Gender and Information Officer
32. Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PRIDE)

Mr. Allan Quee Director
Mr. Lawrence Sesay Project Coordinator
Mr. Justine A. Musa
33. National Forum for Human Rights

Mr. Alfred Carew Research & Information Officer
34. Center for Coordination of Youth Activities (CCYA)

Mr. Ngolo Katta National Coordinator
Local Implementing Partners
35. Bo
Mr. Jaward Sanuce Manager-Peleinahum Rural Development Project
(PRDP)
Pastor Sore E. S. Mansaray Student Services Coordinator
SLOIC / Bo Vocational Training Center
Mr. T.E.S. Lahai Carpentry Instructor SLOIC / BVTC
36. Kailahun
Ms. Satta Bannard Luawa Skills Training Center
Mr. Morrison A. Guser Inter-Religious Women’s Training Centre
Mr. Philip S. James Community Agricultural and
Skills Training Centre
Mr. Mustapha A. Klerk Humanist Watch Salone
Mr. Junisa Kallon United Furniture Workshop
Community Members
37. Ex-combatants
Kailahun: Three men and two women from Kailahun and surrounding area
Bo: Nine men and two women from Bo and surrounding area
Makeni: Approximately forty ex-combatants, of which two women
Freetown: Thirteen men
38. Paramount Chief

Kailahun: Mohamed Sama Kailondu Banya
39. Community Leaders

Bo: Five men
40. Women
Kailahun: Twenty-six women from Kailahun and surrounding area
Bo: Five women from Bo and the surrounding area
41. Youth
Kailahun: Seven men and one woman from Kailahun and surrounding area
Annex 7. Documents Reviewed
Arthy, Simon. 2003. Ex Combatant Reintegration: Key Issues for Policy Makers and
Practitioners, Based on Lessons from Sierra Leone.
Assessment Report of the Sierra Leone Disarmament, Demobilization and

Reintegration Programme. 2000.
Burton, Patrick, Johnson, Samuel, Peters, Krijn, Stavrou, Aki, Vincent, James. 2003.
Tracer Study and Follow-up Assessment of the Reintegration Component of Sierra
Leone’s Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programme.
Carlson, Kristopher & Mazurana, Dyan. 2004. From Combat to Community: Women
and Girls of Sierra Leone.
Comninos, Stelios, Stavrou, Aki, Stewart, Brian. Assessment of the Reintegration

Programmes of the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and
Reintegration. November 8 , 2002.
Echa Working Group. 2000. Harnessing Institutional Capacities in Support of The

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants.
Economic Community of West African States. 2001. Final Report: Third Meeting of
the UN-ECOWAS Government of Sierra Leone Coordination Mechanism.
Executive Secretariat, National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and

Reintegration (NCDDR). 2000 Phase III Joint Operational Plan (JOP, Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR).
Final Report: Survey on Reinsertion & Reintegration Assistance to Ex-combatants.

2002.
Farr, Vanessa, “Gendering Demilitarization as a Peacebuilding Tool.”, Bonn

International Center for Conversion, Paper 20, June 2002, BICC, Bonn 2002.
Jeremy Ginifer with Kaye Oliver, Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools: Sierra
Leone, Evaluation Report EV 647, London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
Cabinet Office, Ministry of Defence and HM Treasury, 2004.
Colin Gleichman, Michael Odenwald, Kees Steenken, and Adrian Wilkinson,

Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration. A Practical Field and Classroom
Guide, Swedish National Defence College, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Forsvarets
skolesenter, GTZ, 2004.
Government of Sierra Leone, National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization

and Reintegration, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme, July
15, 1998.
Hansen, Art, Nenon, Julie, and Wolf, Joy. 2002. Final Evaluation of the Office of
Transition Initiatives’ Program in Sierra Leone.
Humphreys, Macartan and Weinstein, Jeremy M., What the Fighters Say: A Survey of
Ex-Combatants in Sierra Leone June-August 2003 Interim Report: July 2004
Malan, Mark, Rakate, Phenyo and McIntyre, Angela, Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone,
UNAMSIL Hits the Home Straight, Chapter 2: Overview of Pre-UNAMSIL
Interventions, Published in Monograph No 68. Institute for Security Studies,
http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No68/Chap2.html.
Morse, Ted D and Knight, Mark. 2002. Lessons Learned from Sierra Leone
Disarmament & Demobilization of Combatants.
Multi-Country Demobilization Program, World Bank. 2004. Reintegration Study Tour

Report, Sierra Leone. February.
Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, World Bank. 2003. Joint

Supervision Mission Report. September-October.
Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary
United Front of Sierra Leone. Lomé. 7 July, 1999.
Peace Agreement between the Sierra Leone Government and the RUF “Abidjan
Accord”. 30 November, 1996.
Paul Richards, Steven Archibald, Khadija Bah, and James Vincent, Where Have All
the Young People Gone? Transitioning Ex-combatants Towards Community
Reconstruction After the War in Sierra Leone, November 30, 2003
Sierra Leone Government. Agreement on Cease-Fire and Cessation of Hostilities

between The Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and The Revolutionary
United Front (RUF).
Sierra Leone Government. National Recovery Strategy, 2002-2003.
Sierra Leone Government, Executive Secretariat of the National Committee for

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. 2000. Procedures Manual for
Disarmament and Demobilization of Combatants.
Sierra Leone Government, National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and

Reintegration & National Commission for Reconstruction, Resettlement and
Rehabilitation. 2000. Final Report on the: Project Launch Workshops.
Sierra Leone Government-RUF-UNAMSIL. “Meeting of the Joint Committee on

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration”. 15 May, 2001
Sierra Leone Government -RUF-UNAMSIL. “Meeting of the Joint Committee on

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration”. 2 June, 2001.

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration”. 17 July 2001.
Sierra Leone Government -RUF-UNAMSIL. “Meeting of the Joint Committee on

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration”. 10 August, 2001.

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration”. 18 September, 2001.

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration”. 11 October, 2001.

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration”. 8 November, 2001.

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration”. 17 January, 2002.
Government of Sierra Leone and UNICEF. 2002. “Memorandum of Understanding

between Executive Secretariat, National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization
and Reintegration (NCDDR) and UNICEF Freetown,” August.
UNICEF – Sierra Leone, “Protection of Children in the Disarmament, Demobilisation

and Reintegration Programme. Summary of Lessons Learnt,” October 2003.
UNIFEM, “Gender-aware Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR): A

Checklist.” http://www.womenwarpeace.org/issues/ddr/ddrenglish.pdf
United Nations. “Supporting the Political and Security Aspects of the Lomé Peace
Process”.
United Nations. Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN). “Report on

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration.” January 31, 2000.
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, DDR Coordination Section. “Human Security
Fund. Internal Monitoring & Evaluation Report.” August 2003.
World Bank. 2001 Summary Report of the: Sierra Leone Disarmament, Demobilization
and Reintegration Program and the Multi-donor Trust Fund. May.
World Bank. 2001. Demobilization & Reintegration Programming: A Learning Module

from the Transition from War to Peace Staff Development Program.
The World Bank. 1999-2003. The World Bank Administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund
(TF022604) for the Sierra Leone Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
Program, Progress Reports #1-13.
The World Bank, IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (TF-23248 IDA-33120

PPFI-Q0050 PPFI-Q0051 TF-50389) on a Credit in the Amount of US$ 25.0 million to
the Republic of Sierra Leone for a Community Reintegration and Rehabilitation,
December 22, 2003.
Annex 8. Methodology
I. Objectives
According to the Terms of Reference and initial conversations between Creative

Associates, Dr, Kai Kai from NCDDR, and Anton Baaré, a World Bank consultant, the
major objective of the evaluation was:
To learn lessons from Sierra Leone’s experience with disarmament, demobilization

and reintegration of male and female ex-combatants, the extent to which DDRP
had a conflict mitigating role and place these findings within the context of Sierra
Leone’s ongoing poverty reduction strategy.
II. Parameters for the Assessment:

The ToR outlined an approach that was to be participatory and based more on
qualitative than quantitative analysis. The original approach called for a series of
interviewed of World Bank staff, GOSL officials (including NCDDR, NaCSA, and the
various ministries), Implementing Partners, parallel program partners, donors such as
DFID and the EU, relevant international and national NGOs, community members, and
ex-combatants. It also called for research based on literature provided which included
numerous reports and evaluations. (Please see the reference list for details.) The
methodology was to be part field study and part desk study, which is what occurred.
The difference was in the length of stay in the field.
Due to contracting problems, the entire team was in the field for only two weeks and
did not enter the country until the beginning of May. (In March and April, the team
leader was in country for an additional three weeks while contract issues were being
sorted.) This was after the NCDDR office had closed and only two months before the
end date of the trust fund through which the evaluation was funded. The delay meant
that the team did not have as much field time as desired nor had access to many
NCDDR documents as most had been packed and stored. Trips outside of Freetown
were limited and the team only got to visit Bo, Makeni, and Kailahun. The team did
their best to compensate for the decrease amount of field time but this did impact their
ability to collect information first hand.
III. Team Members
The evaluation team consisted of the following people:
Gebreselassie Tesfamichael, Team Leader, DDR, and MDTF Specialist

Nicole Ball, DDR and Security Specialist
Julie Nenon, Monitoring and Evaluation, Reintegration, and Gender Specialist
The team was managed by Ruth Ann Hudsen and Paola Bobadilla of Creative
Associates and assisted in the field by Allen Quee, who provided logistical and
administrative assistance as well as the perspective of a local NGO and IP. The team
would like to thank Talking Drums Studio and IRC for their logistical and administrative
support for the field visits.
IV. Specific Questions
The evaluation team took into consideration the questions outlined below when
conducting the field and research portions of this evaluation. These came from the
ToR and in general, were broken out for four different groups: GOSL officials, donors
and the World Bank, NGOs and other Implementing Partners, and community
members – both ex-combatants and civilians.
Overall program design and implementation

Which internal and external factors have determined the design, management and
results of the program, including the transition from one phase to another, and the
program’s response to evolving needs?
How was the issue of child soldiers and women and girls affected by the conflict
addressed? Which explicit and implicit trade-offs were made between the duty of
Government and the international community to provide protection to these and
other vulnerable groups, and security priorities, including the extraction of weapons
from rebel groups and militia?
Which strategies and modalities were applied to ensure that protection issues were
addressed outside the DDRP per sé, but within a coherent national framework and
international response?
How was the initial program design organized and which design strategic choices
were made, including linkage of the TEP component to the CRRP and program
responsiveness to constraints and opportunities related to targeted assistance to
ex-combatants and addressing ex-combatant needs under community-based
programs?
What were the mechanisms applied in adjusting the program design to the
subsequent opportunities and constraints created by conflict and peace initiative
dynamics and regional and international engagement; including the evolution of the
DDRP from a government program to a negotiated program incorporated in the
Lomé peace agreement and adjustments made after May 2000?
How have issues such as political prioritization, public attention, and demand for
speed and visibility influenced the program design and implementation?
Were the program objectives clear and how were they translated into strategies,
actions and activities?
Did the DDRP staffing, including long-term and short-term technical assistance
adequately correspond to the tasks to be performed?
At which point did the program address the need for an exit strategy and what
actions were taken?
Disarmament
How did procedures and criteria used in the eligibility and certification process, as
well as the extent to which these procedures were actually implemented and
adhered to, impact on the inclusion/exclusion of combatants as verified DDRP
beneficiaries?
How did the DDRP monitor the disarmament process and which venues and
mechanisms have been used to provide ECOMOG and UNAMSIL with feed-back?
Demobilisation/Reinsertion
How were the demobilization centers managed during the subsequent DDRP
phases?
How was the reception and orientation process, including the separation of adults
from children, designed, operationalized and implemented?
How did reintegration interviews conducted by NCDDR staff in the demobilization

centers eventually facilitate the planning and coordination of reintegration
activities?
How was Pre-Discharge Orientation (PDO) implemented during the subsequent

DDRP phases? What were the relevance, effect and impact of these exercises?
Assess the Transitional Safety Net Allowance modality of the DDRP.
Reintegration
Assess the settling-in packages provided;
Assess the arrangements through which the NCDDR coordinated with UNICEF and
other child protection agencies to facilitate the reinsertion and reintegration of child
ex-combatants;
Assess the coordination between NCDDR and NCRRR on interaction with relevant
chiefdoms to encourage reconciliation and facilitation of access to land for ex-
combatants;
Assess the provision of reintegration related information, counseling and referral

services at national, regional and district level;
Assess the Training and Education Programme (TEP) in the context of a present
and future job market in a war torn country, and the degree in which vocational
skills acquired contributed to creative livelihood strategies other than the particular
vocation trained for;
Assess TEP operation modalities, including its procedures for generating and
approving sub-projects and its use of a service provider/implementing partner
modality of operation;
Assess the contribution to the DDRP’s immediate objective of the NCDDR ex-
combatants components of NCDDR ‘parallel partners’ including the Community
Reintegration Programme, the GTZ program and activities initiated/managed by
UNAMSIL’s DDR Unit, including the Human Security Fund;
Monitoring and Evaluation

Which monitoring and evaluation mechanisms were put in place? Assess how
these mechanisms have contributed to (i) program transparency and accountability
as regards controls on eligibility and accountability; (ii) qualitative and quantitative
information on the effect of adopted procedures on the timeliness of delivery of
benefits by NCDDR.
Funding
Assess the design, operational modalities, implementation and management of the
MDTF
Assess the FMPU modality, including a cost-benefit analysis of this option
Coordination/Programme coherence
Map and assess the key policy and implementation coordination and collaboration
mechanisms used at national and international level, including joint reviews, special
meetings, donor conferences, and Consultative Group
V. Reports
The team was originally supposed to turn in an inception report and notes from the
workshop as well as the evaluation report. However, as the inception workshop was
cut for budgetary reasons and the final workshop has yet to occur, the team is
submitting only the evaluation report.
Annex 9. Timeline of Key DDR Related Events
1991:
- Attacks by Revolutionary United Front (RUF) start, which eventually led to

engagement by the Civil Defense Forces, over 20,000 people killed, thousands
maimed and over 2 million displaced – 500,000 of who fled to neighboring
countries.
1992:
- In April, a military coup by the National Provisional Ruling Council ousts President
Joseph Momoh and places Valentine Strasser as head of state.
- In November, a major NPRC offensive against the RUF
1993:
- In March, ECOMOG troops relocate from Liberia to Freetown to assist the NPRC
against the RUF.
1996:
- In January, Strasser is overthrown in a coup and replaced by Julius Maada Bio.
- In March, Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah is elected president.
- In November, President Kabbah and RUF head, Foday Sankoh, sign the Abidjan
Peace Agreement.
1997:
- In May, President Kabbah was deposed by Armed Forces Revolutionary Council

(AFRC). Johnny Paul Koroma became head of state.
- In October, the Conakry Peace Plan was signed by the AFRC and ECOWAS
1998:
- In March, AFRC ousted by ECOMOG and Kabbah restored power.
- In July, UNOMSIL formed.
- In August, Phase I of the DDR process begins. The DDRP originally target 45,000
combatants of RUF, SLA (Sierra Leone Army) and Civil Defense Forces (CDF).
The immediate objective was to assist combatants to lay down their arms and
reintegrate into their respective communities. The ultimate goal was to support
national strategy for peace that includes the consolidation of the political process
and security which form the basis for a viable post war national recovery program.
- The Government’s National Commission for DDR (NCDDR) was responsible for
overall policy and programme guidance. An independent Executive Secretariat
which reported to the NCDDR was established, headed by an Executive Secretary,
and was responsible for overall programme planning and implementation.
- In December, Phase I of the DDR process is aborted due to resumed fighting.
1999:
- In January, RUF/ex AFRC overran Freetown. ECOMOG regain control of the city
but more than 5000 people perished and thousands were abducted, many used as
sex slaves, forced labor, or compelled to join RUF ranks.
- In July, Lomé Peace Agreement (LPA) signed by President Kabbah and Foday
Sankoh.
- In October, UNAMSIL established.
- In October, the DDR process was reactivated, marking the beginning of Phase II.
The program was reviewed and adjusted according to the LPA. A Joint
Operational Plan (JOP) guided multi agency efforts inter alia involving Government,
ECOMOG, UNAMSIL, UNICEF and WFP.
- In November, the National Unity government was formed with Kabbah, Foday
Sankoh (RUF) and Johnny Paul Koroma (AFRC). RUF register as political party
and disarmament began underway. Implementation of LPA proceeded under
ECOMOG. The first UNAMSIL troops arrive.
2000:
- In April, ECOMOG transferred security responsibility to UNAMSIL.
- In May and the immediate months following, RUF abducted UN peacekeepers and
advanced on Freetown while 1000 demobilized rearmed. Civil society
demonstrators were fired upon and some killed by Foday Sankoh’s guards. In
response to the incidents, Sankoh and other RUF leaders were eventually
imprisoned. British paratroopers repulsed the RUF advance and defeated
renegade AFRC fighters. RUF released UN peacekeepers and named field
commander, Issa Sesay, its interim leader. Government ratified a treaty to
establish a special court to try the most egregious violators of international human
rights and Sierra Leone laws.
- In May, the TSA’s were halted due to outbreak of hostilities among fighting forces.
- The period of May ‘00 to May ‘01 is considered an interim phase for DDRP. It was
characterized by negotiations with RUF, mainly for release of UN hostages; a
ceasefire agreement signed in Abuja in November and another in April ‘01. The
latter agreement led to setting up of Joint (RUF, CDF, GOSL, UNAMSIL)
Committee on DDR deciding on political way forward including timing and
sequencing of districts.
- In June, the government and the World Bank arranged for a workshop to review the
status of the DDRP. All stakeholders to peace process (GOSL, UNAMSIL, Donors,
Civil Society, NGO, and ex combatants) were brought together to review DDR and
agree on way forward. This followed by comprehensive technical review of
program in November.
- In November, Government and RUF agreed to cease fire which was generally
observed for 6 months. However, few combatants disarmed and RUF and Liberian
elements effected incursions into Guinea. The ensuing fighting displaced 15,000
inhabitants and led to the premature repatriation of 1000 of Sierra Leonean
refugees residing in Guinea.
2001:
- In May, the UN adopted sanctions against Liberian government intended to deter it

from fostering instability in Mano River region. The GOSL and RUF agreed to
peace building actions that began demobilization of all combatants.
- The first meeting of the Joint Committee which marks the start of Phase III of the
DDR process.
2002:
- In January, all combatants demobilized. All parties to the conflict issued a

declaration of End of War. Since DDR program resumed, cross border fighting
between RUF and Guinean forces ceased. Liberia however remained under UN
sanctions, internal armed conflict in the northwest recommenced, resulting in the
influx of thousands of Liberian refugees into Sierra Leone as well as premature
repatriation of Sierra Leonean refugees.
2003:
- In February, NCDDR adopted a work plan to implement strategy to:

1. Close down DDR program and support structure by December 31 ‘03
2. Fulfill the GOSL commitment to ex combatants by completing on going
reintegration support and offering short term reintegration opportunities to the
remaining caseload of ex combatants
3. Address the transitional issues in order to harness the conflict mitigation

achievement of the program by ensuring the inclusion of ex combatants in
medium to long term community recovery and reintegration efforts.
Any need to add the final points, such as Program closed on time, as planned, in Dec.
2003; MDTF closed on time in June 2004.
Annex 10. Terms of Reference
TERMS OF REFERENCE
Evaluation Sierra Leone's Disarmament, Demobilisation And Reintegration Program

and
the World Bank Administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund (TF 022604)
5.1.0. CONTEXT
5.1.1 Despite its abundant natural resource endowment, significant wealth of well-educated
people and freedom from marked religious and ethnic strife, post-independence Sierra
Leone has had a tragic history, marred by extremely poor governance, gross economic
mismanagement and war. After growing 4% annually in the 1960s, the economy
deteriorated sharply the next two decades as a result of rampant corruption, massive
state intervention, concentration of state spending on the non-poor, dismantling of
local government, and economic policies than held back overall economic activity and
heavily taxed agriculture and the rural population. Real GDP per capita peaked in 1970,
and during 1971-89, a period of poor governance, GDP per capita dropped by over a
third. By 1990, 82% of the population lived below the poverty line, and Sierra Leone had
one of the most skewed income distributions in the world (a Gini Index of 66).
5.1.2 Against this domestic backdrop, and also propelled by the drive of regional actors to
control diamond fields in Sierra Leone and the rest of the Mano River Basin, attacks
by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) from Liberia started sporadically in 1991
but quickly spread throughout the countryside. In effect, the RUF, with backing of
armed elements and financial support from the sub-region and elsewhere, employed
terror tactics that gave them a power disproportionate to their numbers. The state,
moreover, did little to combat them, until they started to overrun cities, when the
Civil Defense Forces, mercenaries and Nigerian-led ECOWAS Military Observer
Group (ECOMOG) forces fought back.
5.1.3 A decade of predatory war killed 20,000 people, maimed thousands, and displaced
over 2 million people, 500,000 of whom fled to neighbouring countries. It prompted a
mass exodus of professionals and businessmen, doubled Freetown's population to
perhaps 2 million and wrecked most of the infrastructure, businesses and much of the
housing stock. GDP per capita halved during the course of the war. Thus, by 2000, GDP
per person was only one-third of the 1970 peak, and Sierra Leone had fallen to the
bottom of the UN Human Development Index. Moreover, the war has contributed to an
incipient HIV/AIDS epidemic.
5.1.4 In 1997, President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, elected in 1996, was deposed by the Armed
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), which governed until February 1998, when it
was ousted by ECOMOG and President Kabbah restored to power. In January 1999,
RUF/ex AFRC forces overran Freetown. ECOMOG regained control of the city but
more than 5000 people perished and thousands were abducted, many were used as sex
slaves, forced labor or compelled to join RUF ranks. In July 1999, efforts by ECOWAS
and the UN culminated in the Lomé Peace Agreement' (LPA), which galvanized
international backing to end the bloodshed and provided the framework for resumption of
donor support to Sierra Leone.
5.1.6 Hopes for Peace Dashed. President Kabbah, Foday Sankoh (RUF) and Johnny Paul
Koroma (AFRC) participated in a National Unity Government from November 1999. The
RUF registered as a political party, and disarmament got underway. Implementation of
the LPA preceded until April 2000, when security support was transferred from
ECOMOG to UN peacekeepers--UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). That
month, the RUF abducted hundreds of UN peacekeepers, seized a large cache of
war materiel, and advanced on Freetown, while thousands of demobilized fighters
rearmed. In response, Foday Sankoh and other RUF leaders were imprisoned. British
paratroops repulsed the RUF advance, and defeated renegade AFRC fighters. The
UK committed its rapid deployment force to Sierra Leone to retrain the army and police.
The RUF released the UN peacekeepers, and named a field commander, Issa Sesay,
its interim leader. In addition, Government ratified a treaty to establish a Special
Court to try the most egregious violators of international human rights and Sierra
Leonean laws, and the international community and diamond companies adopted a
certification regime to curb world traffic in conflict diamonds.
5.1.7 Against this background, in November 2000, Government and RUF agreed to a cease
fire which was generally observed during lithe next six months. However, few
combatants disarmed, and RUF and Liberian elements effected incursions into
Guinea. The ensuing fighting displaced 15,000 inhabitants and led to the premature
repatriation of thousands of Sierra Leonean refugees residing in Guinea. In May
2001, the UN Security Council adopted sanctions against the Liberian Government
intended to deter it from fostering instability and violence in the Mano River region,
including its role in trafficking conflict diamonds.
5.1.8 On May 2, 2001, Government and RUF agreed to peace-building actions that
culminated in the demobilisation of all combatants in January 2002. On January 18,
2002, all parties to the conflict issued a Declaration of End of War. 10. Sub-Regional
Developments. Since the DDR program was resumed, cross-border fighting between
RUF and Guinean forces ceased. Liberia, however, remained under UN sanctions,
internal armed conflict in the northwest recommenced, resulting in the influx of
thousands of Liberian refugees into Sierra Leone, as well as the premature repatriation
of Sierra Leonean refugees. Following intensification of the internal conflict in Liberia,
in early February 2002 the Liberian Government declared a state of emergency.
5.1.9 Two opposition groups, controlling between 60 and 80 percent of the country, launched
attacks on Government of Liberia (GOL) forces in attempts to oust President Taylor
from power. President Taylor resigned on August 11, 2003 after transferring power to
Moses Blah, Taylor's former Vice President, and departed the country for exile in
Nigeria. On August 17, GOL, LORD, and MODEL participants at peace negotiations in
Accra, Ghana signed a peace agreement allowing for a transitional government to
assume power on October 14. The parties to the agreement chose Gyude Bryant as
Chairman and Wesley Johnson as Vice-Chairman of the country's transitional
government.
5.1.10 On August 4, the vanguard Nigerian troops of the Economic Community of West
Africa Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) peace-keeping force began to arrive in Liberia.
ECOMIL expanded to include contingents from Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau, Ghana,
Senegal, Mali, Benin, Gambia, and Togo, for a total of 3,500 troops. On September
19, the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council voted to establish a peace-keeping force
for Liberia consisting of approximately 15,000 troops. The force will assist in
implementing the August cease-fire and peace agreement that aims to have
national elections by the end of 2005. The U.N. Mission in Liberia (IJNMIL) is
expected to reach its full strength of 15,000 troops within three months.
BACKGROUND OF THE DDRP
5.2.0 PROGRAMME OBJECTIVES
5.2.1 Immediately after President Kabbah was restored to power, the Government of Sierra
Leone (Government) in early 1998 took the initiative to design a comprehensive
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme (DDRP). Government
presented the DDR Program to the UN Special Conference in June 1998 and received
the backing of the international community to proceed.
5.2.2 The programme was originally designed to target an estimated 45,000 combatants,
comprising members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), former Sierra Leone
Army (SLA), and the Civil Defense Forces (CDF). The immediate objective of
the programme was to assist combatants to lay down their arms and reintegrate into their
respective communities. The ultimate goal was to support the national strategy for
peace that includes the consolidation of the political process and security, which form
the basis for a viable post war national recovery programme.
5.3.0 INSTITUTIONS
5.3.1 The Government's National Commission for Disarmament, demobilisation and

Reintegration (NCDDR) is responsible for overall policy and programme guidance.
An independent Executive Secretariat, which reports to the NCDRR, has been
established, headed by an Executive Secretary, is responsible for overall programme
planning and implementation.
5.4.0 PROGRAMME PHASES
5.4.1 Considerable efforts were made to initiate Phase I of the DDRP in June 1998 mainly
focusing on elements of the Armed Forces of Sierra Leone, which had surrendered to
ECOMOG. However, the process was aborted due to the escalation of fighting in late
1998 and early 1999, culminating in an attack on Freetown and the subsequent signing
of the Lomé Peace Agreement (LPA) on July 7, 1999.
5.4.2 Phase II of the programme was reactivated and implemented within the framework of
the Lomé Peace Agreement from October 1999. The process of disarmament and
demobilisation commenced with the active participation of the International community
and support of the various stakeholders. The programme was reviewed and adjusted,
and a Joint Operation Plan (JOP) guided multi-agency efforts inter alia involving
Government, ECOMOG, UNAMSIL, UNICEF, and WFP. However, the programme was
halted in May 2000 by the outbreak of hostilities among the fighting forces. This situation
continued until two ceasefire agreements were negotiated a year later.
5.4.3 In June 2000, all stakeholders to the Peace Process (Government, UNAMSIL, Donors,
Civil Society, NGOs, and Ex-Combatants) were brought together in a Consultative
Meeting to review the DDR and agree on an acceptable way forward. This was
followed by a comprehensive technical review of the programme in November 2000 for
the benefit of Government, UN, Donors and the domestic and international Community at
large.
5.4.4 The period from May 2000 to May 2001 was considered an Interim Phase for the
DDRP. It was characterised foremost by negotiations with the RUF, mainly for the
release of UN hostages, a ceasefire and discussion of a framework for resumption of the
disarmament process. A ceasefire agreement was signed in Abuja (Nigeria) in November
2000, and another agreement on the way forward signed later in April 2001. The latter
agreement led to the setting up a Joint RUF, CDF, Government and UNAMSIL
Committee on DDR. -deciding on political way forward including timing and
sequencing of districts. The first meeting of the committee was convened on 15 May
2001 in Freetown, Sierra Leone and this ushered in Phase III of the DDRP, which
started on 18 May 2001. On 18 January 2002, with Disarmament completed all over the
country, Government declared the eleven year rebel war officially over. The
demobilisation process was completed by February 2002.
5.5.0 DONOR CONORDINATION
5.5.1 In February 2001, a mini-CG was held in Freetown, on which occasion Government
and partners , inter alia, reviewed NCDDR's readiness to complete demobilisation. In
June 2001, the World Bank chaired a donors' meeting in Paris that marshalled funding to
conclude that process. A follow-up meeting on DDR was held in Freetown in February
2002, in conjunction with the 2002 UN Consolidated Appeal (CAP), on resources for
reintegration. At the November 2002 Consultative Group meeting in Paris, the
Government of Sierra Leone presented its strategy to complete its Disarmament,
demobilisation, and reintegration program to the international community.
Table I ' Levels of Disarmament/ demobilisation and Discharge by

Program Phases'
DISARMAMENT * PHASE I PHASE II INTERIM PHASE III TOTAL

189 1,982 402 PHASE 4.272 6,845
Children
Adults 2,994 16,916 2,226 43,509 65,645
Sub-total 3,183 18,898 ….2 47,781 _ 72,490
DEMOBILISATION
Children. 189 1,982 402 4,272 6,845
Adults 2,994 15,469 2,226 43,509 64,198
Subtotal 3,183 17,451 2,628 47,781 71,043
DISCHARGE *
Children 189 1,982 402 4,272 6.845
Adults 1,414 15,469 Z226 43,509 62,618
Sub-Total 1,603 17,451 2,628 47,781 69,463
5.6.0 PROGRAMME CLOSURE
5.6.1 In February 2003 the NCDDR adopted a Work Plan to implement this strategy. This
Work Plan aims at: (i) closing down the DDR program and support structure by 31
December 2003; (ii) fulfilling the Government's commitment to ex-combatants by
completing ongoing reintegration support and offering short-term reintegration
opportunities to the remaining caseload of ex-combatants; (iii) addressing transitional
issues in order to harness the conflict mitigation achievements of the program by
ensuring the inclusion of ex-combatants in medium to long-term community recovery
and reintegration efforts.
5.6.2 Programme achievements will include the disarmament of about 72,500 ex-
combatants. NCDDR projections are that by December 2003 around 48,200, or
85% of the DDRP's reintegration caseload will have completed the training offered
against a total reintegration caseload of around 56,750 ex-combatants is (see table
below).
DDRP’s Beneficiaries NCCDR September 2003

No. Ex-combatants
Total Nos. of Combatants Disarmed (phases I, Il, interim 72,490
Nos. of Ex-combatants Demobilised+ 71,043
Nos. of Ex-combatants Discharged + 69,463
Nos. of Child Ex-combatants Demobilised 6,845
Nos. of Ex-combatants Registered 1:o Receive 56,75 1
Reintegration
Nos. of Ex-combatants Having Received or Receiving 48,233
Reintegration Assistance
Discrepancy between the numbers disarmed. demobilised and discharged

reflects combatants lost during the January 1999 attack on Freetown and
those rearmed and remobilized during the Fall 2000 security breakdown at
the end of Phase It Total number includes children. Ex-combatants
considered "discharged" when they receive identification cards.
5.7.0 FUNDING
5.7.1 The DDRP has been funded from the World Bank administered Multi Donor Trust Fund
(MDTF), Government budgetary resources, funding from a World Bank credit, as well as
other bilateral support from, in particular, DFID. Through its Executive Secretariat the
NCDDR coordinates closely with other organizations, such as the UNAMSIL,
UNICEF, WFP, DFID, other bilateral partners, and NGOs, in the implementation of
specific DDR activities.
5.7.2 The MDTF for the Sierra Leone DDRIP was set up to facilitate broad donor support of
the DDRP. A consortium of eleven donors contributed US$ 35 million, estimated to cover
50% of the total programme costs.2 Support to the DDRP s disarmament component
was excluded. from the MDTF grant. Activities for which the Grant was given included:
• Screening, registration, and basic living provision for ex-combatants during their
transitional encampment period;
• Pre-discharge orientation, discharge and reinsertion of ex-combatants in to home
communities;
• Transitional social safety net allowances;
• Economic and social reintegration support for ex-combatants - including disabled

and child ex-combatants - through sub-projects, including training, community
rehabilitation, public works, civic education and counselling, national and
community information and sensitisation;
• Consultants' service for carrying out short-term and long-term studies and
provision of technical support to the programme;
• Operational audits of the trust fund, donor coordination and reporting.
5.7.3 Overview of MDTF donors and grant amounts (September 2003)
Donors Signed Commitments

United Kingdom 2,400,000
Germany 7,111,000
Norway ,077,000
Canada 1,987,000
Switzerland 1,:100,000
The Netherlands 7,50Q,000
Italy ' 82,000
Sweden 762,000
Denmark 24,000
European Commission 9,036,000
US 1 862,000
Total 35,141,000
2
NCDDR's estimate (June 2003) estimates the total programme cost at US$ 70 million.
This excludes considerable funding for the disarmament phase that has been absorbed in
the UNAMSIL budget and by different funding channels from the UK Government.
5.8.0 PARTNERS & PARALLE L PROGRAMMES
The Reintegration component of the DDRP, included (i) provision of a monetised settling-
in package; (ii) coordination with UNICEF and other child protection agencies; (iii)
facilitation of access to land together with NCRRR; (iv) information, counselling, and
referral services; and, (v) an employment, vocational training and apprenticeship fund for
a Training and Education Programme (TEP). The TEF/TEP was spearheaded and
funded from an IDA credit under the Community Reintegration and Rehabilitation Project
(CRRP) implemented by the National Commission for Reconstruction, Resettlement, and
Rehabilitation (NCRRR).
5.8.2 Based on an analysis of capacities within Government at the time, and an assessment
of alternative options, it was agreed between Government and the World Bank that a
capable firm would be contracted through international tendering procedures to operate
the Financial Management and Procurement Unit (FMPU) responsible for ensuring
that all contracting, procurement, disbursement and financial management function
required under the DDRP and the CRRP be carried out in accordance with standard and
accepted guidelines of the donor agencies supporting the two programmes; this
includes the MDTF funding.
5.8.3 The DDRP was designed to provide targeted assistance to ex-combatants, although as a
matter of policy the NCDDR has always encouraged DDRP beneficiaries (commonly
referred to as 'ex-combatants') to participate in community programmes. A number of
parallel community programmes, in particular the DFID funded Community
Reintegration Programme (CRP), and project supported under the UN Human Security Fund
(UN-HSF), have incorporated 'NCDDR ex-combatants' under specific arrangements
with the NCDDR. From the outset, NCDDR and UNICEF negotiated a
Memorandum of Understanding (199?) under which child combatants were separated
from adult as early as possible, and were provided assistance in a parallel programme
under the auspices of UNICEF and its partners.
5.9.0 EVALUATION OBJECTIVES
5.9. 1 The major objectives of the evaluation are:

a. Strategic objective: to learn lessons from Sierra Leone's experience with
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of male and female ex-combatants,
and apply these to national poverty and conflict mitigation strategies, as well as to
increased conflict management capacity of regional organisations.
5.10.0 SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES:
a. Assess the overall relevance, impact and connectedness/sustainability of the

DDRP in relation to the ultimate goal of supporting the national strategy for
conflict mitigation and sustainable peace, and place these findings within the
context of Sierra Leone's ongoing poverty reduction strategy;
b. Assess and document the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and

connectedness/sustainability of the Sierra Leone DDRP in relation to the
programme's immediate objective;
c. Identify "lessons learnt" and relate these to the above sequence of phases of Sierra
Leone's conflict with a view to contribute to improving the policy, strategy and
operational aspects of DDRPs, including design, organization and financial
management, and implementation of similar interventions in a peace
negotiation/peacekeeping context;
d. The application of the evaluation's findings and lessons learnt to support

increased conflict response and conflict mitigation capacity in the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
5.1 1.0 EVALUATION TARGET GROUPS;
5.1 1.1 The target groups of the evaluation are:

a. The World Bank and MDTF Donors;
b. Various close stakeholders, i.e. UN DPKO, UNAMSIL, UNICEF and other
UN system agencies, international humanitarian organizations, (governmental and
non-governmental, including commercial), and international NGO's;
c. ECOWAS member governments;
d. Government of Sierra Leone, arid its institutions involved in, in particular, security
sector reform, youth and gender- social policies and programmes, and community
reconstruction;
e. Sierra Leonean civil society and general public.
5.1 1.2 Furthermore the development community at large, academics and the general public
interested in the area of transition from emergency to rehabilitation and development
are an important target audience in relation to the findings of the evaluation.
5.12.0 Scope of work

5.12.1 As described in the Context and Background section of these ToR, since 1998 the DDRP
has gone through several iterations in response to developments and setbacks in the
Sierra Leone's peace process. The initial programme design and implementation of what
came to the Phase I took place in the period after the May 25t1i 1997 coup led by the
SLA, and was implemented in 1998 after the restoration of Sierra Leone's elected
government and at a time when UNAMSIL, just was taking over from ECOMOG. It was
during this period that the local militia now known as the CDF proliferated. The second
phase of .the DDRP was framed in the Lomé peace agreement of July 5, 1999. Lastly,
Phase III took place after a near meltdown of the peace-keeping mission in May 2000 that
was only averted by a UK military invention. I n this respect, the evaluation shall place the
responses by the various actors in the current political context and opportunity and
constraints .framework present the time of 'actions and reactions.
5.12.2 The main focus of the evaluation is on the processes involved in maintaining a
Government led, and regionally and internationally assisted, response to issues related
to demobilisation, reinsertion and reintegration of ex-combatants as a key conflict
management measure aiming at reconstituting an enabling social environment for early
recovery and development.
5.12.3 As mentioned, technical aspects of the programme's disarmament component are

not within the evaluation's remit. However, the evaluation is expected to cover the
implications of disarmament modalities for the demobilisation, reinsertion and
reintegration components of the DDRP.
5.12.4 Summing up the focus of the evaluation will be describing and assessing the following:
a. The process of how the DDRP through national efforts and external assistance
evolved from the initial response to a mutinous army, to an instrument incorporated
in a formal peace agreement implemented in close coordination with what became
the then largest UN peace keeping operation, and eventual phase-out under
circumstances relatively conducive for government reform and community driven
development;
• The coordination and interplay between various actors;
• The plans, strategies and timing for the intervention;
• The administrative/logistical set-up;
• The impact of the assistance.
• Relevance of experience:, for regional capacity building
b. Actors who played important roles during the process include
• Government of Sierra Leone Agencies
• The World Bank
• DFID
• Other bilateral partners under the MDTF
• European Commission
• USAID
• UNICEF
• WFP
• ECOMOG
• ECOWAS
• UNAMSIL
• National NGOs
• International NGOs
5.13.0 KEY ISSUES
5.13. 1 The evaluation should cover but not be limited to key issues below
a. Overall programme design and implementation
• Which internal and external factors have determined the design, management and
results of the programme, including the transition from one phase to another,
and the programme's response to evolving needs?
• How was the issue of child soldiers and women and girls affected by the
conflict addressed? Which explicit and implicit trade-offs were made between
the duty of Government and the international community to provide protection to
these and other vulnerable groups, and security priorities, including the
extraction of weapons from rebel groups and militia?
• Which strategies and modalities were applied to ensure that protection issues
were addressed outside the DDRP per se, but within a coherent national
framework and international response;
• How was the initial programme design organised and which design strategic
choices were made, including linkage of the TEP component to the CRRP and
programme responsiveness to constraints and opportunities related to targeted
assistance to ex-combatants and addressing ex-combatant needs under community
based programmes?
• What were the mechanisms applied in adjusting the programme design to the
subsequent opportunities and constraints created by conflict and peace initiative
dynamics and regional and international engagement; including the evolution of
the DDRP from a government programme to a negotiated programme
incorporated in the Lomé peace agreement arid adjustments made after May 2000.
• How have issues such as political prioritisation, public attention, and demand for
speed and visibility influenced the programme design and implementation?
• Were the programme objectives clear and how were they translated into strategies,
actions and activities?
• Did the DDRP staffing, including long-term and short-term technical assistance
adequately correspond to the tasks to he performed?
• At which point did the programme address the need for an exit strategy and what
actions were taken.
b. Disarmament
• How did procedures and criteria used in the eligibility and certification process, as
well as the extent to which these procedures were actually implemented and
adhered to, impact on the inclusion/exclusion of combatants as verified DDRP
beneficiaries;
• Flow did the DDRP monitor the disarmament process and which venues and
mechanisms have been used to provide ECOMOG and UNAMSIL with feed-
back?
c. Demobilisation/Reinsertion
• How were the demobilisation centres managed during the subsequent DDRP
phases?
• How was the reception and orientation process, including the separation of adults
from children, designed, operationalised and implemented?
• How did reintegration interviews conducted by NCDDR staff in the demobilisation
centres eventually facilitate the planning and coordination of reintegration
activities?
• How was Pre-Discharge Orientation (PDO) implemented during the subsequent
DDRP phases? What were the relevance, effect and impact of these exercises?
• Assess the Transitional Safety Net Allowance modality of the DDRP.
d. Reintegration
• Assess the settling-in packages provided;
• Assess the arrangements through which the NCDDR coordinated with UNICEF
and other child protection agencies to facilitate the reinsertion and reintegration of
child ex-combatants;
• Assess the coordination between NCDDR and NCRRR on interaction with
relevant chiefdoms to encourage reconciliation and facilitation of access to land for
ex-combatants;
• Assess the provision of reintegration related information, counselling and referral
services at national, regional and district level;
• Assess the Training and Education Programme (TEP) in the context of a present
and future job market in a war torn country, and the degree in which vocational
skills acquired contributed to creative livelihood strategies other than the particular
vocation trained for;
• Assess TEP operation modalities, including its procedures for generating and
approving sub-projects and its use of a service provider/implementing partner
modality of operation;
• Assess the contribution to the DDRP's immediate objective of the NCDDR ex
combatants components of NCDDR `parallel partners' including the Community
Reintegration Programme, the GTZ programme and activities initiated/managed by
UNAMSIL's DDR Unit, including the Human Security Fund;
e. Monitoring and Evaluation

• Which monitoring and evaluation mechanisms were put in place? Assess how these
mechanisms have contributed to (i) programme transparency and accountability
as regards controls on eligibility and accountability; (ii) qualitative and
quantitative information on the effect of adopted procedures on the timeliness of
delivery of benefits by NCDDR.
f. Funding
• Assess the design, operational modalities, implementation and management of the M
DTF
• Assess the FMPU modality, including a cost-benefit analysis of this option
g. Coordination/Programme coherence
• Map and assess the key policy and implementation coordination and collaboration
mechanisms used at national and international level, including joint reviews,
special meetings, donor conferences, and Consultative Group meetings.
EVALUATION APPROACH AND PROCESS
5.14.0 APPROACH
5.14.1 The evaluation should be based on a stakeholder approach, where all groups and
individuals, who affect and/or are affected by the achievement of the programme
objectives, are involved in the analysis. Moreover, the evaluation will take into
consideration the social, political and economic context, which affect the overall
performance of the programs.
5.14.2 In general, the evaluation shall be undertaken following the five evaluation criteria:
relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability/connectedness.
5.14.3 Relevance is concerned with assessing whether the activities is in Iine with local
needs and priorities (as well as with donor policies). Humanitarian and transitional activities
have to be tailored to local needs, increasing ownership, accountability, and cost
effectiveness accordingly (Minear, 1994). `Relevance' refers to the overall goal and
purpose of a programme, whereas `appropriateness' is more focused on the activities
and inputs.
5.14.4 Efficiency is a measure of the "productivity" of the programmes, i.e. to what

degree the outputs achieved derive from efficient use of financial, human and material
resources. To what degree the outputs achieved been delivered as agreed? Could it have
been done better, more cheaply and more quickly? Did the project activities achieve
the desired outputs? Did the inputs efficiently contribute to the achievement of
outputs? Could similar outputs have been obtained at lower costs? Were activities
timely implemented, and if not, did delays result in the need for additional resources
and/or time? Were organisational arrangements adequate for an optimal cost-efficiency?
What were the strengths and weaknesses in management and co-ordination of the various
stakeholders involved? Could these weaknesses have been anticipated and avoided?
How strong is the sense of ownership at various levels? How efficient were approaches/
methods for the achievement of outputs?
5.14.5 The analysis of effectiveness shall indicate to what extent objectives have been
achieved, or can he expected to be achieved. This includes assessing and analysing
coherence covering issues such as effective division of labour among actors, maximising
the comparative advantages of each and strengthening local capabilities.
5.14.6 An evaluation of impact includes an assessment of the positive and negative effects
of the programmes. Unlike effectiveness, which is a more narrow evaluation, the
concept of impact is a far broader one, as it includes both positive and negative
consequences, whether these are foreseen and expected, or not. A comprehensive impact
evaluation help answering the fundamental question: - do the positive effects of the
intervention outweigh the negative ones?
5.14.7 Sustainability/connectedness. Of particular interest are measuring the long-term

impacts of the interventions. To what extent does the positive impact justify the
investments? Are the involved parties willing and able to keep components or activities
going and continue on their own? It is of utmost importance that the activities are
carried out in a context, which takes longer-term and interconnected problems into
account. Whether, in responding to acute and immediate needs, they take the longer-
term into account. This has been has referred to this as "connectedness"; the need "to
assure that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context
which takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account" (Minear, 1994).
OECD (p.22).
5.14.8 The evaluation will be carried out in an objective, sensitive and perceptive manner
with varied and balanced consideration of both positive and negative aspects.
5.14.9 The evaluation will require extensive review of existing documentation with
particular attention to evaluations and evaluative studies, consultations with senior and
operational managers and field staff of involved agencies, as well as
consultations/interviews with a
sample of beneficiaries. This also includes comparative studies on reintegration
projects involving other donors, other geographic locations, and alternative
implementation strategies.
5.14.10 The approach of the evaluation shall be participatory, that is, be flexible in design and
implementation, ensure stakeholder participation and ownership, and facilitate learning
and feedback. Through active involvement, the evaluation should utilize the knowledge
and experiences of stakeholders, who played an important role during the process of
Sierra Leone's Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Program and the World
Bank administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund.
5.14.1 1 The evaluation consists of the following steps/phases:

a. Inception. The Team Leader's will conduct an inception visit to Sierra Leone and the
full team will analyse of available documentation. An Inception Report shall be
prepared and include preliminary findings/selected statements, a detailed activity plan
including time and manpower schedules as well as assignment of responsibilities to
individual team members. The Evaluation ToR may be adjusted based on the findings
in the Inception Report.
b. Electronic and, possibly, teleconferencing interviews with key actors who have been
involved in at various stages will be organised concurrently with the inception and
fieldwork phases. The preliminary findings/selected statements shall serve as point of
departure for in-depth interviews with representatives of key stakeholders and selected
implementing organisations.
c. Fieldwork will be planned and organised in close collaboration with the agencies
concerned so as to get the optimal input from the stakeholders and also not duplicate
existing or ongoing surveys and studies. An inception workshop and a debriefing of
stakeholders will be organised at the outset and conclusion of the fieldwork, respectively.
5.14.12 Where data exists, impact assessment will be undertaken, but emphasis will also be
placed on identifying good practice in performance monitoring.
5.15.0 WORK PLAN
5.15.1 The Team Leader will visit Sierra Leone for initial consultations in January 2004
field work will be completed by late February 2003. A first daft report will be
ready for scrutiny by 31 March 2004. The final report shall be submitted not later
than two weeks after receiving consolidated comments in writing.
5.16.0 COMPOSITION OF TEAM
5.16.1 The team shall comprise the following competences:

• Evaluation experience;
• Conflict assessment/conflict resolution experience;
• Political sensitivity and experience with political processes at senior level
and Humanitarian /developmental experience; and
• Social assessment experience
5.17.0 DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE
Year Programme documents/Review/assessment
1998 ° Programme start (national document)
1999 ° MDTF Grant Agreement
° Review of DDRP as part of Lome Peace process
2000 ° Joint World Bank/DFID/DPKO review (October)
° Lessons learned exercise on disarmament and demobilisation

(April)
2002 ° Assessment of reinsertion component (October)

Assessment of reintegration component (October)
° Implementation Completion Report CRRP (partly covers DDR

reintegration) (Draft November)
2003 ° Social Assessment on ex-combatants and community conflict
dynamics
(Draft October)
° Tracer study on social and economic reintegration (Draft
December)
5.18.0 REPORTS & OUTPUT
5.18.1 The Team shall produce the following reports and submit to NCDDR Head Office -
(Executive Secretary):
a. Inception Report outlining the team's preliminary findings; (by second week of
operation)
(i) Notes from inception workshop in Freetown; if applicable, the Terms of

Reference for the mission should be adapted according to the preliminary
findings
b. Debriefing note concluding the fieldwork to be discussed in a workshop in
Freetown before departure.
c. Draft evaluation report
(I) Notes from a workshop discussing the draft evaluation report.
d. Final report & Reporting- within 4 weeks after receiving NCDDR comments on
Final Draft Report.

NCDDR (2004) Final Report

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NCDDR (2004) Final Report

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Peace in Sierra Leone:

Evaluating the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Process

The Final Evaluation of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

Creative Associates International Inc.

Executive Summary ..............................................................................................................v

5.5 Reconciliation ........................................................................................................68 Deleted: 51

5.6 Program Financing ................................................................................................69 Deleted: 65

Tables Deleted: 110

Table 4. Estimated Cost of DDR Program..........................................................................70 Deleted: 67

AFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary Council

NCDDR National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

2. DDR and the Root Causes of War

3. The Main Points of the NCDDR Program

3.1 Institutional Framework

National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (NCDDR).

Executive Secretariat of the NCDDR (ES/DDR). Previous DDR processes have

of the international support provided exceeded that of many previous international

3.2 Program Design

 Should There be Assistance to Combatants or Support to Communities? It is

 How do Programs Obtain Adequate Linkage to Long-term Recovery and

3.3 Program Implementation

Sound program design must be complemented by sound program implementation.

 Transitional Safety-Net Allowances/Reinsertion Benefit. There is widespread

 Choice of Vocational Training and Education as Reintegration Opportunities. The

 Psychosocial Impact. It is difficult to determine the psychosocial impact of the various

 Implementing Partners. One of the greater challenges in implementing reintegration

 Provision of toolkits. Toolkits were another problematic aspect of reintegration. In

 Employment. Unemployment and underemployment are large problems for Sierra

3.4 Program Financing

Managing Resources. Successful management was based on robust national ownership,

4.1 Political Lessons

• A post-conflict DDR process is a conflict mitigation mechanism; as such, it can make

• National ownership of a DDR process is essential.

4.2 Program Design and Implementation Lessons

• In designing a DDR program it is essential to understand the political and security

• Targeted reinsertion and reintegration assistance significantly assisted ex-

• Monitoring ex-combatants after the completion of the DDR process is necessary in

• A multi-pronged, gender-specific approach should be considered in future DDR

• Child combatants are a special vulnerable group, and it is important to include

• DDR processes must incorporate the principles of transparency, neutrality, and

• Efforts to enhance the capacity of the Implementing Partners need to be undertaken

4.3 Financial Management Lessons

• Multiple funding sources provided flexibility in responding to the varied needs of a

• Failure to fund DDR programs in a timely manner hinders implementation.

• A strong FMPU is critical for program implementation and integrity.

4.4 Programmatic Management Lessons

• Strong management leadership is key to operationalizing a DDR process.

4.5 Lessons Regarding Assistance to Individuals and Communities

• The payment of monetized reinsertion benefits and training allowances to former

4.6 Learning from Past Experience

In spring 2004, Creative Associates International Inc. (CAII) was commissioned to

According to the team’s terms of reference:

The main focus of the evaluation is on the processes involved in maintaining a

“There is the impression that the war brought

A successful DDR process helps to create an environment in which these fundamental

2 The Operating Environment

2.1 DDR and the Root Causes of War

During the transitional phase, “rebuilding the war-ravaged economy as well as

In order to provide the enabling environment to facilitate poverty

expectations for involvement in decision-making and desire for economic opportunity

Table 1. Policy Matrix, IPRSP

democratic accountability at all levels. While it is important to improve economic

2.2 DDR and the Regional Dimension

Should There be Assistance to Combatants or Support to Communities? It is

How do Programs Obtain Adequate Linkage to Long-term Recovery and

Transitional Safety-Net Allowances/Reinsertion Benefit. There is widespread

Choice of Vocational Training and Education as Reintegration Opportunities. The

Psychosocial Impact. It is difficult to determine the psychosocial impact of the various

Implementing Partners. One of the greater challenges in implementing reintegration

Provision of toolkits. Toolkits were another problematic aspect of reintegration. In

Employment. Unemployment and underemployment are large problems for Sierra